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Abstract 
Although the specifics of water utility ownership, regulation and management culture have 
been explored in terms of their impact on economic and customer value, there has been little 
meaningful engagement with their influence on the risk environment and risk management. 
Using a two phase case study approach as the primary source of information, this thesis asks 
what are the particular features of regulation, ownership arrangements and management 
culture which influence risk management, and what are the implications of these 
relationships in the context of ambitions for resilient organizations? In addressing these 
queries, the thesis considers the mindful choices and adjustments a utility must make to its 
risk management strategy to manage strategic tensions between efficiency, risk and delivery 
of safe drinking water. The case studies expose a tension between the ambition of the water 
service providers` strategic objectives to provide safe drinking water and the priority that 
executives place on corporate financial health. This leads to the conclusion that public health 
risk rankings need re-evaluation in relation to financial risks. There was no evidence to 
demonstrate that public health risk mitigation had been costed and evaluated against the 
strategic objectives of the studied organisations. Furthermore, the nature of risk 
conversations varied within organisations, changing the meaning of risk vertically within the 
business. A proposed model for the reporting of risk tolerance and risk appetite with respect 
to mitigating public health risk is the result. Such approaches to risk reporting and costing will 
support water authorities in meeting corporate aspirations to become ‘high reliability’ 
services while retaining the capacity to out-perform financial and service level targets, 
irrespective of regulation, ownership arrangements or management culture. 
 
3 
 
Acknowledgements 
I would like to thank my supervisors, Professor Paul Jeffrey and Professor Simon Pollard for 
their time, support and guidance through the research process. This has been particularly 
appreciated as I conducted the research off campus. I would also like to show my 
appreciation for the support given by Dr Martin Clarke of the Cranfield School of 
Management for his guidance on management research and in particular constructive 
realism.   My thanks also goes to those who contributed to the case study interview process, 
their answers provided the backbone of evidence used in the thesis.  I must also thank 
Scottish Water for supporting me in taking the initial step on my research journey. 
Finally I would like to thank my wife, Laura, for her support and understanding through life`s 
ups and downs over the course of the project.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
Table of Contents  
Abstract .................................................................................................................................. 2 
Acknowledgements................................................................................................................ 3 
Table of Contents ................................................................................................................... 4 
List of Figures ......................................................................................................................... 9 
List of Tables ........................................................................................................................ 12 
List of publications generated through the thesis ............................................................... 14 
Chapter 1: Context of Study .......................................................................... 15 
1.1 Managing risk within the water sector .......................................................................... 18 
1.2 Regulation and risk within the water sector .................................................................. 18 
1.3 Ownership arrangements and risk within the water sector .......................................... 23 
1.4 Management culture and risk within the water sector .......................................... 25 
1.5 The research landscape .......................................................................................... 27 
1.6 Aims and objectives ................................................................................................ 29 
1.7 Terminology ............................................................................................................ 31 
1.7.1 Regulation .......................................................................................................... 31 
1.7.2 Ownership Arrangements .................................................................................. 32 
1.7.3 Management Culture ......................................................................................... 33 
1.7.4 Risk Tolerance and Appetite .............................................................................. 33 
1.7.5    Governance ........................................................................................................ 37 
1.8 Personal motivation for conducting the study .............................................................. 37  
1.9 Structure of thesis .......................................................................................................... 38 
Chapter 2: Literature Review ........................................................................ 42 
2.1 Regulation and risk management .................................................................................. 42 
2.2 Ownership arrangements and risk management .......................................................... 47 
2.3 Management culture and risk management ................................................................. 54 
5 
 
2.4 Themes from the literature and application to this thesis ............................................ 57 
2.5 Refinement of the research agenda and research question ......................................... 59 
Chapter 3: Methodology ............................................................................... 63 
3.1 A Constructive Realist approach to qualitative analysis ................................................ 65  
3.2 Building a conceptual framework .................................................................................. 67  
3.3 Producing the field work agenda ................................................................................... 67 
3.3.1 Research Strategy ........................................................................................... 68 
3.3.2 Research strategy choice ................................................................................ 69 
3.3.3 The researcher`s relationship with the study subjects ................................... 71 
3.4 The case study approach ............................................................................................... 73 
3.4.1 The data .......................................................................................................... 75   
3.4.2 Design of Phase I ............................................................................................. 76   
3.4.3 Design of Phase II ............................................................................................ 77   
3.5 Design of data collection................................................................................................ 78 
3.6 Interview survey methodology and approach to question design ................................ 81 
3.7 Collection of documented performance data ............................................................... 86 
3.8 Ethical considerations and confidentiality ..................................................................... 86  
3.9 Considerations of bias within the sample set and influence on responses .................. 88 
3.10 Approach to Data Analysis ........................................................................................... 89 
3.10.1 Coding and the strategy for code construction ............................................ 90   
3.10.2 Developing the coding networks and inter-relationships ............................ 94 
3.10.3 Capturing data using field notes and analytical memos ............................... 94 
3.10.4 Independent validation of data analysis ....................................................... 96 
6 
 
3.11 Reporting results .......................................................................................................... 99 
3.12 Summary ...................................................................................................................... 99 
Chapter 4: Results – Phase I .........................................................................101 
4.1 Purpose of Phase I........................................................................................................ 101 
4.2 Scope of Phase I ........................................................................................................... 102 
4.3 Phase I Specific Methodology ...................................................................................... 102 
4.4 Data analysis: interviews ............................................................................................. 104 
4.4.1 Organisation ambition, regulation and risk management ........................... 105 
4.4.2 The interplay between ownership arrangements and regulation ............... 112 
4.4.3 Perceptions of risks that should concern the business ................................ 120 
4.4.4 The characterisation of risk at different levels of accountability ................. 126 
4.4.5 Governance Structures that influence risk management approaches ......... 130 
4.5 Emerging themes and Conclusions .............................................................................. 136 
Chapter 5: Research Activity – Phase II ....................................................... 140 
5.1 Purpose of Phase II....................................................................................................... 140 
5.2 Scope of Phase II .......................................................................................................... 141 
5.3 Phase II Specific Methodology ..................................................................................... 141 
5.3.1 Selection of Actors within Organisations ...................................................... 148 
5.4 The case study candidates ........................................................................................... 149 
5.4.1 United Kingdom Case A ................................................................................ 149 
5.4.2 United Kingdom Case B ................................................................................. 152 
5.4.3 France Case C ................................................................................................ 154 
5.4.4 Portugal Case D ............................................................................................. 155 
7 
 
5.4.5 Canada Case E ............................................................................................... 157 
5.4.6 Comparison of selected metrics of cases ..................................................... 159 
5.5 Phase II interviews ....................................................................................................... 162 
5.5.1 Strategic Objectives ...................................................................................... 164 
5.5.2 Financing investment in infrastructure ........................................................ 171 
5.5.3 Management culture and risk management ................................................ 186 
5.5.4 Risk management.......................................................................................... 195 
5.5.5 Politics, ownership arrangements, regulation and risk ................................ 203 
Chapter 6: Discussion .................................................................................. 212 
6.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................. 212 
6.2 Discussion of Phase I findings ...................................................................................... 214 
6.3 Discussion of Phase II findings ..................................................................................... 218 
6.4 Regulation and risk within the water sector ................................................................ 219 
6.5 Ownership arrangements and risk within the water sector ........................................ 221 
6.6 Management culture and risk within the water sector ............................................... 224 
6.6 Summary ...................................................................................................................... 226 
Chapter 7: Conclusions ................................................................................229 
7.1 Development of a conceptual framework based on the case study outputs ............. 230 
7.2 The research informing improvements to risk management practise ........................ 232 
7.3 Suggestions for improving risk reporting..................................................................... 233 
7.4 Answering the research question ................................................................................ 241 
7.5 The research findings and novelty of the project ........................................................ 249 
7.6 Limitations of the study ............................................................................................... 250 
8 
 
7.7 Recommendations for further work ............................................................................ 251 
References ......................................................................................................................... 255 
Appendices 
Appendix I – Ethics Committee Approvals and Confidentiality Agreement ...................... 261 
Appendix II – Codes generated using CAQDAS .................................................................. 267 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9 
 
List of Figures 
Figure 1.1 Scientific disciplines employed during the research project .............................. 31 
Figure 1.2 Simple representation of risk appetite with respect to company strategic 
objectives and risk tolerance ............................................................................................... 35 
Figure 1.3 Illustrative representation of risk appetite with respect to a company`s strategic 
objectives and risk tolerance. .............................................................................................. 36 
Figure 1.4 Thesis structure ................................................................................................... 39 
Figure 2.1 The influence of regulation on risk management .............................................. 47 
Figure 2.2 The influence of ownership arrangements on risk management ...................... 54 
Figure 2.3 The influence of culture on risk management .................................................... 57  
Figure 2.4 Conceptual framework of interdependencies that inform risk management 
strategy choices ................................................................................................................... 58 
Figure 3.1 Inductive and deductive research strategies (Easterby-Smith, 2008) ...............  70 
Figure 3.2 The cycle of inductive/deductive research strategies ........................................ 72 
Figure 3.3 Data collection and analysis process .................................................................. 80 
Figure 3.4 Example of application of codes to transcript text ............................................. 93 
Figure 3.5 Noticing, collecting and thinking. A simple representation of the analytical process 
used in CAQDAS. (Based on Saldana, 2009 and Friese, 2012) ............................................. 95 
Figure 3.6a Screen shot of coded section of an interview transcript from CAQDAS .......... 98 
10 
 
Figure 3.6b Screen shot of sub-section of an interview transcript (the same as in Figure 3.8a) 
from the validation exercise ................................................................................................ 98 
Figure 5.1 Number of code references for selected codes related to strategy and planning
............................................................................................................................................ 170 
Figure 5.2 Number of code references for selected codes related to financing ............... 170 
Figure 5.3 (a) Comparison of finance related coding frequencies between hierarchal groups 
(directors) ........................................................................................................................... 181 
Figure 5.3 (b) Comparison of finance related coding frequencies between hierarchal groups 
(managers) ......................................................................................................................... 182 
Figure 5.3 (c) Comparison of finance related coding frequencies between hierarchal groups 
(regulators) ........................................................................................................................ 182 
Figure 5.4 Frequency of the term “Customer experience” ............................................... 188 
Figure 5.5 Frequency of coding related to Efficiency targets ............................................ 189 
Figure 5.6 Frequency of coding related to OPA ................................................................. 190 
Figure 5.7 Frequency of coding related to reactive management .................................... 193 
Figure 5.8 (a) Comparison of risk management related coding frequencies between 
hierarchal groups (directors) ............................................................................................. 195 
Figure 5.8 (b) Comparison of risk management related coding frequencies between 
hierarchal groups (managers) ...........................................................................................  196 
Figure 5.8 (c) Comparison of risk management related coding frequencies between 
hierarchal groups (regulators) ..........................................................................................  196 
11 
 
Figure 5.9 Risk conversations within a utility .................................................................... 202 
Figure 5.10 Frequency of coding related to Political Intervention .................................... 208 
Figure 6.1 Conceptual framework of interdependencies that inform risk management 
strategy choice revisited .................................................................................................... 227 
Figure 7.1 Representation of risk impact with relative to risk appetite and tolerance values
............................................................................................................................................ 234 
Figure 7.1 Representation of the current risk profile at a point in time within the risk 
universe (taken from Figure 1.2) ........................................................................................ 235 
Figure 7.3 A representation of the impact on operational cost of various investment choices
............................................................................................................................................ 237 
Figure 7.4 A possible simple representation of changes to the financial impact of risk with 
investment choice .............................................................................................................. 239 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12 
 
List of Tables 
Table 1.1 Ownership arrangements, regulation and a range of parameters associated with 
water management across a selection of countries ............................................................ 22 
Table 2.1 Utility ownership arrangements in the water sector (adapted from Ruester and 
Zchille, 2010) .......................................................................................................................  49 
Table 3.1 Four research strategies and their logical approach ........................................... 69 
Table 3.2 Selection of social science methodologies (Yin, 2009) .......................................  73 
Table 3.3 Interview questions developed for Phase I case study and validation exercise 
based on the literature review output ................................................................................ 84 
Table 3.4 Open questions developed for Phase II case study and validation exercise (based 
on the output of Phase I and literature review) .................................................................  85 
Table 3.5 Ad-hoc conversations which provided supplementary qualitative data ............. 86 
Table 3.6 Selected codes identified during the Phase I open coding exercise .................... 92 
Table 4.1 Operational arrangements of UK water service providers ................................ 103 
Table 4.2 Summary of actors participating in the Phase I case study exercise ................. 105 
Table 5.1 Phase II interview candidate selection criteria .................................................. 142 
Table 5.2 Candidate jurisdictions for inclusion in Phase II ................................................ 145 
Table 5.3 Selected roles and their relative accountabilities within organisations ............ 149 
Table 5.4 Summary of some financial information reported by Case A ............................ 151 
Table 5.5 Summary of some financial information reported by Case B ............................ 153 
Table 5.6 Summary of some financial information reported by Case D ........................... 156 
Table 5.7 Summary of some financial information reported by Case E ............................ 158 
Table 5.8 Comparison of a range of business performance metrics for four of the 
participating organisations at the financial year end 2012 ............................................... 159 
13 
 
Table 5.9 Interviewee Identification Key ........................................................................... 164 
Table 5.10 Code summary for strategic objectives ........................................................... 169 
Table 5.11 Code summary for finances ............................................................................. 172 
Table 5.12 Summary of financing arrangements discussed by interviewees and implications 
for risk management .......................................................................................................... 183 
Table 6.1 Summary of interview themes and perceived importance to respondents ...... 217 
Table 6.2 Ownership arrangements of the case study candidates ................................... 222 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
List of publications generated through the thesis 
14 
 
ALLAN, R., JEFFREY, P., CLARKE, M. & POLLARD, S. 2013. The impact of regulation, ownership 
arrangements and management culture on managing corporate risk within the water 
industry. Water Policy, 15, 458-478. 
ALLAN, R., MAUELSHAGAN, C., LUIS, A. M., JEFFREY, P. and POLLARD, S. 2013. Making risk 
management stick: reflections on risk governance in water utilities.  In U. Borchers, J. Gray 
and K. C. Thompson (eds.), Water Contamination Emergencies: Managing the threats, RSC 
Publishing, Royal Society of Chemistry, Cambridge, ISBN 978-1-84973-441-7, pp.33-
46, DOI:10.1039/9781849737890-00033. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 1: Context of the Study 
15 
 
The management of risk to protect public health and the environment is arguably the 
principle purpose of any organisation or institution charged with the provision of water 
and waste water services (Pollard, 2008).  Internationally there is no real consensus on 
best practise in delivery of drinking water and wastewater services in terms of the 
ownership arrangements of the service providers. The majority of countries still provide 
drinking water and wastewater services through municipal public bodies with a growing 
number engaging the private sector to deliver elements of the service. Very few 
countries, with the exception of England and Wales, have a fully privatised water 
industry (Parker 2003, Owen, 2011). Here, privatisation is taken to mean the strategic 
water assets are owned, operated and maintained by a privately owned organisation.  
Furthermore there is no consensus internationally on the most effective regulatory 
regime for protecting customer interests with respect to delivery of drinking water and 
wastewater services (Section 2.2). The operating environment for business in the water 
sector is complex (Parker, 2012), with service providers expected to manage aging 
infrastructure at a time when capital investment funding is limited, decisions need to be 
evidence based, and company performance is under public and regulatory scrutiny. 
Water Service providers are expected to manage multi-disciplinary activities from 
catchment to treatment, treatment to customer and from customer back to the 
catchments. The end to end process of water supply and wastewater treatment faces an 
array of threats to operability (and opportunities) which can be usefully described in risk 
terms.  The water companies are also obligated to completely assess, prioritise and 
manage risks in an environment of competing management objectives.  This thesis sets 
out to better understand the tensions between choices in regulation, ownership 
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arrangements and management culture; and the influence that this has on risk 
management. 
An understanding of the nature and impact of risk within the water sector can only be 
attained with reference to the societal role which water services play. Although it is not 
the intention of this thesis to itemise or delineate all relevant risks1, a broad overview of 
the central concerns that drive risk appreciation and management within the sector is 
warranted. The principal operational driver for any water and wastewater service 
provider is the delivery of fresh clean drinking water and the removal of wastewater in a 
safe and responsible manner. The Bonn Charter (2004) is the central statement of 
ambition here and constitutes a sectoral commitment setting the framework for the 
basic operational and institutional arrangements necessary for the provision of water 
and wastewater services, from source to tap. State and contractual performance 
measures provide operationally relevant targets but the Bonn Charter offers a (globally 
legitimate) consensus position on the principles of water service delivery. The primary 
objective of the Charter is to enable provision of good safe drinking water that has the 
trust of consumers. To achieve this, the service provider must aspire to provide water 
that is safe to drink, aesthetically pleasing and in sufficient volume at a cost that is 
considered good value for money. The Charter links this ambition to a consideration of 
risk, stating that; 
 ‘management control systems should be implemented to assess risks at all points 
throughout water supply systems and to manage such risks.’(p9)  
                                                             
1
 Within the Water Sector risk includes such elements as operational, economic, reputational, supply chain and 
technical risks. Within these broad risk categories there are sub-sets, for example, within economic risk there 
will be elements of risk associated with capital investment, operational costs, the cost of unplanned 
interruptions to supply, etc. This thesis does not intend to map out all relevant risk types. 
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A risk based approach to quality service delivery is also evident in the World Health 
Organisation’s (WHO) Drinking Water Quality Guidelines, which documents the 
requirements for the provision of safe drinking water based on a preventative risk 
management philosophy. The guidelines recommend the development and 
implementation of water safety plans (WSPs) and a detailed methodology for their 
development (WHO, 2002). 
The WSP approach is designed to assess the risks to the water supply by identifying 
mitigating actions that prevent raw water pollution from occurring; establishing 
appropriate treatment processes; and documenting risks to the water supply in 
distribution that prevent secondary contamination post treatment. These risks might 
relate to asset condition, financing, technology performance, skills & competencies, or 
any of a whole host of factors embedded within and without the utility’s corporate 
remit. The principles within the WSP approach are scalable from small rural supplies to 
larger networks that serve urban centres.  The WSP approach provides an important 
mechanism that enables water companies to take steps towards pro-active adaptive 
management, as discussed by Davidson and Deere (2005). Other contributions (e.g. 
Byleved et al., (2008)) build on this principle and explore the benefits of using safety 
plans to inform communication strategies when dealing with public health matters. Yet 
others, (Hrudey, 2001, Pollard et al., 2004, Hrudey et al., 2006) provide compelling 
evidence for the value of the risk management approach which lies at the heart of water 
safety plans, whilst Summerill et al. (2010b) have considered aspects of leadership in risk 
governance within the water utility sector.   
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Other recent work on the application of risk management processes in the water sector 
(MacGillivray et al., 2006, 2008) and (Pollard et al.,2007; 2009) propose benchmarking 
criteria to aid Water Service providers in successfully managing the challenges of cost 
reduction and risk mitigation. Consideration is given to other important influencing 
factors such as competition, leadership and governance that have a role to play in 
establishing an organisation`s strategy in delivering water and waste water services that 
meet regulatory objectives (quality, environmental and financial). 
1.1 Managing risk within the water sector 
As stated above, managing risk is set against the backdrop of a complex operating 
environment. The water service provider must effectively and efficiently manage a range 
of assets that vary in terms of age, design and capacity. This is done within a multi-
stakeholder, institutional and business context where there is competition for financing 
between activities which cover operations, capital investment and maintenance. Trade-
offs and strategic choices are made by management as they seek to deliver services. At 
the same time organisations are expected to demonstrate capability in risk management 
which encompasses appropriate systems, processes, measurement and transparency 
through reporting.   
1.2 Regulation and risk within the water sector 
There is general consensus that well designed and implemented regulation can benefit 
the common good in society (Haines, 2011; Pollard 2008; Gunningham and Sinclair, 
2002). However there is little consensus on the optimum regulatory framework for 
managing risks within the water sector (MacGillivray et al, 2008). Water and wastewater 
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supply services are, in many cases (but not exclusively), regulated by an environmental 
regulator, drinking water quality regulator and a financial regulator. A tension often 
exists between the regulatory objectives of the respective bodies which vary with 
political direction (Haines, 2011). Debate continues as to whether centralised “command 
and control” regulatory systems should be replaced by a form of self-regulation 
(Gunningham and Sinclair, 2002). This debate has heightened in recent years as 
government spending is under increased strain from global economic challenges. This in 
some way has encouraged politicians to push the management (and cost) of risk back 
into industry and the water sector is no exception here. As regulation shapes 
behaviours, it is of interest to identify the impact that changes in regulation have on risk 
management practises within the water sector. Table 1.1 summaries the percentages of 
private sector participation in water management; together with regulatory operating 
systems; and a range of data which informs the characterisation of water management 
for a selection of countries. The data from the table has been collected from multiple 
sources (Marques, 2010, Economist, 2010, Owen.D.L, 2011). The table illustrates the 
variation in ownership arrangements (discussed further in Section 1.3) employed to 
deliver water service over a wide geographical area containing a broad range of 
populations. Supporting water supply services are a range of regulatory systems which 
have been broadly split into centralised, decentralised, sector specific, multi-sectoral, 
independent and non-independent characteristics. Within these broad categories there 
are region and country specific variations. For example in Armenia the “multisector 
regulatory system” called the Public Service Regulatory Committee (PSRC) is 
interdisciplinary (economic, quality and public service competencies) and covers water, 
electricity, gas and telecoms. The PSRC is classified as independent from political control 
20 
 
and has autonomy to apply sanctions and enact legislation. In general the PSRC operates 
financial mechanisms based on an in-year rate of return scheme.  
In Italy there is a sector specific regulator, the “Committee for the supervision of the 
water resources” known as COVIRI. The regulating body sets pricing and monitors the 
application of laws relating to water. While COVIRI is made up of different stakeholder 
actors it is controlled directly by the Ministry for the Environment and therefore cannot 
be classified as independent.  
Kenya operates a different regulatory system that is classified as both sector specific and 
independent. The regulator here is known as the “Water Service Regulatory Body” 
(WRSB). The WRSB has control over economics, water quality, customer rights and 
sustainability of the water systems. 
In Australia, Canada and the USA generally have devolved regional multi-sectoral 
regulators that are classified as independent. In each case the regulatory authorities 
cover: oil, gas, telecoms, water, electricity and, in some provinces, transport. While 
classified as independent, there is evidence (Chapter 5) that the regulators in Canada 
come under political pressure to avoid reporting failures (Section 5.5.5) which calls into 
question the regulators independence and ability to enforce legislation. 
In regions such as Central and Eastern Europe and some parts of Asia and Oceania the 
regulatory model is based on non-independent multi-sectoral regulatory systems which 
have an increased level of state control. These agencies have structures in place 
designed to balance the needs of the customers with those of the water service 
providers. The principles are based around the provision of good drinking water quality 
and safe sanitation at an affordable price.   
21 
 
Each country specific system has evolved over time and to meet the needs, or perceived 
needs of the countries` inhabitants. Table 1.1 illustrates that factors such as; number of 
inhabitants, geography and water consumption per capita do not appear to influence 
the choices of regulatory (or ownership arrangements) when considering best practise in 
delivering water services.  Table 1.1 also shows a significant variation in customer 
charges for the selected countries (either as a charge per cubic meter or as an annual 
fee). Tariff setting does not appear to be directly related to the choice of regulatory 
model (or ownership arrangements). Given the range of variations exposed in Table 1.1, 
and of direct relevance to this thesis, it is of interest to examine how the choices in 
regulatory systems influence risk management approaches (explored in Chapter 5, 6 and 
7). 
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Table 1.1: Ownership Arrangments, Regulation and a range of parameters associated with water management across a selection of countries (Marques, 2010; Economist, 2010; Owen, 2011).
Region Country Regulatory Model
Area of 
country
Population
Population 
Density
Volume 
Water 
Abstracted 
Volume 
Abstracte
d for 
Drinking 
water
Ave 
Consumption
Water Losses
Water Services 
Average Price
Ave Invoice 
per 
Customer 
per Annum
Sectoral 
Employment
Water Wastewater Water 
Wastewater 
services
Waste 
Water 
Treatment
Water
Waste 
Water
Units % % N/A km2 x Million inhabitants/km2 % % % N/A N/A Million m3
Million 
m3
Litres per Day 
per Person
% Euro/m3 Euro N/A
Belgium 3 10 Devolved regional regulator 30500 10.5  - 99 82 50  -  - 730 400 106  - 0.79 57 7200
France 67 47 Sectoral regulator - not independent 543965 64.4 112 99 80 80 75 52 14900 14400 165  - 3 177 Circa 500,000
Greece 35 38 Multisectoral regulator - not independent 132000 11 84  -  -  - >1000 >1000 800 600 200 25  -  -  -
Italy 43 33 Sectoral regulator - not independent 301300 59.4 197 96 84 75 91 91 7600 4500 230 40 1.23 250 64000
The Netherlands 0 10 Sector Specific independent regulator 41500 16.5 395 100 98 97 10 25 1210 1100 124 10 1.34 177 4900
Portugal 25 24 Multisectoral regulator - not independent 92300 10.3 111 91 75 66 523 314 862 560 153 35 0.33 130 17500
Sweden 1 1 Devolved regional regulator 45000 9  - 100 100  - 294 294 900 18 188 22 0.68  - 6000
United Kingdom 87 90 Sector Specific independent regulator 235000 58.8 408.8 99 96 93 26 11 6307 4790 153 28 2.5 770 38700
Armenia 23 0 Multisectoral independent regulator 298000 3.2 101 90 70 0 5 5 588 88 84 85 0.36  -  -
Czech Republic 71 69 Multisectoral regulator - not independent 78900 10.3 132 92.4 80 75 1211 1211 699 532 100 24 1.8 66 15000
Kosovo 11 0 Sector Specific independent regulator 10900 2.1 220 74 55 0 7 7 138.8 57 180 59 0.14 108 1500
Lithuania 0 0 Multisectoral regulator - not independent 65200 3.4 52 77 66 60 300 300 140 98 63 27 1.12 40 6431
Romania 11 0 Multisectoral regulator - not independent 238391 22  - 70 50  - 2000 2000 900 300 200  - 0.23  - 150000
Slovak Republic 20 20 Multisectoral regulator - not independent 49000 5.5 111 86 58 55 14 14 325 225 121 32 0.65  - 8740
Ghana 0 0 Multisectoral independent regulator 238500 23 93 59 7  - 2 1 205 103 20 50 0.43  - 3200
Kenya 0 0 Sector Specific independent regulator 538400 34.7 59 55 25 20 100 50  -  -  - 60  -  -  -
Mozambique 3 0 Sector Specific independent regulator 801600 21.4 25 26 4.6 3 220 20 85 42 21 51  -  -  -
Niger 4 0 Multisectoral independent regulator 1267000 14 11 63  -  - 2 0 43 37 12  - 0.33  -  -
Tanzania 0 0 Multisectoral independent regulator 945100 38 41 60 3 3 20 10 185 111 14 40 0.28  -  -
Zambia 0 0 Sector Specific independent regulator 752600 11.7 16 68 34 34 29 29 316 168 110 47 0.25  -  -
Australia 37 12 Devolved regional regulator 7700000 21  -  -  -  -   -  - 19 2 280 12 0.59 341 12000
Indonesia 5 0 Sectoral regulator - not independent 1900000 234.7 134 18 3 2.3 >320 >320 6600 3300 146 50 0.49 25 3162
Philippines 13 2 Multisectoral independent regulator 300000 90.5 295 85 72 10 >1600 >1600 4800 2400 133 50 0.22  - 4000
Singapore 28 0 Multisectoral regulator - not independent 704 4.7  - 100 100  - 1 1 500 215 158 4.5 0.53  -  -
Beliz 33 33 Multisectoral independent regulator 23000 0.32 13 90 40 40 2 1 65 25 240 38 0.15  - 550
Brazil 30 21 Devolved regional regulator 8515000 190  - 81 48 48 1350 1350 22650 15400 145 40 0.68  -  -
Barbados 0 0 Multisectoral independent regulator 431 0.28 647 99  -  - 1 1 42.7 21.4 210 50 0.55  -  -
Canada 3 6 Devolved regional regulator 9984700 33.3 3.2 85 85 80 9000 9000 5400 4200 343 23 0.72 235 300000
Chile 96 94 Sectoral regulator - not independent 757000 16.6 21.3 99.8 95.2 81.9 52 50 1451 905 150 38 0.59 225 9570
Colombia 24 11 Sector Specific independent regulator 1139000 44.4 39 88.3 74.1 25 2886 1071 2329 1188 59 49 0.36 92 18600
Costa Rica 0 0 Multisectoral independent regulator 51100 4.1 85 98 21 4.5 1800 5 350 175 117 50 0.26  - 3000
Honduras 7 7 Sector Specific independent regulator 112500 7.5 64 75 36  - >2000  -  -  -  - 50 0.1 25  -
Jamaica 0 0 Multisectoral independent regulator 11000 2.7 252 73 30  - 8 4 287 95 132 67 0.75  -  -
Mexico 13 22 Multisectoral independent regulator 1953000 109 252 89 86 36 10500 250 10300 5100 144 50 0.15 115 96800
Panama 11 0 Multisectoral independent regulator 75500 3.3 43 86 51 39 11 2 498 290 280 42 0.22 71 2500
Peru 3 10 Sector Specific independent regulator 1285000 28.7 22 84 76 28 50 50 1264 717 97 42 0.41 60 8000
Trinidad and Tobago 0 0 Multisectoral independent regulator 5100 1.3 208 92 21 21 1 1 365 160 360 55 0.12 48 2500
Uruguay 0 0 Multisectoral independent regulator 176200 3.5 19 92 48  - 2 3 320 147 125 54 0.85 171 4360
USA 15 7 Devolved regional regulator 9800000 303  - 84 95  - 53000 50000 560000 190400 660  - 0.33 312 445000
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1.3 Ownership arrangements and risk within the water sector 
Internationally there are a range of ownership arrangements for Water Service Providers 
(Table 1.1). Typically the ownership arrangements are viewed as either “public” or 
“private”. In fact there are is a range of activities (and services) within the remit of a 
water service provider that can be delivered with some public and or private sector 
participation (Owen, 2011). Where public/private partnerships exist there are further 
distinctions to be made around the commercial operating models which range from 
leasing of assets to concession contracts (See Section 1.5). For the purposes of this thesis 
the “ownership arrangements” discussed include: 
 Public Sector Ownership (For example Ghana, Uruguay Lithuania (Table1.1)), 
where the public sector own and operate assets. 
 Private Sector Ownership, where private enterprise owns and operates assets 
(For Example, England (within the UK) and Chile (Table 1.1)). 
 Private sector participation (The majority of examples in Table 1.1) which can be 
sub-categorised into; 
o Private participation that covers less than 10% of the population 
o Private participation that covers between 10% and 50% of the population 
o Private participation that covers greater than 50% of the population 
o Private participation offering full range of corporate services (asset 
ownership and operation), where the governing institute may hold a 
majority share in the company 
o Private leasing of assets plus operations including maintenance 
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o Private sector delivery of infrastructure upgrade and maintenance 
o Private sector concession contracts for small asset operation 
o Private sector operation of assets 
Many countries` water services (for example, Mexico, France and Australia) are not 
exclusively operating under a single system and may operate a complex combination of 
leasing, management, operational and maintenance contracts. These contracts can be 
negotiated and agreed at a regional or federal level (Owen, 2011). 
This thesis considers a number of international case studies including the UK, where 
there are variations in regulation and ownership arrangements for water service 
providers. In Scotland the water and wastewater services are operated on behalf of the 
Scottish government (and ultimately the Scottish public) by Scottish Water. This differs 
from England and Wales where water and wastewater service provision is delivered 
through a number of privately owned and mutualised organisations. In Northern Ireland 
water and wastewater services are delivered through a different public ownership 
arrangement (Parker, 2012). The regulatory arrangements in each country within the UK 
have similarities that include independent regulation of economics, water quality and 
the environment.  Within the context of the regulatory arrangements there is a 
requirement to develop a strategic business plan which, in England, Wales and Scotland, 
feeds into a “regulatory contract” that normally covers a five year period, although this 
is constantly under review. These strategic plans outline a program of capital investment 
that is designed to replace aging infrastructure, improve water (and waste water) 
quality, reduce the impact of operations on the environment and enable some 
operational cost efficiency. A tension may exist between delivering improvements to 
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service, economic efficiency and capital investment delivery. In addition to this, private 
organisations have an obligation to shareholders that ultimately requires a return on 
investment in the form of a dividend (or other payment mechanism) and increased value 
of the organisation. Equally, publically owned utilities may not have access to the capital 
markets and will compete for tax revenue with other public services which may limit the 
water utilities` ability to deliver critical investment (the variation of income per cubic 
meter of water produced and per capita is illustrated in Table 1.1). Each choice that the 
water utility makes with respect to operational arrangements, environmental 
stewardship and capital investment within the regulatory arrangements will have a 
unique risk profile.  
Section 1.4 Management culture and risk within the water sector 
The approach that the individual water utilities take to managing risk will be shaped by 
the predominant management culture within the institution. Organisations responsible 
for the planning and delivery of utility services such as energy, transport and water are 
exposed to a wide array of diverse management cultures. For the water sector, the 
impact of these influences on the effectiveness and efficiency of service delivery has 
been a primary concern over at least two decades (Richardson et al., 1992, McGuinness 
and Thomas, 1997, Bakker, 2003a). However, studies seeking to better understand how 
ownership arrangements, regulation and management culture influence the operation 
of utilities have largely focused on the economic and customer value performance of the 
organisations under review. This is understandable given the broader public debate on 
the wisdom and benefits of privatised water services. However, somewhat surprisingly 
and of direct relevance to this thesis, few have considered the impact of regulation, 
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ownership arrangements and management culture on water utilities` approaches to 
managing commercial, operational and systemic risk. Risk perception and analysis plays 
a hugely influential role in decision making within the boundaries of a regulated business 
(Haines, 2011b) and, given that utility performance (against whatever metrics) is a 
function of how decision takers deliver results within the confines of what is deemed 
acceptable, it is unusual that more attention has not been paid to exploring the 
associated ‘risk dynamic’ (taken to mean the interplay between risks associated with 
utility actions and management strategies for coping with those risks). 
A management culture driven by a fixation with the efficiency and performance agendas 
is clear from the findings identified in the literature review (reported in Chapter 2), with 
remarkably little attention paid to other possible impacts of regulatory and ownership 
arrangement changes. This is in stark contrast to other literatures, for example those 
concerned with the evolution of polycentric governance arrangements (Ostrom, 2010) 
and the influence of regulation on risk perception and management (Haines, 2011) 
which have recognized and articulated a rich landscape of influences on risk 
environments and management response preferences. Other relevant contributions 
have explored benchmarking risk management capability within the international water 
utility sector (MacGillivray et al., 2006, MacGillivray et al., 2007a, MacGillivray et al., 
2007b, MacGillivray and Pollard, 2008) and explored operational antecedents of good 
risk governance in the sector (Hrudey et al., 2006, Summerill et al., 2010a, Summerill et 
al., 2010b).  
The variations in ownership arrangements, regulation and elements such as revenue (as 
illustrated in Table 1.1) will drive management culture and therefore attitudes to risk 
management. The influence of management culture on risk management has not been 
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fully addressed in previous studies (Chapter 2) and yet the need to deliver sustainable 
water services for a growing population is a high priority. This thesis offers an 
opportunity to bring into sharp focus the interplay between the above components and, 
as a consequence, improve risk management choices for water service provision 
(Chapters 6 and 7).  
1.5 The research landscape 
Adam Smith, in 1776, published “The Wealth of Nations” which debated the benefits of 
denationalisation and market reforms that informed the industrial revolution. The 
merits of a variety of ownership arrangements and the emergence of regulation have 
been widely debated since and there is little or no common approach to water service 
provision between, and in some cases within, countries (Ruester and Zschille, 2010; 
Owen, 2011; Parker, 2012a).  Water services have been characterised as having some 
critical features which make it more difficult to operate fully privatised utilities 
(Marques, 2010). This includes elements such as economies of scope and scale; water 
services are considered to be a natural monopoly; water is required for life and social 
justice must be considered; generally the provision of water services are capital 
intensive; and the operational environment varies with geography, water use and raw 
water quality (Marques, 2010). Regulation is an important activity that serves to protect 
the public interest (and public health) and help guide the direction of the industry to 
make improvements in terms of services together with delivering economic efficiency 
(Saal, 2007; Marques, 2010). Studies have identified a tension between achieving 
economic efficiency and public service obligations (Peda et al., 2013, Pérard, 2009, 
Ruester and Zschille, 2010).   
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Since 1973 the UK water industry has undergone radical reform (Parker, 2012). In 
England and Wales there were a series of step taken which were initiated by the 1973 
Water Act and subsequent policy changes that ultimately resulted in the privatisation of 
the regional water authorities in 1989.  Scotland and Northern Ireland were not included 
in the market reform initiatives and the governing bodies of these home nations chose 
to deliver water services through public sector arrangements. In many other countries 
water services also remain in the public sector and many ownership arrangements and 
regulatory arrangements exits (Owen.D.L, 2011, Ruester and Zschille, 2010, Renzetti and 
Dupont, 2004, Renzetti and Dupont, 2003) which are designed to offer best value to 
consumers while protecting public health (Pérard, 2009, Ruester and Zschille, 2010, 
Peda et al., 2013). In general, the evidence presented in the identified studies suggest 
that the efficiency of a water service provider is not dependent upon the ownership 
arrangements. There is little evidence that these studies take into account influences on 
asset deterioration, capital investment profiles, quality improvements and the 
underlying risk profiles that the organisations have.   
Consideration of these features of water service provision can be articulated as an initial 
two principle research question: 
Do water sector regulation, ownership arrangements and management culture impact 
on the risk management strategy?  
And; 
If they do, what impact does this have on the primary objectives (good safe drinking 
water that has the trust of consumers) of the utilities? 
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In addressing the principle research questions the investigation asks (i), what are the 
particular features of regulation, ownership arrangements and management culture that 
influence the risk dynamic? and (ii) what are the implications of these relationships in 
the context of ambitions for water service providers? In addressing these queries, 
consideration has been given to the choices and adjustments a utility may make to its 
risk management strategy to deliver its regulatory objectives such as public health and 
environmental protection. 
1.6 Aims and objectives 
The aim of the research reported here is to expose the inter-relationships between 
regulation, business ownership arrangements and management culture (in the context 
of water service provision) and how this interplay influences a water service provider`s 
approach to risk management. The study builds upon existing research in risk 
management and governance. The traction that risk management achieves is examined 
within a variety of organisations exhibiting differing ownership arrangements and 
management cultures operating under differing regulatory regimes. In order to achieve 
the aim of the research, the following objectives have been the focus of the project. 
 Characterize water service provider performance against the regulatory contract 
objectives (or other relevant instrument). This uses published annual performance 
data and other available metrics and data sources where publically available. 
(Chapter 4 and 5) 
 Identify the governance and financing arrangements for water services in each case 
study context. (Chapter 4 and 5) 
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 Identify the business priorities and ownership arrangements for each case study. The 
implications of the variations across the case studies will be considered with respect 
to approaches in risk management. (Chapters 2, 4 and 5) 
 Propose improvements to risk management approaches and reporting. (Chapter 7) 
It is recognised that this study addresses a limited number of elements relating to the 
selected topic.  Limitations on time dictate what can be practically achieved within the 
scope of the project (the limitations of the thesis are discussed in Section 7.3). With this 
in mind the study may refer to, but will not include formal analysis of: 
 Detailed analysis of the improvement rate of efficiency and performance 
between private and public ownership arrangements. 
The research question (Section 1.5) is further refined and developed from the output of 
the literature review and discussed in Section 2.6. The research agenda requires a 
multidisciplinary approach to deliver meaningful output. Figure 1.1 represents the 
principle scientific disciplines employed in the research activity. The core discipline and 
topic of interest is risk analysis. In particular the water industries approach to risk 
management choices under a range of conditions. The research agenda developed to 
explore risk analysis is delivered through methodologies in management science, 
psychology and social science methodologies in combination. This co-constructed inter-
disciplinary approach supports the complex nature of the problem as defined in 
Chapters 1 and 2. The methodology and interdisciplinary approach is discussed in more 
detail in Chapter 3.  
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1.7 Terminology  
In this section, the principle terminology used within the thesis is defined. It is important 
to be clear on the definitions as used in this thesis as they may deviate from similar 
terms in other bodies of work. 
1.7.1 Regulation 
The Oxford English dictionary definition of `regulation` is “A rule or directive made and 
maintained by an authority”. In the context of this thesis regulations are rules or 
instruments designed to control, inform, challenge and influence the behaviours, 
activities and conduct of water service providers. Within this study the three areas of 
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operating are the focus for regulation; environmental quality, water quality and 
economic performance. 
1.7.2 Ownership arrangement 
The term ownership arrangement describes the local, regional or national models for 
water utilities in place between the governing bodies, accountable authorities (often 
referred to as the municipality) and private sector for delivering a product, service or 
some other commodity. In the context of this thesis the services delivered are the 
provision of drinking water and removal and treatment of waste water. Ownership 
arrangements are multi-dimensional in that they vary dependent upon factors such as 
financing; available resources; cultural preference; politics; geography; population 
served; objectives of the businesses; services offered; assets owned; assets operated and 
assets built (Owen, 2011).   
Public Ownership Arrangements 
For the purposes of this thesis `public ownership arrangements` describes an operating 
environment where water and waste water services are delivered through assets owned, 
operated and maintained by a `public body`. Where a `public body` is an organisation 
whose work is part of the process of government. 
Private Ownership Arrangements 
Within the context of this thesis `private ownership arrangements` describes an 
operating environment where water and waste water services are delivered through 
assets owned, operated and maintained by a `private enterprise`. Where a `private 
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enterprise` is a business owned and operated by independent individual(s) rather than by 
a government.  
Private Sector Participation 
`Private sector participation` covers a wide range of ownership arrangements occupying 
the space between public ownership arrangements and private ownership arrangements. 
Private sector participation involves private enterprise delivering a range of aspects of 
water and waste water services that may include infrastructure investment, operation 
and maintenance, leasing, concession contracts and ownership of selected assets.  
1.7.2 Management culture 
Management culture should not be confused with organisational culture. Organisational 
culture according to Johnson (1992) can be expressed as learned behaviour within an 
organisation that has evolved through cumulative experience as objectives are delivered 
in an operating environment influenced by internal and external forces. Normally new 
entrants into the organisation would take on the some or all of the inherent behaviours 
that define the organisation. Management culture differs in that it can be characterised 
as a set of behaviours that have  been deliberately encouraged by management with the 
purpose of delivering the corporate objectives (Easterby-Smith, 2008).  In this thesis the 
management culture is taken to mean “the set of behaviours that the leadership group 
have instilled in the organisation to deliver regulatory and business objectives”. 
1.7.4 Risk Tolerance and Appetite 
Within risk management processes and governance structures, risk appetite is often 
mentioned. Indeed the research shows how, within the interview responses elicited 
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through this study (Chapter 4 and Chapter 5), senior managers and directors frequently 
refer to risk appetite. Risk appetite can be defined as the amount and type of risk that an 
organization is prepared to pursue, retain or take responsibility for (ISO, 2009). Although 
the ISO definition appears to be clear, this contribution highlights in Chapters 4 through 6 
that defining the risk appetite for a particular organisation is something that senior 
managers find difficult to quantify and articulate. Partly this is because there are 
elements of risk appetite which can be classified as psychological (Slovic, 1995, Slovic et 
al., 2004) and therefore difficult to measure effectively. The psychological elements of 
risk appetite are important however in this thesis financial risk appetite is considered as 
it is measurable within the context of the organisations financial limits and thus is easier 
to quantify than psychological elements. The following section articulates why the 
measurable financial risks are helpful in defining the risk appetite and tolerance of a 
business. These measurable elements of finance can be used to set a baseline for risk 
tolerance and appetite, over which less measurable psychological elements can be 
layered to build a more holistic view of risk appetite within an organisation.  
Any organisation needs a quantum of capital to operate regardless of ownership 
arrangements. The organisation will have, to a greater or lesser degree, a series of 
objectives to fulfil within its sphere of operation. Normally businesses would deliver 
strategic objectives within the limitations of available operating capital. In most cases the 
delivery of objectives is affected by changing circumstances (changes in energy price, 
treatment failures, climate change, etc.) and both positive and negative outcomes are 
manifested during the course of day to day business. The outcomes of actions taken to 
meet objectives will either contribute to, or reduce stress on the company finances. The 
amount of risk taken (as a consequence of actions or decisions) may also influence the 
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stresses placed on the financial position of the organisation. As some point in the 
lifecycle of the business, risks may manifest themselves in a way that has a catastrophic 
impact on the finances of the operation meaning the business fails. The point at which 
financial failure is about to occur can be described as risk tolerance. Theoretically, then 
the risk appetite should be a smaller quantum of capital than the risk tolerance to avoid 
financial failure of the business or organisation. Figure 1.2 illustrates the discussion and 
differences and relationship between risk appetite and tolerance.   
 
The dotted box represents the total risk that an organisation may encounter. This could 
be described at the risk universe unique to the fictitious organisation. Line 1 represents 
the planned improvements to company performance laid out in the strategic business 
plan. Line 2 represents the upper limit of performance achieved and line 3 is the lowest 
limit of performance achieved (Figure 1.3). Line 2 could be called out performance 
36 
 
(where the organisation gets to when nothing fails)  and Line 3 could be classified as 
business failure (where the organisation fails to meet any and all objectives) 2 and 3 are 
at the extreme tolerances of business performance and, for the purposes of this 
contribution, can be classified as risk tolerance. Lines 4 and 5 represent performance 
outcomes which sit comfortably within the risk tolerance envelope and represent the 
organisation`s acceptable performance limits which protect financial and operational 
sustainability (Figure 1.3). Lines 4 and 5 can be classified as the boundaries of risk 
appetite. In other words the business in not prepared to take risks that could push 
performance above Line 5 or below Line 4 (Figure 1.3). For the purposes of this 
contribution risk appetite will be defined as the willingness to take decisions and actions 
with uncertain outcomes that an organisation is prepared to take without compromising 
risk tolerance.  
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All of the assumptions made by the organisation in relation to performance and risk are 
rooted in future predictions and are very much dependent upon fore-sighting, planning, 
stakeholder expectations, reliability of historical performance data and trending analysis. 
1.7.5 Governance 
The internal organisational processes used to manage and monitor both risk and 
elements of leadership are formally considered and examined in Chapters 2, 4 and 5. 
These elements and activities could be broadly described as “Governance” which is 
understood as the act, process, or power of governing, administering or leading. 
Governance arrangements can be difficult to define and in Chapters 4 and 5 it is explored 
by some directors and management representatives. The responses given by these actors 
suggest perceptions of governance (both the process and implementation) vary vertically 
within the organisations involved in the cases. 
1.8  Personal Motivation for conducting the study. 
The thesis author has some 23 years experience working in the water industry and related 
commercial businesses. During that time it had been observed that the water utilities 
aspired to become a “high reliability” organisations, meaning the sector desired to have 
an impeccable record in risk management and achieve zero water quality failures, similar 
to that of other high reliability industries like aerospace, oil and gas and nuclear energy, 
where failures can have a significant impact on life and/or the environment. Over the 
years working within the industry, the researcher noted that although the aspiration to be 
a “high reliability” organisation was there, the water industry in many instances focused 
on reactive interventions when failures occurred rather than adopting a pro-active 
management (and leadership) style. The researcher was motivated to explore perceptions 
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of current operational practices, which, for the most part, conflicted with a desire for risk 
management maturity, a pervasive risk management culture and a shift to operating a 
high reliability sector. With this in mind, a number of conversations took place between 
the researcher and actors within the water industry which suggested that regulation, 
ownership arrangements and management culture may have a dominant influence on 
approaches to risk management (Chapter 4 and 5).  The researcher was motivated to use 
the emerging idea as a starting point for development of the research proposal (Chapter 1 
and Chapter 2). 
1.9  Structure of thesis 
Figure 1.4 illustrates the structure of the thesis and highlights the relationships between 
chapters and the overall development of the research contribution.  
Chapter 1, the introduction, has outlined the research question and the reasons for 
undertaking the research. The chapter develops the thinking around the scope, aims and 
objectives of the project. It has also set out the definition of adopted terminology and 
articulated the relevant issues that have been taken into consideration when developing 
the project themes and framework.  
Chapter 2 documents the findings from the review of literature that was carried out to 
inform the study by interrogating the body of work relating to water service provision and 
risk. A series of questions were asked of the literature which were designed to identify 
gaps in the research landscape while challenging current thinking in the maturity of risk 
management within water service providers operating in differing regulatory 
environments and under different ownership arrangements. The review itself utilised a 
number of web based literature databases and explored the body of available work both 
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vertically and horizontally across different aspects of water management and risk 
management. The review provides the groundwork for the development of the study 
framework; finesses the research challenge and question; delineates the knowledge gaps 
and identifies the leading researchers in the chosen field of study. The review also 
informed a critique of relevant work relating to interdisciplinary research involving utility 
ownership arrangements, regulation, risk management, economics and culture.   
 
Figure 1.4:  Thesis Structure and fundamental components  
 
Chapter 3 builds on the evidence collected in the literature review and informs the 
design of the final research question and study framework. Having established and 
refined the principle research question, the chapter then goes on to explain the research 
approach and methodology. In this case the epistemology of the research approach is 
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based on constructive realism (Section 3.2) (Easterby-Smith, 2008, Fleetwood, 2005, 
Miller and Tsang, 2011). The chapter discusses the challenges of case study based data 
collection and analysis using the approach reported by Yin (2009) and those of computer 
assisted qualitative data analysis (CAQDAS) using coding methodologies (Neuman, 2003, 
Corbin, 2008). 
Chapter 4 describes the first phase of the research activity and explains the purpose of 
this exercise. The initial study was designed to deliver a range of outputs that included 
piloting used to test the researcher’s interview technique on a limited number of actors; 
testing the output and identified research opportunities in the literature review; 
developing methodology, coding design and analytical process using CAQDAS.  
Chapter 5 documents the second phase of research activity which was informed by the 
evidence collected from the literature review and the output of the first phase case 
study work. At the core of the research sits case studies that include a range of agencies 
with varying ownership arrangements governed by a variety of regulatory frameworks. 
Interviews were conducted with a range of actors operating at different management 
and operational levels within the chosen water service providers and regulatory offices. 
As with Chapter 4, the collected data were analysed by CAQDAS and synthesised into a 
qualitative view of the importance of risk management within the context of the 
operating model of the organisations examined. The data were subject to a quality 
control process conducted by an independent analyst to validate the output.  
Chapter 6 discusses the research findings and frames this within the context of previous 
contributors to the field. The chapter considers the findings of both phases of research 
and discusses the interplay between ownership arrangements and regulation. This 
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chapter explores variations in meaning and interpretation of “risk” within the context of 
the organisations` delivery plans and defines some actions that a utility could take to 
ensure consistency of approach to risk management that support pervasiveness of risk 
management within their institute.  
Chapter 7 offers insights and conclusions on the tensions between water utility 
ownership arrangements and regulatory frameworks on the safe delivery of water and 
sanitation services. Some suggestions for improving risk reporting are offered. The 
chapter reflects on the research journey and highlights the novelty of the work and 
contribution to knowledge gained from the findings of the project. The final sections 
consider the implications of the thesis for the management of risk within the water 
industry and identify further opportunities for research in this topic area. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
The provisional research question reported in Section 1.5 was synthesised from a limited 
search of the literature, conversations with industry actors and academic staff and 
personal experience of the researcher (see Section 1.8). The material below reports a 
more comprehensive literature review drawing on the provisional question to frame an 
investigation into contributions to knowledge related to this thesis. The literature base 
was explored both vertically, taken to mean topic specific; and horizontally, taken to 
mean across topics (Wray, 2011). The topics considered were regulation, ownership 
arrangements, management culture and risk management in relation to water 
management and included some literature on risk management in other sectors such as 
banking where there have been recent systemic failures that could contribute to 
learning for the water sector. The work of notable researchers (for example David Saal 
and David Parker) was traced through the development of their thinking. The output of 
the examination of literature informed the refinement of the research question and the 
development of a research framework (see Section 2.4 and Figure 2.4).  
2.1 Regulation and risk management 
Regulation as defined in Section 1.3.1 is “A rule or directive made and maintained by an 
authority”. Regulations are enacted to pursue consumer interests (Gunningham, 2011, 
Haines, 2011b, Baldwin, 2012). Regulations shape water service provision, influencing: 
 The economics of operation  
 The economics of capital investment and capital maintenance 
 Water quality standards that need to be attained 
 Environmental standards that need to be attained 
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 The protection of public health 
 Customer charges and affordability of water and wastewater service  
Regulators work closely with water service providers to ensure that water services aspire to 
deliver safe drinking water, safe sanitation that is affordable (Pollard, 2008). Risk 
management is central to ensuring the water service provider discharges its duties as 
defined by regulation.  Regulation has typically been based on a command and control 
strategy (Gunningham, 2002) where organisations must comply (command) or be penalised 
(control).  More recently there has been recognition that regulation, in many cases, has 
adopted a more risk based approach where-by the water service providers are expected to 
demonstrate an understanding of the risks within their water systems and the supply chain 
(Gunningham, 2002; Pollard, 2008; Haines, 2011, Baldwin et.al., 2012). New approaches in 
regulation require water service providers to adopt more formal risk management 
processes and deliver regulatory targets. The demands on resources are further complicated 
by Global economics and politics as governments are coming under pressure from financial 
constraints and the cost of borrowing as well as political pressure to reduce bureaucracy 
within government systems (Baldwin et.al., 2012). The result of this is a move to push the 
risk management away from the central governing institutes/regulators and towards the 
water service providers (Gunningham, 2002, Haines, 2011a, Haines, 2011b). The burden for 
managing risk is then placed on the water service provider, who already has multiple 
demands on management and leadership time (Section 1.4).   
The influence of regulatory priorities on the productivity of water utilities has been 
highlighted by Abbott and Cohen (2009). They suggest that post-1995 (when financing of 
English and Welsh water companies was reviewed), changes to the price cap in the UK 
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helped improve productivity over and above what might have been expected with 
privatisation per se. Utilities face significant financial challenges in acquiring sufficient 
funding to ensure that water quality, customer service and environmental objectives are 
met (Rodriguez, 2004, François et al., 2008). A tension exists between the general economic 
interest, public service provision, internal markets, competition and state intervention 
(Rodriguez, 2004, François et al., 2008).  The impact of regulation on risk has been 
considered (Haines, 2011, 2013) but few contributions seek to understand the interplay 
between the regulatory demands (water quality, environment and finances) on the choices 
made for service delivery and the risk management strategies applied (including 
management culture) which influence the risk and risk management practices within the 
water service sector. 
These contributions on financing and productivity illustrate the constraints that limited, 
periodic regulatory cycles impose on utility efforts to deliver regulatory obligations. 
Evidence from a number of detailed studies (MacGillivray et al., 2007a, 2007b) suggest that 
when faced with an aging infrastructure and limited funds, utilities will prioritise short term 
interventions before long term mitigation measures (Hrudey et al., 2006). Such strategies 
instil a reactive approach to risk management as resources (human as well as financial and 
technological) become focused on immediate priorities. In contrast,   a more appropriate 
risk management strategy (Pollard et al., 2008) under such circumstances could be 
characterised by contingency planning although, with little incentive for operators to value 
more pro-active strategies, even contingency planning will reflect restricted temporal and 
risk threat horizons. 
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Another dimension of regulation worthy of consideration in the context of corporate risk 
management is the role that competition plays. Privatisation theory (Boycko and Shleifer, 
1996) suggests that public service approaches to achieving efficiency and quality 
improvements can be influenced through the introduction of competition. Cubbin and Stern 
(2004) discuss the role of competition within the utility sectors and observe that in some 
areas (gas, electricity and telecoms), the positive effects of competition took some time to 
show and evolved along with regulation. However, for utilities like water, where there is a 
public service obligation and significant networked infrastructure to deliver services, it is 
more difficult to establish true competition given the natural monopoly that exists. Stern 
(2010) examined lessons from the introduction of competition within energy markets and 
applied the knowledge base to the English and Welsh water sector. Stern points out that the 
recent Cave review (Cave, 2009) raised the issue of competition. He points to the 
liberalisation of the telecoms and energy markets as relevant, and postulates that wholesale 
distribution of water could be opened up to competition in England and Wales, drawing on 
existing models in other utility sectors. This would require appropriate codes of practise, 
abstraction controls and consideration of the wider environmental costs to society. By 
contrast, Scotland has already opened up competition in water services. Sawkins and Reid 
(2007) looked at concerns that cross-subsidy existed in the water services in Scotland and 
examined the approach taken to cross subsidisation by the Scottish Executive. They point to 
the Water Services (Scotland) Act 2005 and the formation of the Water Industry 
Commission (WIC) that has been tasked with developing an approach to competition in the 
Scottish water market. The Scottish Executive published a number of statements and 
reports (Scottish, 2004b, 2004a, 2005b, 2005a) as part of the consultation, concluding that 
the introduction of retail competition was desirable. Sawkins and Reid (2007) establish a 
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mechanism for the flow of cross-subsidy but also highlight that more work is required to 
implement their framework. Competition in the retail markets in Scotland is now 
established with a number of licensed providers operating. Recently Scottish Water`s retail 
business Scottish Water Business Stream has seen a loss of contracts worth circa £300m of 
income which feeds into the wholesales parts of the business and is a component of 
financing used to maintain operability (including investment). This unpredicted sizable gap 
in financing will ultimately have an effect on investment, operability and the risk profile 
within the business. 
There is little unambiguous evidence to support conclusions about the effectiveness of 
competition in public utility services. Water is essential for life and difficult to value. At 
present, it is typically only the costs of transporting and treating the water that the 
customer pays for. Opening up water service provision to competition might create 
incentives to improve performance and efficiency, but may also lead to additional 
operational risks (MacGillivray et al., 2006). Risk management strategies will need to be 
adjusted to compensate for any variations in service provision or new entrants to the 
market (as seen in Scotland). Contracts between delivery partners will need to expose 
systemic risks and be clear on the owners of such risk (Ruester and Zschille, 2010). 
The dynamics exposed by the above discussion are illustrated in Figure 2.1. Regulation sets 
the ambitions and minimum performance standards that utilities must aspire to, with 
respect to efficiency, service, drinking water quality and environmental sustainability. 
Regulation also shapes the strategic operating environment for a utility and influences the 
relationship between utility, customers, markets, and (increasingly) the natural 
environment. It also circumscribes a risk agenda in terms of both the character of dominant 
47 
 
risks and the utility’s ability to respond to those risks (Macgillivray et al., 2006). As alluded to 
by Parker (1998), the priorities which an organisation places on competing regulatory 
objectives within a regulatory contract period will have a direct impact on the company risk 
profile. 
 
2.2 Ownership arrangements and risk management 
The merits  of ownership arrangements in delivering efficient water services have been 
widely debated internationally  (Wallsten and Kosec, 2008, Martínez-Espiñeira et al., 2009, 
Bayliss, 2003, García-Rubio et al., 2010, McKay, 2003) and improvements to productivity and 
efficiency were a central consideration in policy decisions made by the UK government that 
led to privatisation of the water companies in 1989 (Parker, 2012). Emerging evidence 
suggests that successful privatisation and efficient delivery of service is contingent on a wide 
range of additional factors. For example, a management culture that drives for efficiency 
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within the limitations of a regulatory pricing review period and constrained funding 
availability tends to be characterised by a reactive management approach (Saal et al., 2007, 
Ruester and Zschille, 2010). 
The ownership arrangements of utility services vary widely at an international level (Table 
1.1) but can be categorised into state ownership (or public ownership arrangements), 
private ownership, and private sector participation (section 1.7.2). Each ownership model 
has important consequences for the particular forms of risk experienced by a water service 
provider (Pollard et al., 2007) and the risk management tools available to them (Macgillivray 
et al., 2006).   
Responsibility and accountability for managing risk is the most obvious implication of utility 
ownership arrangements with either society or shareholders sharing the burden with the 
governing institute and/or regulators (Section 2.1). However, both public and private 
ownership arrangements allocate risk and responsibility across a variety of individuals, 
institutions, corporate bodies, communities and even generations. Consideration of the 
ownership arrangements in Table 2.1 invites discussion about how risk is distributed across 
the social, commercial, and governance landscape. Indeed one might argue that such a 
discussion would greatly aid understanding of risk management challenges, and advance the 
development of more integrated approaches. 
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Table 2.1: Utility ownership arrangements in the water sector (adapted from Ruester and 
Zschille, 2010) 
Ownership arrangements Description Opportunities Potential Weakness Example Countries 
Public ownership arrangements and 
operation. Full State control. 
All financial and 
operational risk sits with 
the governing 
institution. 
Scotland, Norway, 
Netherlands, Uganda, 
Singapore, America, 
Germany 
Leased assets operated by 
contractors. Assets remain State owned. 
Operational and some 
financial risk sit with the 
contractors. 
Germany, France, 
America, Panama, 
Australia, Philippines 
Cooperation (Partnering) Model with 
public institution the majority 
shareholder. 
Financial and Operational risks 
are jointly owned.  
Operational and some 
financial risk sit with the 
contractors. 
Germany, France, 
America, Panama, 
Australia, Argentina, 
Philippines 
Contracting out of management 
activity that includes planning, 
financing, construction and operation. 
Financial and Operational risks 
are spread across a range of 
business.  
Difficult to co-ordinate 
and get best value. Some 
businesses may bid low 
to win the contract 
which will lead to budget 
over spend. 
Germany, France, 
America, Panama, 
Australia, Argentina, 
Philippines 
Concession model that stops short of 
full privatisation. 
Most of the risk sits with the 
contractors. There may be 
sufficient incentive to drive out-
performance of the contract. The 
contract will be better defined 
and run for longer period, 
providing stability. 
The public institutions 
will still be fully 
accounTable for service 
failures. 
Germany, France, 
America, Australia 
Privatisation. 
Service provision, financial and 
operational risk are the 
responsibility of the private 
organisation. Efficiency 
improvements should be 
achieved. 
Little state intervention. 
Private institution must 
meet service standards 
and shareholder 
demands. England, Chile 
 
Interdependencies between regulation and ownership arrangements have also been shown 
to influence corporate risk management. Parker (1999), discussing the regulation of 
privatised public utilities in the UK, highlights the move from state-owned utilities to private 
ownership arrangements with governance through state regulation. He reports that the 
privatisation model developed in the UK in the 1980s is now being used or adapted for use 
in other countries, introducing the private ownership arrangements of what were 
traditionally state-run organisations. He argues that privatisation in the UK has provided 
benefits for consumers and investors with respect to reduced charges, quality 
improvements and return on investment. He also explains that successful privatisation is 
reliant on the legitimacy of regulation, effective relationships between the regulator and 
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regulated body, and an appropriate institutional context. Highlighting examples in Asia, 
Latin America and Africa, Parker cites evidence of political instability that impact on the 
legitimacy of regulation and therefore the perceived independence of the institutions and 
individuals. Risk management practises within a specific jurisdiction will be influenced by 
local legal and institutional arrangements and have a direct impact on the reliability of 
service to consumers.  For example, with a publically owned utility such as those in Norway, 
Scotland or the Netherlands, the majority of the infrastructure and financial risk sits with 
the governing authority (see Table 2.1). As the ownership arrangements move towards the 
private sector, so the risk is shifted to a greater or lesser degree away from the governing 
institution. Table 2.1 also highlights a contract management approach adopted in Germany 
and France where the service providers and contractors hold the balance of operational risk. 
However, a weakness of this arrangement is that financial benefits to the controlling 
institution do not always deliver attractive or even sufficient returns on investment (Ruester 
and Zschille, 2010).  
The dynamic between regulation, ownership arrangements and risk management is re-
enforced by Ruester and Zschille (2010) in their examination of the German water sector. 
Germany provides a useful case study because water services are provided by 765 individual 
suppliers, operated by the state through a range of business models that include municipal, 
private and public-private partnerships on a regional basis. For public-private partnerships, 
there is a further subset of ownership arrangements that the authors define as public sector 
ownership with support from private contracts for various elements of business operation. 
The diverging objectives of public and private operators can generate very different 
approaches to managing risk. Although for the private operator, profit is a significant 
concern, public authorities may prefer to outsource more difficult operations where 
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environmental factors, age of assets or poor raw water quality (and therefore higher 
treatment costs) passes on higher cost to the operator and keeps the direct overheads 
relatively low. Price caps on customer charges and constraints on access to capital for 
infrastructure investment leads to tension between new design and build infrastructure 
projects and capital maintenance requirements.  
Other studies (Bhattacharyya et al., 1995, Shaoul, 1997, Bosworth and Stoneman, 1998, 
Renzetti and Dupont, 2003, Chenoweth, 2004, Dore et al., 2004, García-Sánchez, 2006, Bel 
and Warner, 2008) conclude that although private companies should be more efficient, 
evidence suggests this may not necessarily be the case. Renzetti and Dupont (2004) discuss 
factors that influence the performance of water utilities, highlighting that ownership 
arrangements are of particular interest. They point out that econometric modelling predicts 
that private ownership arrangements incentivise a reduction in costs to help achieve 
maximum benefit for shareholders and customers in the form of reduced charges. However, 
there is little empirical evidence to confirm this and, of relevance to this contribution, there 
is no recognition of the impact of these ownership arrangement choices on the risks the 
water service providers face. The calculations of efficiency within the identified studies do 
not fully factor in quality enhancements (and asset deterioration as a result of under-
investment) which may also influence the risks within the utilities. The authors argue that 
privatisation needs to be accompanied by the introduction of competition if the move to  
deliver greater benefit to the customer and shareholder, while recognising that competition 
and private sector participation could result in less investment in infrastructure which may 
result in more operational risk. Parker (1999) supports this view by highlighting that where 
natural monopolies exist (such as water and wastewater service provision), service 
providers (public or private) will only be motivated to improve performance when 
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regulation is in place to create the necessary incentives to invest in infrastructure and 
capital maintenance but there is no acknowledgement that driving down costs will alter the 
risk profile within the water utility and that this will need to be recognised and managed. 
Renzetti and Dupont (2010) provide evidence that concurs with Ruester and Zschille (2010) 
that the specifics of size of operation, cost of treatment, geography, customer base and 
water resources (quality and quantity) all have an impact on the ability of a water service 
provider to achieve its performance targets. An additional factor influencing performance is 
variability in pricing policy and accounting practices that do not take into account the full 
cost of service provision and therefore may lead to underinvestment that puts operational 
processes at risk. There is little or no evidence that suggests changes in provision of 
financing will affect the risk profile.  This is in agreement with Saal, Parker and others (Saal 
and Parker, 2000, Saal and Parker, 2001, Saal and Reid, 2004, Saal et al., 2007) who observe 
that when privatisation of the water sector was introduced in the UK in 1989, the price cap 
regulations were relatively unchallenging and resulted in a lower than expected rate of 
efficiency improvement. It was not until 1995, when the price cap rules were reviewed, that 
efficiency improvements increased. However, the efficiency gains within the water industry 
in the UK were not as significant as those secured from earlier privatisations (e.g. gas, 
telecoms, electricity) due to the water companies` regional monopoly position (lack of 
competition) and the relatively low initial price cap. At the time the effect of improving 
efficiency on the risks within the business were not known, however recently water charges 
in England have increased to accommodate the lack of investment in infrastructure which 
has led to deterioration of the asset base (increasing operational risk). Saal and Parker 
conclude that improvements in efficiency post 1995 were due to the changes in regulation 
rather than privatisation per se. The contributions presented in this section major on 
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efficiency without fully appreciating the influence that the efficiency measures have on the 
risk profile of the organisation and the influence that ownership arrangements have on 
management culture. 
The studies reviewed indicate that whilst the form of ownership has been explored as a 
determinant of operational performance, researchers have yet to fully take into account 
what this means for the management or risk within the organisations (García-Rubio et al., 
2010, Martínez-Espiñeira et al., 2009, McKay, 2003). The review suggests that price cap 
rules can both limit or enable funding and that access to funding drives infrastructure 
investment choices. The balance between infrastructure replacement and capital 
maintenance will shape operational risks that ultimately influence the reliability of services 
to the customer. Figure 2.2 summarises the discussions in this area. As margins are 
squeezed in a privatised sector, perhaps as a direct result of more insistent regulation, 
decisions about prioritising investment and driving efficiency in operational practices will 
necessarily expose some parts of the business to more risk than would hitherto have been 
the case. Pollard et al (2004) remind us that this tension can only be managed by vigilant 
organisations irrespective of their particular ownership arrangements or regulatory 
environment. 
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2.3 Management culture and risk management 
The dominant management culture and leadership style found within a water utility will 
shape how the organisation chooses to meet or exceed the targets and objectives set by 
regulation and other stakeholders. The influence of management culture on business 
performance and risk has been of growing interest to researchers and commentators since 
the 1980s with Johnson (1992) developing  a framework, known as “the culture web”, that 
is widely used to demonstrate the links between culture, strategy and management 
behaviour using components such as norms, values and symbols. Drew and Kendrick (2005) 
define culture as one of the five pillars of corporate governance (along with leadership, 
alignment, structure and systems) that are needed for integrated risk management. Both 
Baumgartner (2009) and Rizak and Hrudey (2007) demonstrate that embedding 
sustainability and risk management into the culture of an organisation can lead to corporate 
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success; though both are challenging concepts to drive home within a business, particularly 
in the face of  multiple demands on leadership time. Their contributions are consistent with 
the view that management culture influences the risk management strategy of the water 
utility. 
As Stacey (1996) explains, organisations tend to desire known outcomes, but in order to be 
innovative they may need to occupy territory that has less certainty with high degrees of 
epistemic and stochastic uncertainty. This view is supported by Osborn and Hunt (2007), 
Tetenbaum (1998) and Tetenbaum and Laurence (2011) who suggest that in today`s 
operating environment, organisations work within complex adaptive systems that force 
them into domains of high uncertainty. The tensions inherent in operating as part of a 
complex system may be minimised by application of the appropriate risk management 
cultures. These management cultures may then provide a bridging function between 
uncertainty and risk.   Water companies need to become more risk mature (MacGillivray et 
al., 2006, MacGillivray and Pollard, 2008) and look to preventative measures to ensure 
continuity of both safe drinking water and safe sanitation. Such maturity involves a risk 
management culture that takes into account data, uncertainty (both stochastic and 
epistemic), emerging risk, available finance, in addition to the competency of staff and 
regulatory objectives.  
The influence of management culture on risk management strategy and performance has 
only partially been explored within the water industry. Summerill et al. (2010b) considered 
water safety plans as a move towards a more preventative risk management approach. 
Organisational culture was shown to play a substantive role in the choices made by utilities 
with respect to how water safety planning was implemented. The study identified `enabling` 
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and `blocking` cultural features that impacted the development of consistent water safety 
plans. The utilities in this study were self-motivated to produce the plans. However, time, 
resource and communication issues occasionally blocked progress. In contrast, enabling 
features included strong leadership, continuous improvement, community (and therefore 
customer) focus, proactive engagement, competition, empowerment and competency of 
the workforce. 
Gigerenzer and fellow researchers (Todd and Gigerenzer, 2003, Hutchinson and Gigerenzer, 
2005, Brandstätter et al., 2006, Katsikopoulos and Gigerenzer, 2008, Goldstein and 
Gigerenzer, 2009) offer us insight into the way individuals apply heuristic processes in 
making decisions with limited data. These works explain how simple heuristic systems have 
developed that allow fast decision making based on acceptance or rejection of a range of 
cues within an individual`s or group`s epistemic limits. This might suggest that certain 
organisations with differing regulatory obligations and ownership arrangements prioritise 
objectives and targets in a way that legitimises their business strategy. This may be helpful 
to note when developing an understanding of water service providers` approach to risk 
management. 
Figure 2.3 articulates the impact of management culture on a water utility’s approach to risk 
management. This in turn will have an influence over the resilience and financial stability of 
the organisation. Hrudey et al. (2006), Pollard et al. (2004) and Summerill et al. (2010a) all 
emphasise the importance of culture on the adoption of specific risk management strategies 
and examine why organisations persist with a reactive approach to water quality failures 
and water safety planning.  
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2.4 Themes from the literature and their application to this research 
The foregoing critique builds upon previous reviews by Walter et al (2009) and Bel and 
Warner (2008) and expands on these works by specifically and explicitly considering 
regulation, ownership arrangements, and management culture as influences on risk 
management. The review is summarised in Figure 2.4 as a conceptual framework of these 
interdependencies. The model illustrates how interventions by regulators or businesses, 
which are intended to achieve improvements for customers, may have unintended 
consequences. So, for example, limiting customer charges is beneficial to the customer and 
should drive innovation and value into the organisation. However, it may also compromise 
long term quality improvements, sustainability and increase the risk of failing assets.  This 
review has identified that regulation informs priorities such as economic viability, 
compliance, investment choices, affordability and the protection of public health and the 
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environment (Section 2.1) all of which will influence approaches to risk management. As a 
conceptual model of the dynamic between risk management and a significant slice of a 
utility’s operating environment, Figure 2.4 is both descriptive and diagnostic, proposing 
explanations for shifts in risk management approaches. The extent to which it also supports 
critical analysis and prognosis can only be confirmed through subsequent deployment 
through case study research. It does, however, provide a validated (if admittedly rather 
mechanistic) model for understanding the interaction of regulation, ownership 
arrangements and management culture on risk management choices. 
 
The foregoing sections have illustrated some examples of regulatory mechanisms (price 
caps, quality standards, introduction of competition) that influence this framework.  A range 
of ownership arrangements which will be informed by regulation (public ownership 
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arrangements, privatisation and models described as private sector participation) have been 
documented and inform the management culture that influences risk management choices. 
Although the review demonstrates that uncertainty (stochastic and epistemic) incentivises 
reactive risk management, it also suggests that operating within the time bound limits of a 
regulatory contract and the availability of capital funding has more of an influence over the 
balance between reactive risk management (typically under restricted funding conditions) 
and proactive risk management (where there is adequate access to capital markets).  
Water utilities operate within a dynamic business environment and are subject to changes 
in regulation, objectives and ownership arrangements that will affect the risk profile of the 
organisation. It is clear from this review that utilities must remain vigilant to change and 
constantly re-evaluate the appropriateness of risk management strategies in order to 
manage risk (systemic and corporate) and cost reduction challenges. There is a clear need to 
better understand how to best craft an organisation`s risk management strategy under 
different operating conditions, supporting a measured risk management culture. An 
improved risk management model will support water authorities in meeting the aspirations 
of the Bonn Charter and becoming “high reliability” services while still out-performing their 
financial and service level targets. 
2.5 Refinement of the research agenda and research question 
In order to protect public health and maintain services to its customers, a water provider 
must ensure the networks it operates are robust to, inter alia, changes in population, 
climate change and water scarcity (Blackmore and Plant, 2008, Wang and Blackmore, 2009). 
Where risk management enables the organisation to focus on the ability to prevent failures 
and maintain a stable system, strategies to enhance resilience seek to develop interventions 
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that support the ability of systems to adapt to change. Hence, risk management regimes 
that promote resilience will be pro-active rather than reactive, intentionally seeking out and 
characterising risk within organisational plans and operations as a precursor to building 
resilience enhancing capacities (Pollard et al., 2009).  
Other research supports the need for further work to better understand the challenges a 
utility faces in embedding risk management practise and making it pervasive through the 
organisation. Hrudey et al. (2006), Pollard et al. (2004), Wu et al. (2009) and Rogers and 
Louis (2008) provide supporting evidence that regulation, ownership arrangements and 
management culture have an influence on how a water utility approaches risk management. 
Organisations that have developed high reliability systems will manage the tension between 
systematic risk and cost reduction.  
There is evidence of the relationships between regulation and corporate governance 
installed to oversee risk management which has relevance to the research agenda 
developed here. Rothstein et al. (2006) draw our attention to the emergence of risk 
(systemic or corporate) as an organising concept for regulation and governance which has 
led to many debates, particularly with respect to Ulrich Beck`s risk society thesis (1992). 
Rothstein et al. (2006) argue that more recent preoccupations with risk are not driven by 
changing distributions of real, or imagined ills in society, but rather by changing ills in 
governance. In fact, the review emphasises that failure has always been a part of 
governance but more recent pressures on organisations such as greater coherence, 
transparency and accountability have exposed the limits of governance as a result of this 
greater awareness of institutional risk. Rothstein et al. (2006) conclude by arguing that risk 
“colonisation” resulting from the dynamics of contemporary governance leads to risk 
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defining the object, method and rationale of governance. It can be argued that management 
strategies need to remain agile and under review to take account of new and emerging risks 
resulting from changes to regulation, ownership arrangements and management culture 
within a water utility business. Inflexible governance and risk management systems may 
result in creating further unintended corporate risk.  
The literature review has identified a number of interesting features of the interplay 
between regulation, ownership arrangements, management culture and risk. The main 
focus of research in this area is around the efficiency of business models employed to 
deliver water and waste water services. The review noted that few studies have considered 
the impact of regulation, ownership arrangements, and management culture and efficiency 
improvements on water utilities` approaches to managing operational and systemic risk. 
This thesis explores this gap in the research and intends to better understand the 
approaches to risk management under varying regulatory and ownership arrangements. 
Chapter 3 expands on the literature review and uses the output to synthesise a framework 
for the research. 
The literature review described in Chapter 2 explored a rich landscape of research that 
examined regulation and ownership arrangements in the water sector and some other 
sectors, on risk management. This analysis of previous work revealed that there was a broad 
range of research on the efficiency of ownership arrangements but that there was a gap in 
understanding of how management decisions influenced risk management choices within 
the  water utilities. As national and international financing continues to come under cross-
sectoral pressures and the desire for efficiency remains a significant political priority; the 
need to understand the impact of these driver facilitated through mechanisms such as 
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regulation, ownership arrangements on risk management becomes greater. The 
consequences of failure to deliver safe drinking water and sanitation can have an immediate 
and significant impact on public health and the environment. The literature review, in part, 
has been confirmatory by exposing evidence that regulation, ownership and management 
culture do have an impact on risk management (Sections 2.1. through 2.5). Having 
highlighted that such features do have an impact on risk management, the question can be 
refined to: 
 
How do the specifics of regulation, ownership and management culture influence risk 
management choices for water service providers?   
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
Chapter 2 exposed a complex and rich landscape of influences and interdependencies 
rooted in a social context that is not easily quantified or understood. Figure 2.5 highlighted 
that the delivery of water services is a complex matrix of interactions where management 
tasked with delivery of the services do so in an environment defined by regulation, limited 
by economics and influenced by politics. The review exposed a gap in understanding of how 
variations in regulation and ownership influence management culture and ultimately risk 
management practise. Chapter 3 defines the general methodology adopted to facilitate the 
research activity and it should be noted that some elements of methodology were specific 
to the Phase I and II research activities. The variations in methodology are reported in 
Sections 4.3 and 5.3 respectively.  
In Section 1.6 the research disciplines were briefly described (See Figure 1.1) and it was 
reported that a multi-disciplinary approach to addressing the research question was being 
employed. A qualitative approach has been chosen and is based on social sciences 
methodology to enable a context specific appraisal and deeper understanding of what water 
industry actors think and believe about risk management practise with respect to regulation 
and ownership arrangements. The adopted qualitative approach is based on rigorous and 
established techniques (Silverman, 2013a) that enable the researcher to analyse and 
present the data in an objective way. This is discussed in detail in Section 3.4.   
Chapter 3 goes on to explain the approach to data analysis using computer assisted 
qualitative data analysis systems (CAQDAS) and in particular describes the methodology of 
code development and theory building (Silverman, 2011). During this phase of the analysis it 
was important to independently validate the analysis (Blaikie, 2000, Easterby-Smith, 2008, 
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Creswell, 2009, Silverman, 2011) and this is discussed in Section 3.4.6. During the data 
collection and analysis phases it was noted that the researcher was working within one of 
the institutes included in the study and this could influence the interpretation of the results. 
This possible bias is considered in some detail in Section 3.3.4. A critical perspective on 
theory and method development is used to; 
• Understand, identify and apply a robust approach to data gathering and 
interpretation. 
• Identify  and secure the collaboration of  appropriate candidate organisations for the 
case studies. 
• Develop and execute interviews with selected respondents. 
• Examine and critique accessible company data including business plans, compliance 
reports and quality performance reports. 
• Analyse and Interpret the available evidence (interviews and documents) using a 
qualitative methodology. 
Chapter 3 explains the approach taken to two phases of fieldwork which build on the output 
of previous activities, Phase I building on the literature review and Phase II informed by 
Phase I and the literature review. The development of each phase uses the core 
methodological principles described in Chapter 3 but there are elements of the method 
adapted to support the phase specific requirements defined by the outputs of the previous 
research activities and the agenda set for the respective phase. The phase specific 
methodology is described in Section 4.3 for Phase I and Section 5.3 for Phase II. 
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3.1 A Constructive Realist approach to qualitative analysis  
Within the context of the research agenda, this project examines the interplay between 
regulation, ownership arrangements together with actors who`s actions (and behaviours) 
collectively define the management culture (Partington, 2002) within the organisations 
examined as case studies. This thesis operates in the domain of management studies and 
the interactions between groups and individuals can be classified as social in nature (Blaikie, 
2000, Partington, 2002, Easterby-Smith, 2008, Silverman, 2013a). Management research can 
be described as concerned with the production and legitimisation of forms of knowledge 
associated with the practise of management (Partington, 2002). Like other research 
disciplines it involves observation, reflection, conjecture and testing theories and models 
that advance knowledge and best practise in management applications. In the Social 
Sciences and management research, methodology is defined by reference to 
epistemological perspectives that inform the interpretation and validation of data which 
supports theory construction (Blaikie, 1993, Blaikie, 2000, Easterby-Smith, 2008).  
Neuman (2003) suggests three principle approaches to Social Science research. These are 
positivism, interpretive social science (ISS) and critical social science (CSS). In many cases 
researchers adopt one approach but elements of the other philosophies may be used to a 
greater or lesser extent as the study evolves. In summary, the positivist approach is that 
which is generally associated with the natural sciences and is built around data, experiment 
and statistical validation.  With Positivism, the researcher is an objective, neutral observer 
who remains detached from that which they are observing. ISS by contrast, is based on 
qualitative methods (field study and observation) that examine meaning embedded in text 
and takes into account social interactions and context in an empathetic way. To compare, 
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CSS suggest that meaning about reality is generated by individuals and groups rather than 
reality being both real and apprehendable (as with positivism).  Neuman (2003) points out 
that: 
“The CSS researchers conduct studies to critique and transform social relationships by 
revealing the underlying sources of social control, power relations and in-equality”. Pg 109 
Neuman (2003) 
By identifying and defining revealing underlying sources of social control, inter-relationships 
and the interplay; the CSS researcher empowers people, and in particular, individuals or 
groups that are less powerful or marginalised. In general the CSS researcher would define 
social sciences as “ critical process that goes beyond the surface illusions to uncover the real 
structures in the material world in order to help people change conditions and build a better 
world for themselves” (Neuman, 2003). The CSS approach is appropriate for this study as it 
supports the investigation of motives and the impact of power groups and individuals within 
the interacting organisations (in this case, Regulators, Directors and Senior Management, 
etc)(Ackroyd, 2000, Easterby-Smith, 2008). Constructionism sets an orientation towards 
social reality that assumes beliefs and meaning are constructed by individuals or groups 
which fundamentally shape what reality is for them (Neuman, 2003; Blaikie,2010; 
Silverman, 2013). The research activity is centred on understanding how features of the 
water sector (Regulation and ownership arrangements) inform management culture (in 
part, the reality) and these influence approaches to risk management. The research activity 
is constructed around open questions which allow participants to express their reality within 
the research framework (Figure 2.6). 
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3.2 Building a conceptual framework  
The literature review (Chapter 2) defines a complex landscape of interactions in the context 
of water regulation and ownership arrangements (Figure 2.6). These organisation to 
organisation relationships are interwoven at various points by equally complex social 
relationships between the actors within organisations at various levels of management and 
in operations (Partington, 2002, Easterby-Smith, 2008). With such a rich and diverse set of 
parameters it is desirable to develop a conceptual framework for the research which 
provides a focus to the methodology, field work, data collection and interpretation; 
enabling the project to be delivered to a convincing academic standard within available time 
scales (Blaikie, 2000, Corbin, 2008).  
The conceptual framework (Figure 2.6) is not designed to be interpreted as defining the full 
complexity of interactions between regulators, water service providers and the individuals 
within these organisations (For example the agreement of regulatory contracts and the 
delivery of regulatory targets set against such contracts (Section 2.2 and Figure 2.3)). It 
offers an informative guide (or aide memoire) to the possible influences over attitudes and 
decision making when considering approaches to risk management and elements of 
interaction between regulators, utilities and individuals. The framework has informed the 
development of the fieldwork documented in Chapters 3, 4 and 5. 
3.3 Producing the field work agenda 
As discussed in Chapter 1, this research is an enquiry into how the interplay of regulation 
and ownership arrangements and management culture influences the risk management 
application. Study design informs development of a legitimate methodology that develops 
and enables collection and analysis of data. Section 3.1 discussed general approaches to 
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qualitative analysis and explained the range of research philosophies available, suggesting 
the CSS approach is appropriate for this study. Section 3.3 outlines the development of the 
field work agenda through the development of a research strategy which is based on a CSS 
approach. 
3.3.1 Research Strategy 
In this section the concepts of enquiry logic are explored more deeply to enable the 
development of data gathering and analysis. This in turn informs the field work agenda. 
The methodological perspectives outlined by Blaikie (1993, 2000) and Easterby-Smith (2008) 
can be categorised by four principles of logical enquiry (Table 3.1); inductive, deductive, 
abductive and reductive. Inductive enquiry aims to establish universal generalisations that 
explain observable patterns and is based on a positivist epistemology that assumes 
knowledge is derived from controlled experimentation and data analysis.  Deductive enquiry 
aims to test theories in order to prove or disprove them and is based on a critical rationalist 
epistemology that suggests that knowledge is never proven and observations are limited. 
Abductive enquiry sets out to understand the world through observation and describe social 
actors` motivations, accounts and experience. The epistemological position is based around 
interpertivism which recognises that knowledge is derived from meaning and interpretation 
of everyday interaction. Finally, reductive enquiry aims to explain observed phenomena 
with respect to the structure and mechanics that define reality. This is based on realism as 
an epistemological position that suggests that knowledge is gained by modelling 
mechanisms, structures and systems that define reality. This study uses a combination of 
inductive and deductive approaches and recognises that the researcher had been 
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embedded into that which will be observed. This can be described as a realist approach 
(Easterby-Smith, 2008, Bhaskar, 2008).  
Table 3.1: Four research strategies and their logical approach (modified from Blaikie 
(1993). 
Forms of 
Reasoning 
Inductive Deductive Retroductive Abductive 
Aim Establishes 
universal 
generalisations 
used to explain 
patterns. 
Tests theories to 
eliminate false ones 
and corroborate 
remaining ones. 
Discovery of 
underlying 
mechanisms that 
explain observed 
patterns and 
regularities. 
Describes and 
understands social 
interaction from 
the perspective of 
the social actors. 
Starting Point Accumulate 
observations and 
data. 
Producing 
generalisation. 
Identifies 
regularities to be 
explained. 
Construct of theory 
and deduction of 
hypothesis. 
Documents and 
models regularities. 
Development of a 
hypothetical model 
of a mechanism. 
Discovery of 
common lay 
concepts, meaning 
and motives. 
Production of 
technical accounts 
from lay accounts. 
End Point Use generalisations 
to develop laws and 
patterns that help 
explain further 
observation. 
Testing of 
hypothesis by 
matching to data. 
Determine 
mechanism by 
observation and 
experiment. 
Develop theory and 
test iteratively. 
 
3.3.2 Research strategy choice 
The thesis is concerned with the development of ideas and theories that explain features 
and interactions between actors within regulation and water utilities in an attempt to better 
understand and define the influence such features and interactions have on risk 
management application within the water sector. This ambition is strongly aligned to the 
inductive research strategy of “theory-hypothesis-observation-confirmation”. In addition, 
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there are elements of the research that require an answer as to why things happen which is 
more aligned to the deductive approach of “observation-pattern-hypothesis-theory”. This 
interaction is depicted in Figure 3.1.  Both strategies can be used in tandem (Blaikie, 2000) 
and may help to overcome weaknesses in adopting a single approach research strategy. 
Figure 3.2 depicts the re-enforcing cyclic effect when combining inductive and deductive 
research strategies (Blaikie, 2000, Creswell, 2009).  In summary, the primary strategy for the 
research is based on induction but supported by including deduction in the process at the 
appropriate points. 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Inductive and Deductive Research Strategies (Easterby-Smith, 2008) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Observation Patterns Hypothesis Theory  
Theory Hypothesis Observation Confirmation 
Deductive Strategy 
Inductive Strategy 
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Figure 3.2: The cycle of inductive/deductive research strategies (adapted from Blaikie, 
2000 and Neuman, 2003) 
 
3.3.3 The researcher`s relationship with the study subjects 
Blaikie (1993,2000) points out that consideration should be given to the relationship 
between the researcher and researched to identify and address any possible bias. 
Consideration of bias is important when establishing the stance (and inter-relationship) that 
the researcher has with his research cases, as it can influence the outcome of a number of 
aspects of the research activity, such as data gathering, interpretation and analysis of the 
data. For example, in this research study, the researcher was working for one of the 
organisations involved in the research, for part of the duration of the study. The researcher 
had pre-existing relationships with the actors interviewed within the organisation and was 
very familiar with the processes and systems operated by the business. A conscious choice 
Theory 
Hypothesis 
Observation Pattern 
Hypothesis 
Deductive 
Deductive 
Inductive 
Inductive 
Inductive 
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was made by the researcher between being an “outsider”, observing the social situation at a 
distance or an “insider” immersed in the social world of the research subjects.  The research 
was conducted from the position of insider with the researcher immersed and engaged with 
the research cases from one of the case study organisations.  
Having established the researcher`s position as an insider (for part of the study), it was also 
important to define the researcher as an “expert” or “learner”. The expert position is armed 
with relevant knowledge, theory, concepts, and tools that inform the further development 
of knowledge, compared to that of the learner who aims to set aside existing social scientific 
knowledge in an attempt to help the research cases conceptualize and understand the social 
world in which they are immersed. In this case the researcher can be classified as a learner 
as he sets aside existing knowledge of risk management to better understand the influence 
of regulation, ownership arrangements and management culture have on risk management 
practise. This means that the researcher can be thought of as an “insider learner”. The 
implication of this is that there is requirement for a degree immersion in the case study 
organisations which opens the researcher up to influence by the case study organisations 
and, equally, the researcher could influence the case study organisations. The nature of the 
immersive interaction between researchers and case study organisation could lead to 
potential bias. 
The potential bias within the research activity was managed by applying a consistent 
approach to interview structure and data analysis that was challenged by the supervisory 
team and at the periodic reviews throughout the duration of the project. In Phase II, the 
output of the interviews across case study Cases were reviewed by an independent 
researcher to verify the coding structure (Section 3.9).   
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3.4 The case study approach 
In the preceding chapters and sections the study has been defined as social in nature and 
based on a constructive realism epistemology. In Section 3.3.3 the researcher has declared 
an “insider learner” stance and in Section 3.3.2 the research approach has been justified as 
a combination of inductive and deductive strategies. In this Section (3.4) the process for 
data collection is discussed and described. A number of researchers, for example,  Blaikie 
(2000), Neuman(2003), Creswell(2009) and Yin (2009) suggest a range of methodologies 
that can be used to collect data in the social sciences domain. Yin (2009) offers a set of 
criteria which can be used as an aid to selecting an appropriate social science method for a 
given set of circumstances (Table 3.2). The data collection is based on interviews, company 
data and other reports. Other data collection methods such as surveys and close question 
interviews where considered but the open interview approach was preferred as it gave the 
actors more freedom to express their views unconstrained, which added to the richness and 
diversity of responses.  
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Table 3.2: Selection of social science methodologies (Yin, 2009) 
Method Question Type Control over 
Research 
Parameters 
(Behaviour, 
environment, 
social Setting, etc) 
Focus on 
contemporary 
Events 
Experimentation How, Why Yes Yes 
Surveys How Much, How 
Many, Who, What, 
Where 
No Yes 
Analysis of Archive 
Materials 
How Much, How 
Many, Who, What, 
Where 
No Yes and No 
The Study of 
Historical events 
How, Why No No 
Case Studies How, Why No Yes 
 
There is little control that the researcher has over the operating environment of the 
organisations which provide the focus for the study and there is no control over the social 
environment or behaviours. Furthermore the research is concerned with contemporary 
events and how these impact on long term outcomes for the water industry. Given this, the 
study will be employing case study methodology advocated by, for example, Easterby-Smith 
(2008), Blaikie (2000), Silverman (2013) and others.  
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3.4.1 The Data 
Yin (2009) describes the types of evidence and data that are required to be collected in 
order to develop a robust and legitimate case study output.  These include elements such as 
archive records, interviews (open ended, focused and structured), observations, and other 
documentary evidence.  
The study is built upon multiple case studies. Gathered evidence includes company reports, 
strategic plans (where these exist), regulatory documents, risk management procedures 
(and reports), structured and open interview questions and observations by the researcher 
(Yin, 2009). Much of the evidence, for example, company reports, strategic plans and 
regulations are available through company websites, government websites and national 
archives.  Risk management processes were accessible for some, but not all case studies and 
confidentiality agreements needed to be signed for access to some data, particularly reports 
that contained information on reported risks within organisations. Financial information was 
provided directly by some case study cases, some were obtained through company websites 
and some were not accessible. Where information was unobtainable, for example Section 
5.4.3 (where a short written response was provided), the discussions were limited but based 
on the available evidence. The data gathering exercise was aided by the fact that the 
researcher held a senior position within one of the organisations and had access to actors 
and reports more readily than a researcher that is out-with the organisation. The researcher 
had very good working relationships with actors in most of the other case study 
organisations (including regulators) which made access to data (including interviews with 
executives) perhaps more straight forward than would normally be the case for this type of 
investigative work (Easterby-Smith, 2008; Partington, 2002). Although this is the primary 
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method of research, it is noted that the there are elements of experimentation and these 
modified during the two phases of research activity (Section 4.3 and 5.3). 
3.4.2 Design of Phase I  
The research activity was conducted in two phases with Phase I designed to verify the 
output of the literature review learning and assess the effectiveness of the interview 
techniques used and the construction of the questions designed.  
The purpose of Phase I (Section 3.5) was to: 
 Verify the observations made in the literature review (Chapter 2) 
 Test the researcher`s competence in developing interview questions and executing 
interviews 
 Gather a set of data to inform selection and development of a more detailed set of 
case studies under Phase II 
The researcher worked within the utility and had open access to a range of actors at senior 
management level, together with regulatory officers. At this stage in the study the focus was 
on the interplay between regulation and ownership arrangements on the management 
culture and how this influenced risk management. It was practical and reasonable 
(recognising time limitations and availability of senior managers and directors) to target 
those actors within the organisation who had accountability for managing risk. The 
regulators views are important, providing an independent position on how risk management 
was implemented within the organisation.  
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3.4.3 Design of Phase II  
Phase II builds on Phase I and is centred on acquiring the necessary data to address the 
research question (Section 2.5).  There were a number of questions that needed to be 
addressed when developing the design of Phase II that included: 
 What information is needed to address the research question? 
The information required to address the research question is contained within each case 
study as documented evidence and additional material is held by actors within the 
organisations as; experience, process application, management culture and technical 
competence. 
 Where is the information located? 
The information resides within the organisations, in the public domain and with the case 
study actors. 
 How will the researcher gain access to the information? 
The researcher gained access to the data by engaging with the actors who agreed to be 
participants in the case study interviews. Some of the participants supplied supplementary 
documentation, for example, financial reports, risk registers, performance reports. The 
researcher gained additional documented evidence from company websites, regulators and 
government websites.  
 How will the information be extracted and analysed? 
The information collected was collated as a project within a CAQDAS system and coded as 
described in Section 3.5 through 3.11. 
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 How many interviews are enough to address the research agenda? 
The number of interviews required to deliver enough data to validate a study has been 
widely debated (Mason, 2010, Baker, 2012). Valid qualitative studies have been based on as 
few as one interview with the mean number of interviews in a study conducted by Mason 
(2010) being 31 (based on a review of 560 studies). With such variation in sample size it is 
worth considering the principle of saturation (Glaser and Strauss, 1967) where collection of 
further data does not necessarily delivery new meaningful insights on the topic of study.  In 
the case of this thesis, saturation was considered along with the objectives of the study and 
access to the required actors. The total number of recorded interviews was 29 which are 
within a reasonable target range for a qualitative study. A further 17 informal conversations 
took place which added to the richness of the analysis (Table 3.5).  
Five case studies where selected (Section 5.3) which provided a number of variations in 
regulation, ownership arrangements and management culture. The case studies had 
differing geographies and in one case (Case C) operated across a number of countries and 
therefore regulatory systems. The selection process is described in Section 5.3.1. As with 
Phase I, the output of the Phase II research activity was generated and analysed using the 
methodology described in Sections 3.5 through 3.11. The actors interviewed within each 
case study were anonymised with the numbers of interviews for each case listed in Table 5.3 
and a key for actor identification given in Table 5.9.  
3.5 Design of data collection 
Figure 3.3 is a visual representation of the research journey milestones. The first step taken 
was to deliver a research proposal which identified a potential gap in research for the topic 
of interest (Chapter 1). The proposal was further developed and expanded in the literature 
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review (Chapter 2). In turn the literature review informed the research question and the 
proposed analytical methodology (Chapter 3).  The research activity was then broken down 
into two phases of case study work.  
The second phase of multiple case study work was undertaken once Phase I was completed 
(Sections 3.4.2 and 3.4.3). Multiple case studies should be carefully considered and 
approached as one would approach empirical laboratory research which is built from 
multiple experiments (Neuman, 2003; Creswell, 2009; Yin, 2009). In other words each case 
study should be considered as an individual experiment, adopting a strategy where the 
observations from one case study are used to inform the agenda for subsequent enquiry. In 
this way, rich and meaningful qualitative evidence that informs the study objectives is 
synthesised.  
The project needed to be mindful of the potential for bias and of the validity of 
interpretation so as to ensure a credible scientific contribution could be made. Recent 
commentary on qualitative studies (Silverman, 2005, Silverman, 2013a) has highlighted 
concerns over the application of established social science methodologies and perhaps over 
use of these techniques (Silverman, 2013b) which is a legitimate observation. These 
challenges to the appropriate use of qualitative methods have been given careful 
consideration when selecting the methodology for Phase I and Phase II.  
The appropriate application of social science methodology was determined by examining 
existing literature on social science methodology and acquiring an understanding of when 
and how such methodologies can be usefully deployed in qualitative studies. Evidence, for 
example interview transcripts, were analysed using CAQDAS and employed established 
methodologies for qualitative interpretation (Easterby-Smith, 2008, Silverman, 2011, 
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Neuman, 2003, Blaikie, 1993). Similarly, for the construction of coding systems, 
methodology was used that was adapted from literature on the application of CAQDAS  
(Friese, 2012, Saldana.J, 2009, Lewins. A, 2007). A verification exercise was conducted ( see 
Section 3.10.4) that, to a degree, acted as a quality control on the process of coding. The 
rigour applied to the application of selected methods should mitigate concerns over the 
application of the chosen data gathering and analysis process. 
 
  
 
Figure 3.3: Data Collection and analysis process 
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3.6 Interview survey methodology and approach to question design 
Foddy (2003) observes that the use of verbal data has become dominant in Social Science 
studies.  Sliverman (2013) also highlights that the use of interviews in case study work 
appears to be overused or used inappropriately. Interviews are, however, a cost-efficient 
way of exposing and recording behaviours and opinion. Foddy (2003) together with Kvale 
and Brinkmann (2009) explain the usefulness of good interviews while emphasising the 
limitations and unintended results or bias that the interviewer can impose on the interview 
situation. Interviews form the backbone of this study and it is therefore important to make 
mindful choices in the construction of questions and the execution of the interviews to elicit 
as rich a response as possible from the limited time available with the interviewees.  
Foddy (2003) explains that all questions are open to interpretation and explains that 
answers will be open to influence from the interviewer`s behaviour (for example, style in 
asking questions, beliefs, relationship with interviewee and knowledge of subject) as well as 
how the interviewee interprets the question in relation to memory recall, experience, 
attitudes, beliefs, etc. In general terms information is exchanged between interviewer and 
interviewee in a cyclical process of encoding and decoding the language used in questioning 
and answers given. Every exchange is open to miss-interpretation, influence and bias.  
The interview questions for both sets of case studies (Phases I and II of the research agenda) 
were designed as open, semi-structured questions, taking into account the sensitivity 
around interpretation of the wording used in each question. The semi-structured interviews 
with open ended questions are listed in Table 3.3.  
The questions were constructed around the central themes identified in the literature 
review (Chapter 2). The use of a standard set of open questions allowed for a range of 
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opinions to be expressed within the selected group of actors. The questions were slightly 
modified for the interviews conducted with the regulator to reflect the accountabilities they 
have with respect to the water sector regulation.  A total of five interviews were conducted 
during Phase I. Each interview lasted approximately forty five minutes and was fully 
transcribed for analysis. The transcriptions were kept confidential, in-line with the ethics 
requirements (Appendix I). Respondents signed a consent form and were made aware that 
the information they provided would be anonymised but may form part of a publication 
(Appendix I).  
Phase I interviews were transcribed and analysed using CAQDAS (Friese, 2012, Saldana.J, 
2009) and the output of the analysis, along with the literature review output, was used to 
modify the questions for Phase II of the study. Table 3.4 lists the questions used during 
Phase II. 
Each interview (for both phases of the research agenda) was a conversation which used the 
questions listed in either Tables 3.3 or 3.4. Supplementary questions were asked during the 
course of the conversation to develop and expand on interesting features of the answers 
given. The supplementary questions varied from respondent to respondent dependent upon 
the answers given and how these were decoded by the researcher. This iterative process is 
represented in Figure 3.4. The Phase II interviews varied in duration from around 25 
minutes to one and a half hours with the average being circa 50 minutes. The shorter 
interviews were given by interviewees that were lower in the organisational structure 
and/or who had limited experience of risk management and regulation. Their responses are 
included and still valid as they offer an understanding of the importance allocated to risk 
management and the pervasiveness of risk management within the organisations. In one of 
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the case study targets, the organisation of interest (from Portugal), did not give interviews 
but provided two written responses, one answering the questions in Phase II (Table 3.4) and 
the other relating to other questions that they felt relevant. The responses, while limited, 
were still valid in the context of the study as they gave an insight into what an organisation 
was prepared to share with third parties on the subject of risks. The documents are unique 
within the study and have been included in Appendix III. The responses were analysed using 
CAQDAS and coding methodologies consistent with the other interview transcripts. 
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Table 3.3: Interview questions developed for Phase I case study and validation exercise, based on literature review output. 
Question Motivation Primary Question Origin of Question (lit Rev or Prof insight) Expected response Director Expected response GM Expected response Manager Expected response Regulator
1
Validate Organisational 
approach to regulation.
Can you describe how Scottish 
Water`s ambitions and activities 
are shaped by regulatory 
objectives?
Literature Review and Professional 
Insight: In the UK there is evidence in the 
business plans that water companies 
focus on meeting or out performing the 
regulatory contract.  Paying less attention 
to longer term objectives.
Will vary but the key 
concern for directors is 
access to funding while out 
performing the regulatory 
contract.
Outperformance of the 
regulatory contract is 
essential. This will include 
financial and operational 
objectives.
Compliance with regulation 
cannot be compromised.
Compliance with regulation 
cannot be compromised.
2
Validate Organisations 
understanding of 
Ownership and 
Performance.
Does the form of ownership of 
the business influence its 
potential for success within the 
current regulatory 
environment?
Literature Review: It would appear that 
privatisation does not lead to greater 
efficiency. Performance is linked to a 
range of factors that include complexity 
of treatment, abstraction, networks, etc.
The general view would be 
that there are advantages 
and disadvantages of both. I 
would expect that access to 
capital markets is the main 
driver and therefore they 
would favour privatisation 
over public ownership 
models.
This will be mixed as the 
GMs have a range of 
experience in the public 
and private sectors. I would 
expect personal experience 
would influence the 
answers.
This is likely to be a personal 
judgement based on 
personal experience and 
political views.
The regulator will give an 
unbiased opinion on the 
advantages and 
disadvantages of both but will 
be reluctant to give a 
personal view.
3
Validate Understanding 
of Risk strategy within 
the organisation.
What are the major risks faced 
by Scottish Water in delivering 
its objectives?
Literature Review: Evidence suggests that 
although water companies understand 
risk, it is not yet embedded in the 
organisations culture sufficiently to meet 
the requirements of, for example, the 
Bonn Charter.
The directors are likely to 
discuss the corporate 
process. They may give a 
view on the effectiveness 
of the strategy.
The GMs will be aware of 
the risk management 
strategy and policy. They 
may give examples of risks 
that they have escalated 
through the process. They 
may have a view on the 
effectiveness of the current 
system.
The manager will be clearer 
on the mechanics of the 
organisations risk 
management system. They 
should be able to comment 
on the effectiveness of 
operation.
The regulator will know of the 
risk strategy but may feel that 
it is not yet embedded into 
the culture. This will be 
supported by evidence 
gathered during site audits.
4
Determine the priority 
of risk within the 
context of achieving the 
business objectives.
Thinking about your area of 
responsibility, can you provide a 
couple of examples of how risk 
is charicterised and managed 
when delivering your business 
objectives?
Literature Review and Professional 
Insight: Water companies appear to put 
the task before leadership or risk. For 
example, there is evidence to suggest 
that outsourcing is used as a way of 
mitigating risk.
The directors will be in a 
position to give good 
examples of risk mitigation 
measures that do not 
compromise delivery of out 
performance. 
The GMs may be able to 
give good examples of risk 
mitigation for their 
particular areas. Some will 
give examples of longer 
term (greater than 5 years) 
interventions.
The manager should be able 
to give some specific 
detailed examples of risk 
management initiatives for 
their area of responsibility.
The regulator may express 
concern that the business 
objectives are priorities to 
the detriment of managing 
operational risk and the 
protection of public health. 
5
Establish the importance 
of governance within 
the organisation.
To what extent are governance 
structures and processes within 
Scottish Water appropriate for 
managing the types of risk that 
the business faces?
Literature Review: The recent banking 
crisis is driving business towards 
introducing more governance, evidence 
points to greater governance leading to 
the generation of additional risk.
The directors will be able to 
describe the organisations 
approach to governance.
The GMs will give a similar 
response to the directors. 
They may indicate that 
there are too many 
governance groups within 
the organisation.
The manager should be able 
to give examples of 
governance activity but this 
may be more specific to their 
area of accountability.
The regulator will be clear on 
the governance processes of 
the organisation but may 
question the necessity of 
some of the activities.
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Table 3.4: Open questions developed for the Phase II case study work (based on phase one output and literature review).  
  
Question Motivation Primary Question Origin of Question (lit Rev or Prof insight) Expected response Director Expected response GM Expected response Manager Expected response Regulator
1
Understand and validate 
the business priorities 
of the organisations 
(regulators and service 
providers) to see if 
there is alignment.
What Drivers Influence the 
Business Priorities in your 
Organisation?
Literature Review and output from the 
phase 1 interviews.  The principle drivers 
may include access to funding, delivering 
regulatroy objectives and improvements 
to customer service.
Will vary but the key 
concern for directors is 
access to funding while out 
performing the regulatory 
contract.
Outperformance of the 
regulatory contract is 
essential. This will include 
financial and operational 
objectives.
Compliance with regulation 
cannot be compromised.
Compliance with regulation 
cannot be compromised.
2
Gain insight and 
understanding into what 
competing tensions are 
present and how this 
may influence decision 
making.
What Tensions do you feel exist 
between the various drivers and 
to what extent do these impact 
on sustainable busines practise?
Literature Review and output of phase 
one interview process. Tensions appear 
between financing, quality and service. 
Each regulatory body and water provider 
will put a different weighting on each of 
the factors. 
The general view would be 
that there are advantages 
and disadvantages of both. I 
would expect that access to 
capital markets is the main 
driver as it enables quality 
and service imporvements.
This will be mixed as the 
GMs have a range of roles 
and responsibilities within 
the organisation. Their 
answers will be aligned to 
their areas of responsibility.
This is likely to be a personal 
judgement based on 
personal experience and 
accountability.
The regulator will be able to 
articulate most of the 
tensions and may favour 
delivery of the regulatory 
objectives that they are 
accountable for.
3
Validate Understanding 
of the risks that the 
orgnisation faces.
What are the key areas of risk 
with which youthink the 
organisation sould be most 
concerned?
Literature Review: Evidence suggests that 
although water companies understand 
risk, it is not yet embedded in the 
organisations culture sufficiently to meet 
the requirements of, for example, the 
Bonn Charter. This is supported by the 
output of phase one.
The directors are likely to 
discuss the corporate 
process. They may give a 
view on the effectiveness 
of the strategy.
The GMs will be aware of 
the risk management 
strategy and policy. They 
may give examples of risks 
that they have escalated 
through the process. They 
may have a view on the 
effectiveness of the current 
system.
The manager will be clearer 
on the mechanics of the 
organisations risk 
management system. They 
should be able to comment 
on the effectiveness of 
operation.
The regulator will know of the 
risk strategy but may feel that 
it is not yet embedded into 
the culture. This will be 
supported by evidence 
gathered during site audits.
4
Determine the priority 
of risk within the 
context of achieving the 
business objectives.
How do the performance 
objectives and the fundng 
model of the organisation meet 
the regulatory priorities?
Literature Review and output pf phase 
one.  Decision makers tend to be aware of 
risks but are still required to make 
decisions which may be counter to the 
risk mitigation measures.
The directors will be in a 
position to give good 
examples of risk mitigation 
measures that do not 
compromise delivery of out 
performance. 
The GMs may be able to 
give good examples of risk 
mitigation for their 
particular areas. Some will 
give examples of longer 
term (greater than 5 years) 
interventions.
The manager should be able 
to give some specific 
detailed examples of risk 
management initiatives for 
their area of responsibility.
The regulator may express 
concern that the business 
objectives are priorities to 
the detriment of managing 
operational risk and the 
protection of public health. 
5
Establish the importance 
of governance within 
the organisation.
Is there an appropriate risk 
management culture in the 
organisation and what 
improvements, if any, would 
you like to see with respect to 
managing risk?
Literature Review and output of phase 
one interview process suggests that 
organisations will have base risk 
management in place but this is not as 
mature as would be expected.
The directors will be able to 
describe the organisations 
approach to governance.
The GMs will give a similar 
response to the directors. 
They may indicate that 
there are too many 
governance groups within 
the organisation.
The manager should be able 
to give examples of 
governance activity but this 
may be more specific to their 
area of accountability.
The regulator will be clear on 
the governance processes of 
the organisation but may 
question the necessity of 
some of the activities.
6
Deterimine how 
organisations approach 
long termstratgey and 
planning.
How do you percieve your 
organisation`s remit and role 
changing in future?
Literature Review and Phase One output 
suggests that utilities will focus on short 
term planning horizons such as annual or 
five year blocks.
The directors will be in a 
position to give good 
examples of risk mitigation 
measures that do not 
compromise delivery of out 
performance. 
The GMs may be able to 
give good examples of risk 
mitigation for their 
particular areas. Some will 
give examples of longer 
term (greater than 5 years) 
interventions.
The manager should be able 
to give some specific 
detailed examples of risk 
management initiatives for 
their area of responsibility.
The regulator may express 
concern that the business 
objectives are priorities to 
the detriment of managing 
operational risk and the 
protection of public health. 
7
Establish and 
understanding of how 
effective the actors 
think their risk 
management processes 
are embedded within 
the business.
How pervasive do you think risk 
management is within your 
organisation?
Literature Review, personal experience 
and the output of phase one suggests that 
in some cases risk management does not 
gain traction through out the 
organisation.
The directors will believe 
that the risk management 
processes in place are 
effective for the most part 
but could be imporved.
The GMs will give a similar 
response to the directors. 
They may indicate that 
there are too many 
unproductive meetings  
within the organisation.
The manager should be able 
to give examples of risk 
managment activity but this 
may be more specific to their 
area of accountability.
The regulator will not 
necessarily be clear on water 
companies risk management 
processes and how well 
embedded these are.
86 
 
3.7 Collection of documented performance data 
Case study work should not just be a series of interviews (Silverman, 2013b, Neuman, 
2003) used to assess the qualitative nature of an organisation or a set of cultural 
features of a group. Information from a wider range of sources can significantly enrich 
the project output (Creswell, 2009, Yin, 2009). In many cases data is publically 
available for water companies. In the United Kingdom, water quality data, asset 
information, financial performance and investment profiles are easily accessible 
through either the relevant regulators` web sites and/or the water service providers` 
web sites. The data can also be obtained through freedom of information requests or 
simply by contacting the organisation of interest and seeking permission to access the 
data for research purposes. Some data linked to the non-UK cases was a little more 
difficult to access, however a similar process of accessing data through publically 
available routes and/or direct contact was applied.  
3.8 Ethical considerations and confidentiality  
It was agreed at the outset of the project that the actors and organisations taking part 
would be anonymised within the outputs of the study. It was important to elicit open 
and honest responses from the interviewees in a safe environment where they could 
express opinion and sensitivities without concern of being identified. In doing this it 
was hoped that the interview outputs would be richer, more expressive and have 
more depth than if the interviews were formally documented within the body of the 
report. The richness of answers is key to enhancing the quality of the analysis 
(Silverman, 2013b) and legitimising the qualitative research approach. 
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By ensuring anonymity, the relationship between interviewer and interviewee can be 
improved (Creswell, 2009, Brinkmann.S, 2009) resulting in the potential for deeper 
and more meaningful conversation that uncovers opinion and deeper levels of 
understanding. With this in mind, enough general information on the organisations 
involved in the study has been included (for example, in Table 5.2) where the 
assessment of organisations is geographically based. Interviewees` general role titles 
have been used and a unique reference number allocated to protect their identity 
(Table 5.9). 
The research ethics policy of Cranfield University was followed (Appendix I) with a 
particular emphasis on the following: 
 Being open and honest with potential respondents; 
 Ensuring respondents understood what would happen to the 
information they provided; 
 Ensuring respondents understood their right to withdraw from the 
study at any time; 
 Producing contact details so that respondents could raise queiries 
subsequent to interviews. 
When considering the project as a whole and the ethics agreements (Appendix I), the 
Cranfield policy requires that the project and supporting activities are legal, are 
aligned to the University`s values, will produce an output that is valid and enhance 
reputation.  A proposal for ethical approval for the study was submitted and 
approved by the Cranfield Science and Engineering Research Ethics Committee 
(Appendix I).  
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3.9 Considerations of bias within the sample set and influence on responses. 
As discussed in Section 3.3.3, in this project the researcher can be classified as an 
“insider-learner” (Blaikie, 1993, 2000). At the start of the project the researcher had 
some knowledge of risk management issues and extensive knowledge of the water 
industry, with some 14 years experience in water sciences, water and wastewater 
quality and operations. The researcher was also embedded in one of the case study 
organisations for part of the duration of the project. With this in mind, close attention 
was paid to the method choice, interview technique, approach to data analysis, etc, 
(See Section 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6), with a recognition of, and sensitivity to the bias that the 
researcher could bring to the study. A number of checks and validations have been 
used to identify influences and bias of the researcher. The first practical step was to 
conduct Phase I of the research activity to test the researcher`s ability to design open 
questions and a credible interview technique. The output of the initial five interview 
transcripts were analysed using CAQDAS and the output was discussed, reviewed and 
tested within the research team (principle researcher and supervisory staff). The 
outcome of the review confirmed that the researcher`s interview technique was 
satisfactory, based on the conversational style of interview technique suggested by 
the transcript text (and recordings) together with the richness of the interviewee 
responses. The coding methodology appeared appropriate and consensus was 
reached on the adequacy of the interpretation of the interviews, allowing the 
researcher to proceed to Phase II of the research activity. 
The Phase II activity output (data collection, interview transcripts and coding exercise) 
was reviewed by an independent,  post-doctoral researcher, who holds a PhD in social 
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sciences  to validate the coding system. This validation exercise is discussed in Section 
3.10.4. The validation exercise highlighted that the coding system and the way that it 
had been applied by the 3rd party researcher was similar to that of the principle 
researcher. While this is not a definitive validation exercise in quantitative terms it 
demonstrates that the analytical techniques are replicable with broadly similar 
outcomes. 
3.10 Approach to data analysis 
Recorded interviews were transcribed by the principle researcher with support from 
professional administration staff. Some interviewees, principally operational staff, 
declined to be recorded. In cases where transcripts are not available, field notes were 
used as aid memoires to the answers given at the interviews. All interviews and 
analysis were supplemented by observations and ad-hoc conversations during 
interactions with industry actors (Table 3.5). These interactions included water 
company staff, regulators and other stakeholders including water users. Observations 
included interactions between senior management and regulators engaging in 
conversation about such topic areas as compliance with regulation; interactions 
between senior managers during management meetings, discussing, for example,  
elements of business performance, governance issues and compliance; conversations 
between managers and operational staff discussing actions resulting from incidents 
(where an incident is a failure of the water treatment process which may result in 
harm to the public). All of the conversations add richness to the qualitative analysis 
and the understanding of organisation management culture.  The analysis of the 
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interviews was carried out using CAQDAS (Section 9.9) and (Friese, 2012; Lewins.A, 
2007). 
Table 3.6: Ad-hoc conversations which provided supplementary qualitative data   
Participant Case Study Date 
General Subject 
Area 
Director A 
06/02/12 Ownership 
Arrangements 
Regulator A 16/02/12 Regulation 
Manager A 03/02/12 Risk Management 
Manager A 07/03/12 Risk Management 
Operator A 23/02/12 Risk Management 
Operator A 08/03/12 Regulation 
Operator A 08/03/12 Risk Management 
Director B 03/04/12 Risk Management 
Manager B 12/04/12 Regulation 
Operator B 05/04/12 Risk Management 
Operator B 05/04/12 Risk Management 
Director C 
01/02/12 Ownership 
Arrangements 
Director C 
09/02/12 Ownership 
Arrangements 
Director C 17/02/12 Risk Management 
Operator C 22/03/12 Risk Management 
Operator C 29/03/12 Regulation 
Operator C 05/04/12 Regulation 
 
3.10.1 Coding and the strategy for code construction  
Coding structures need to be mindful of the framework that the project is working 
within the data analysis process. The coding process needs to be defined but flexible 
enough to be adjusted to avoid constraining the richness of the qualitative analysis. 
The process of coding is cyclical and more detail is built during each revision of the 
interview scripts. The adopted coding sequence follows that proposed by Neuman 
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(2003) and Saldana (2009). The initial review involved open coding which is a process 
that enables the researcher to locate themes and develop codes in an attempt to 
condense large volumes of raw data into themes. The second phase of coding is 
known as axial coding and focuses on re-analysing the data using the preliminary 
codes and emerging concepts from the open coding exercise. The principal objective 
is to review and examine the initial codes that lead to organisation of ideas and 
themes that develop an axis of primary concepts. The final step in the coding process 
involves scanning all the data and previous developed codes for cases that 
demonstrate the emerging themes; this is known as selective coding. Each project 
document was analysed using this approach. Throughout the three phases of coding 
the inductive and deductive strategies (Section 3.3.2) were applied which 
underpinned the cyclic nature of coding. The initial open coding exercise was more 
weighted to the inductive elements of the strategy, where observation from the 
interviews were translated into coding and patterns which informed thinking (Figure 
3.2). The ideas forming from the open coding then informed the axial coding which 
incorporated more deductive strategy. The selective coding element of the analysis 
incorporated both inductive and deductive elements (Figure 3.1).  
From the three phases of coding analysis conducted in CAQDAS a range of open codes 
were established, examples of which are listed in Table 3.6. These codes, with other 
similar logical codes, were applied to each interview and have helped develop the 
analysis documented in Chapter 4 and 5. Figure 3.4 is a screen shot demonstrating 
how the open codes listed in Table 3.6 have been applied to the transcripts of the 
interviews (Friese, 2012, Saldana.J, 2009). 
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Table 3.6 Selected codes identified during Phase I open coding exercise. 
Code Sub-code Definition 
Regulation 
Collaborative Used when there is an indication of regulators 
and organisations working together. 
Objectives Used when business, ministerial or regulatory 
objectives are mentioned. 
Ownership 
Political Used when there is reference to interaction 
with political entities. 
Incentives Used when incentives to meet objectives are 
mentioned. 
Shareholders Used when shareholders are mentioned. 
Funding Used when economics, OPEX, CAPEX and 
funding mechanisms are mentioned. 
Governance 
Process Used when processes are mentioned. 
Decision Making Used when decision making and delegation are 
mentioned. 
Accountability Used when ownership or risk and decisions are 
mentioned. 
Risk 
Management 
Economic Used when the economics of risk management 
is mentioned 
Political Used when risk management within a political 
context is mentioned. 
Public Heath Used when public health management is 
mentioned. 
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Figure 3.4 : Example of application of codes to transcript text. 
 
Data analysed for Phase II of the study was conducted using the same techniques as 
Phase I. The output of Phase I informed the open questions developed for Phase II 
and the coding strategy during the analysis. Appendix II lists the codes developed in 
each phase of the research. The codes in phase one, while informative, were 
developed into a more descriptive set of codes during the analysis of the Phase II data 
based in the cyclical nature of the inductive and deductive strategy (Figure 3.2). The 
descriptive codes better reflected the nature of the responses given by the 
participants in the Phase II case Studies (Chapter 5). 
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3.10.2 Developing the coding networks and inter-relationships 
As well as developing a code structure, the inter-relationships between interviewees 
was considered as part of the analysis. During the analysis the actors were grouped by 
role, by country and by organisation. Connections were made within countries 
between service providers and regulators. By creating a range of sub-families it was 
possible to view the data through multiple lenses to gain a deeper, richer analysis and 
understanding of the common themes, experiences and tensions that exist within the 
sample group. The document families were grouped in ways that enabled vertical and 
horizontal comparisons to be made within the data that facilitated a more complete 
and detailed analysis. 
3.10.3 Capturing data using field notes and analytical memos 
In Section 3.6 and 3.10 it was highlighted that some interviewees, while happy to be 
interviewed did not agreed to be recorded. Ethical considerations mean that the 
preference not to be recorded needed to be honoured. Where recordings (and 
transcripts) were not generated, field notes were taken.  The output of the field notes 
(a form of transcript)were included in the analysis.  Other forms of notes were 
developed throughout the research activity, these notes can be referred to as 
analytical memos (Saldana, 2009). These analytical memos are of importance as they 
capture the researchers thinking and document observations, emerging themes and 
help support theory building. The whole analytical process can be described as one of 
noticing, collecting and thinking. Figure 3.5 is a simple representation of the cyclical 
nature of the analytical process. 
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“Noticing things” in the context of this thesis can be described as a process of finding 
interesting things within the data when reading and reviewing transcripts, 
documents, field notes, audio files, etc. During this process analytical memos can be 
generated, notes made or documents marked up. The process would generally be 
considered as a pre-coding phase around connecting ideas, themes and observations 
that will aid the coding process. Noticing things can be done alone, reflecting on the 
data collected, or through discussion with colleagues and other researchers which 
may lead to further observation about the data set under review. Either way the 
principle objective is to notice elements within the data that further advance thinking 
and ultimately, the analysis of the data. 
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“Collecting things” is a complementary process to noticing things and is about 
gathering evidence, where evidence can be described as documents, interviews, 
surveys, analytical memos codes, code families, etc. The collected evidence is brought 
together in the project specific HU (Friese, 2012; Saldana, 2009). Collecting data is not 
a one off activity but part of the iterative process described in Figure 3.6. As more 
relevant things are noticed, new evidence may emerge which gets added to the HU. 
The final part of the cycle is “Thinking” about the evidence and data collected, making 
connections and structuring the data in a way that enables theory building, 
generation of concepts, building of emerging patterns and trends. New data and 
evidence may emerge which requires further thinking and analysis, leading to 
modification of theories and concepts. The cyclical process can be repeated any 
number of times through the qualitative CAQDAS process to build rigour and 
confidence into the output. 
 3.10.4 Independent validation of data analysis 
The study is based on qualitative analysis principles as described earlier in Chapter 3. 
Analysis of qualitative data is subjective and interpretation is dependent upon the 
epistemology and ontology of the researcher (Neuman, 2003, Easterby-Smith, 2008, 
Creswell, 2009). Given that a set of qualitative data can be analysed in different ways 
dependant on the epistemological position taken by the researcher, it is desirable to 
validate the analytical approach and coding structure through an independent 
mechanism. Here the analytical process has been challenged by the supervisory team 
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in the initial phases of the researched and a review conducted by an independent 
post-doctoral researcher competent in qualitative research methodologies. 
A selection of transcripts were chosen from multiple organisations and roles (listed in 
Table 5.3) and submitted to the independent reviewer. A copy of the codes developed 
by the principle researcher was submitted with the data. The reviewer then 
attempted to code the transcripts using the codes submitted. The re-coded 
transcripts were saved as PDF documents and sent back to the principle researcher 
for comparison. Figures 3.6 a and b depict screenshots from the original transcript 
and a portion of the same section generated during the validation exercise. The 
limitations of the scaling of the two different document management programs 
means that the CAQDAS screen shot reveals more of the interview transcript 
compared to that of the PDF reader. The independent validation exercise supported 
and verified the researchers approach to the coding process by demonstrating that a 
qualified third party could apply the same analytical technique and independently 
replicate broadly the same outcome from the data set. It is recognised that the 
exercise is limited to a secondary qualitative perspective and should be interpreted 
within that context.   
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Figure 3.6a Screen shot of a coded section of an interview transcript from Atlas.ti 
 
 
Figure 3.6b Screen shot of a sub-section of an interview transcript (the same as in 
Figure 3.6a) from the validation exercise. 
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3.11 Reporting of Results 
The qualitative analysis is reported in Chapter 4 and 5. In Chapter 4 the data is 
presented as coded sections of quoted text for each of the groups of actors. The code 
frequencies for a number of codes are presented along with example quotes in Table 
4.3 which is a summary table for Phase I. Discussions of the data for each area of 
interest are structured in a similar way to aid the flow of the discussion. Each section 
is broken down into: 
 The Regulator`s Response 
 The Directors` Response 
 The Managers` Response 
 Comments 
Phase II generated much more coded data and it was of interest to investigate and 
analyse the variation of responses between groups of actors (for example Section 
5.5.2). It was also of interest to establish the response of all actors against specific 
codes to see if there were commonalities or substantive differences of views (for 
example Section 5.5.3). In order to facilitate a deeper understanding of the data, the 
frequency of coding was presented in tabulated form (see Table 5.11) and as a series 
of histograms (for example, Figure 5.4 and 5.5).   
3.12 Summary 
The research is focused on establishing a deeper and richer understanding of the 
approach taken to risk management within water service providers that operate 
within different regulations, ownership arrangements and management cultures. The 
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nature of the study supports the adoption of a qualitative approach to the research 
(Sections 3.1 through 3.3). Chapter 3 has discussed the qualitative methodology used 
in the research and has addressed emerging concerns about the overuse and/or 
incorrect application of qualitative analysis in social and management studies. The 
data was collected through semi-structured interviews, analysed and coded using 
CAQDAS. A sub-set of interview transcripts were further analysed by an independent 
third party post-doctoral researcher as a validation mechanism designed to challenge 
the principle researcher`s approach. Using interviews, document analysis and a 
multiple-case study approach has allowed a qualitative strategy that has supported an 
improvement in understanding of what influences organisational approaches to risk 
management application in the water sector. As the study progressed the 
methodology used was modified based on the context of the case studies and the 
findings in Phase I. The adapted phase specific methodologies are covered in Sections 
4.3 and 5.3.  
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Chapter 4: Results – Phase I 
Chapters 3 through to 6 describe the delivery of the research agenda from 
development of the researcher`s approach to qualitative methodology, interview 
technique and analysis using CAQDAS. The chapters contribute to the development of 
a deeper appreciation of some of the factors which influence risk management across 
a range of ownership arrangements and regulatory systems. Each chapter builds on 
the output of the preceding chapters leading to observations, suggestions and 
conclusions discussed in Chapter 7.   
4.1 Purpose of Phase I 
Phase I of the research activity was designed to address a number of considerations. 
The primary objective was to test the output and observations of the literature review 
while further informing the development and refinement of the research question. 
The secondary objectives were to develop, test and improve the researcher’s ability 
to conduct qualitative research (using a limited set of actors and documents) before a 
more substantive multiple case study exercise was undertaken. The practical, 
systematic approach and methodology adopted in Phase I was modified for Phase II, 
taking into account learning gained. The phase specific modifications to the 
methodology described in Chapter 3 are documented at the beginning of Chapter 4 
(Section 4.3) and Chapter 5 (Section 5.3).  
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4.2 Scope of Phase I 
The initial phase of research activity involved five principle actors operating in two 
organisations. The first was a water and wastewater service provider (water 
company) and the second organisation was the water quality regulator who 
monitored the water company`s operational performance with respect to drinking 
water quality. Phase I included a review of the water company`s business plan 
together with annual performance reports which documented the actual out-put of 
the organisation compared to that predicted in the strategic business plan. The 
regulators independent reports on the water quality performance were also included 
in the investigation. 
4.3  Phase I specific methodology  
The case study in Phase I was constructed using data gathered from senior managers, 
directors and regulators (Section 4.2). The ownership arrangements and regulatory 
framework which the case study operates within are one set of conditions of interest 
within this study.  The utility is a publically owned business which differs in ownership 
arrangements compared to other parts of the United Kingdom (Table 4.1). England 
and Wales water utilities were privatised in 1989, with Welsh Water adopting an 
operating model based on mutualisation. Northern Ireland has similarities in 
ownership arrangements to the case study water service provider. All of the water 
service providers are regulated using comparable statutory instruments across 
finance, water quality and environment disciplines. Table 4.1 lists the ownership 
arrangements of the water service providers in the UK together with the regulators. 
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Table 4.1: Operational Arrangements of UK water service providers. 
UK Region Ownership 
arrangements 
Environment 
Regulator 
Water Quality 
Regulator 
Financial and 
Service 
Regulator 
Scotland Public Ownership 
arrangements 
Scottish 
Environment 
Protection Agency 
Drinking Water 
Quality Regulator 
(DWQR) 
Water Industry 
Commission 
Northern Ireland Public Ownership 
arrangements 
Northern Ireland 
Environment 
Protection Agency 
Drinking Water 
Inspectorate 
(Northern Ireland) 
The Utility 
Regulator – 
Electricity, Gas 
and Water 
England Private Ownership 
arrangements 
Environment 
Agency 
Drinking Water 
Inspectorate 
(DWI) 
OFWAT 
Wales Mutualisation Environment 
Agency 
Drinking Water 
Inspectorate 
(DWI) 
OFWAT 
 
At the time of writing, the case study was the fourth largest water service provider in 
the UK and served circa 5 million customers covering approximately one third of the 
land mass of the UK. The organisation operates 268 water treatment works along 
with networks and distribution. The annual operational budget was in the order of 
£278m (covering water and waste water operations) and the capital investment plan 
identified close to £500m of improvement projects and capital maintenance per 
annum. The utility operates over a wide range of assets and geographies which 
include very small rural supplies and islands through to large urban centres. More 
detail on this utility is documented in Section 5.4.1. The case study organisation was 
selected because it provided one variation relevant to this thesis. The principle 
methodology adopted is documented in Chapter 3 but was limited to a single 
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organisation with a small group of participants. The variation in participants is limited 
to actors within the organisation and the regulating authority. The selection of 
participants is discussed in Section 3.4.1. The data reporting in Phase I differs from 
that of reporting in Phase II in that it only includes codes quotes and tables of code 
frequencies (See Section 3.11).   
4.4 Data Analysis: Interviews 
The actors took part in a circa 45 minute interview using the questions listed in Table 
4.2. and using the principles described in Section 3.6. Section 4.4 discusses the 
answers given by the actors in response to the interview questions. The interviews 
were semi-structured and Supplementary questions were asked during the interview 
process. The supplementary questions varied between interviews as they were part 
of the conversation in response to the actors reply to the principle questions 
(employing the iterative process described in Section 3.7 and Figure 3.4).  The output 
of the interviews were analysed using CAQDAS (Section 3.9 and 3.10). 
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Table 4.2 Summary of actors participating in the Phase I case study exercise 
Actor Reference Organisation Role Responsibility 
C001 Government Regulator Water Quality 
A002 Utility A Director Finance 
B001 Utility A Director Asset Management 
A001 Utility A General Manager Regulation 
D001 Utility A General Manager Strategy and 
Planning 
 
4.4.1 Organisation ambition, Regulation and Risk Management 
Section 2.1 reviewed and commented on a body of literature concerning changes in 
regulatory approaches and studies which sought to better understand regulation and 
institutional arrangements for the water sector. The outcome of the majority of 
studies pointed to a lack of consensus around regulation of water services, noting 
variations on geography, social influences and political views as possible influencing 
factors.  
The initial question in the interview designed for the Phase I case study sought to 
understand how the regulation influenced the objectives and ambition of the 
organisation while validating the organisational approach to regulation (Table 3.3). 
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The Regulator`s Response 
The regulator highlighted that:  
“Some of the organisations ambitions and approaches are very clearly defined by 
regulatory objectives”. C001 
It was explained that there is a range of legally binding commitments and a number of 
regulatory mechanisms which can be used to influence the behaviour of Case A 
(enforcement action, authorised departures, prosecution).  
“The most extreme one of these is prosecution which is sort of the last resort really.  
We’re in the process of defining our approach in a policy document to all of these so 
we’re crystal clear again with [Organisation A] as to when we’ll use these tools.  But 
really prosecution would be a last resort where the other tools have failed or where 
we need to be publicly seen to be a strong regulator and achieving our aim of 
protecting public health and consumers.  Having said that, the Scottish legal system 
makes it difficult for us always to be certain that we’re able to use this tool in that it’s 
always the procurator fiscal bringing about the prosecution.  So all we can do is 
recommend a prosecution and provide a report to the PF and then it’s completely in 
the PF’s hands as to whether or not it proceeds and how it proceeds.” C001 
C001 felt that there were many other ambitions which were determined through 
consensus between the regulator and Case A without the need to amend the 
regulatory framework.  
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“There are many other ambitions that are determined through discussion with 
[Organisation A] and the regulator and generally consensus.  We tend to be, as a 
regulator we tend to be fairly clear with [Organisation A] what we’re trying to achieve 
when we’re asking for something.  So the outcome we expect is sort of fairly clear to 
organisation A from the start.  We try to leave it up to [Organisation A] to decide how 
it’s delivered.  We try not to get too involved in the detail of that.” C001 
The Directors` Response 
Both Directors acknowledge the importance of the regulatory framework in the 
country: 
 “Arguably the only reason [Organisation  A] came into being was because of 
regulatory objectives” 
 And; 
 “I would like to think our ambitions and activities are consistent with regulatory 
objectives because we`re here primarily to protect public health and the 
environment”. A002 
A002 went on to explain the role of regulation in setting the objectives of the 
organisation and this was very much the case from the formation of organisation A in 
2002 until 2010.  
“If I then look at the what I call the first stage of the [Organisation A]`s journey, which 
was in the period from 2002 to 2006 the whole mindset when we kicked off in 
organisation A was that it actually felt a bit like survival, it felt like how on earth are 
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we going to achieve all these required efficiencies, there was a real focus particularly 
on OPEX efficiency. We had a specific target to achieve by 2005/06, the last year of 
that first regulatory period. And it almost felt in the business that there was no future 
beyond 2005/06, it was could we get to the OPEXs target for that particular year and 
initially that looked very, very daunting. So the whole focus of business was one, to 
achieve OPEXs target set by the regulator, but two, it was, even from mindset angle, it 
was set on this regulatory period, there was no sense of the business beyond 2006. 
Well history shows that we got there and we beat the 05/06 OPEXs target. And over 
the last part of that period we were preparing for the 2006 to 2010 period where 
again effectively the regulator set the agenda because it was a regulatory officer and 
then, from July 2005 onwards, the first Water Industry Commission as a corporate 
body. They came up with this idea of introducing the OPA2 mechanism into 
[Organisation A]`s area of operation, that existed in other parts of the country. And so 
the whole focus of business in 2006 to 2010 suddenly changed from: 'Yes we need to 
become more efficient but actually all about improving our customer services 
measured by OPA and it pains me a bit to say this but that came about because the 
regulator said that's what we should focus on and not because we as a board believed 
that that's what we should focus on. I should say, we want to put customers at the 
heart of the business but we hadn’t had the foresight to think through on a specific 
mechanism on OPA. So the 2006 to 2010 period was then all about living within the 
                                                             
2
 OPA stands for Overall Performance Assessment and was developed by the Financial Regulator for 
Organisation A. OPA includes metrics for unplanned interruptions, pressure, drinking water quality, 
response to written complaints, ease of telephone contacts, sewer flooding, sewage treatment works 
compliance, leakage and complaints. Organisation A`s OPA score went from 162 in 2004 to 397 by 
2014.  
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financial envelope that the commission set but crucially about beating this customer 
service OPA target.” A002 
The directors mention that the regulatory contract influences behaviours in a way 
that focuses on short term delivery but this is in contrast to the vision which goes 
beyond short term goals and requires more long term strategic planning. There is 
evidence within the answers that suggests Organisation A has an ambition to set its 
own objectives but within the boundary of regulation.  
“When I come now into the new period of 2010 to 2015, we’re starting to get into a 
more balanced position where yes we are seeking to deliver on regulation objectives 
but they're actually objectives that we bought into. So right from the very beginning of 
the preparation for the 2010 to 2015 period we were aligned with the commission's 
thinking that we should be pursuing an upper quartile agenda. Of trying to get to an 
upper quartile position on customer service and upper quartile position on efficiency, 
so in fact our business plan that we put forward very much reflected where the 
direction of regulatory travel. Clearly it remains to be seen whether we achieve or 
outperform all those specific objectives. Looking to the future then I think the balance 
is tilting further still because the commission is saying to us: 'Now right, [Organisation 
A], you go and own and develop a strategy, you put forward your plans and your 
propositions, you put forward your assessment of how you can improve service and 
how you can improve efficiency.” A002 
And; 
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“We have to be very clear about our long term objectives with regard to things like 
water resource management.  So regulatory objectives tend to be short term, our 
ambitions are longer term than that.  So we’re looking over a 25 year period on issues 
like water resources and I guess all the other aspects of asset management as well.  
The ambition is to be able when we get into regulatory price review periods to be able 
to extract a five year workload from our 25 year plans and use that to formulate 
investment proposals for the coming five years which feed into the price review.” B001 
The Managers` Response 
The general managers recognise the influence of the regulators in setting objectives 
in the past but both managers feel that Case A is now in a position to set its own 
agenda for success and is able to influence future regulation and direction. One 
manager points out that:  
“We are looking to transcend the regulatory environment”. A001 
And; 
“In my view [Organisation A]'s ambition for its customers coming through stronger 
rather than just being there to do what we're told, let someone else interpret. We're 
now actually trying to influence and shape the impact of regulations upon 
organisation A from the way the European context. So I think there are things that 
come down through legislation that do shape what we must do and that's more about 
a level playing field across Europe.” D001 
And; 
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“We were quite historically very, very far behind in terms of efficiency, we were quite 
behind in terms of our investments to satisfy European directives, like the urban waste 
water treatment directive, bathing water etc. and even our water quality at that time 
whilst our water quality was good compared with other world countries, within the UK 
we were still behind UK companies. So I think the first four to possibly eight years of 
our existence right up to 2010 a lot of our ambitions were actually shaped by 
regulatory objectives. I think that's now changing as we go forward, as we went into 
2010 to 2015 and the setting our own business plan objectives for the next four 
years.” A001 
Author`s Comments 
In this section (4.4.1) there is an acknowledgement that regulation is not just 
formulated at a local or national level, but rather feeds down from Europe and this 
shapes the objectives and direction of the organisation. All of the actors within 
organisation A are consistent in the responses given: 
 When Organisation A formed it was driven by regulatory objectives. 
 By the second regulatory period (2006 – 2010) confidence grew in 
organisation A`s ability to deliver 
 By the third regulatory period (2010 – 2015) the leadership was confident 
enough to influence and shape the strategic objectives, acknowledging the 
requirement for further improvement. 
The regulator recognises the transformation of Organisation A over the regulatory 
periods and has stated (in the examples given) that they would prefer a collaborative 
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relationship going forward but would use regulatory instruments to ensure 
compliance if necessary.  
4.4.2 The interplay between ownership arrangements and regulation 
Chapters 1 and 2 drew attention to a range of studies that sought to determine the 
impact of ownership arrangements on the economic performance of the water utility. 
Few of these studies took into account the consequences for risk management. 
Within the limits of Phase I it was of interest to see if the actors felt that ownership 
arrangements were an important feature, informing business priorities and risk 
management choices. 
The Regulator`s Response 
“Speaking from experience, working in a PLC and having knowledge of [Organisation 
A] in public ownership I’d say that one of the key difference is with the investment side 
of things.  In a PLC there seems to be more flexibility or I perceive there to be more 
flexibility in terms of funding arrangements.  If the regulator says something needs to 
be done then the money is found.  There is more flexibility to move money around 
because it’s up to that organisation how it spends its money as long as it’s satisfactory 
to shareholders.  Whereas in [Organisation A] things are much more pigeon holed 
financially and things need to be agreed well in advance for future investment periods.  
If that money hasn’t been set aside for a particular project then it gives [Organisation 
A] great difficulty.  So there are times when we will use enforcement notices or the 
threat of prosecution to bring about the improvements we want but historically that 
has quite often been at the expense of another project rather than just the money 
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being absorbed by the business.  I think that is quite fundamental and it does give us 
difficulties as regulator because we have to be aware of the limitations around 
[Organisation A].  I mean perhaps future moves to improve its borrowing powers 
would assist that. “ C001 
The regulator suggests that the public ownership status restricts access to capital that 
is required to invest in improving services to customers. This may lead to funds being 
moved from one project to another which could expose Organisation A to other risks. 
When asked about enforcement actions taken to require Organisation A to make 
choices based on treatment failures, the regulator noted that: 
“We have come across challenges to us from within the legal system and from 
consumers as well when we look at or threaten prosecution of [Organisation A].  In 
that we would be prosecuting a public body and obviously any fine or any damage 
would be to a public body.  What good does it do?  We’ve had that challenge, however 
we think the same situation exists with SEPA and local authorities and there’s plenty 
of public bodies get prosecuted.” C001 
This is an interesting dilemma for a regulator working with publically owned 
organisations. Legal action to prevent failure (or as a consequence of failure) within 
the public body is seen, by consumers, as an illogical action. Here the regulator 
expresses some frustration when faced with taking punitive action towards 
Organisation A for failings. 
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The Directors` Response 
The Directors of Organisation A, while acknowledging that they operate within private 
ownership, point to a range of incentives that drive behaviours similar to that of 
private companies. For example: 
“I guess what we’ve sought to create in the culture of the organisation is a company 
that operates with all the normal commercial disciplines of a private company albeit it 
recognising that we are in the business of delivering an essential public service.” A002  
And; 
“we don’t have the explicit equity incentives, but we have tried to mirror the incentive 
properties of an equity owned company that would apply to the managers of an 
equity owned company in the sense that we’ve got quite significant personal 
incentives in place for the sort of top 40 senior people in the business who can typically 
add anywhere between 25-50+% to their base remunerations through the 
achievement of demanding performance targets. And I think the existence of those 
management incentives, which to a large extent mirror what you would have in a 
private company situation, do make it very difficult to give an objective answer to this 
question.” A002 
Another Director highlights the influence of politics within the governance and risk 
management approach of Organisation A. 
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“In our case there’s an expectation that we will manage the business effectively.  Meet 
all of our obligations.  Importantly deliver the ministers objectives for [Organisation 
A].  So for every price review period there’s a formal ministerial letter sent to 
[Organisation A] and the directors are all legally obliged to deliver the minister’s 
objectives within the price review period.  There’s, you’d call it a regulatory contract.  
Now the ownership model for us inevitably brings politics pretty close to where we’re 
at and the political debate around success or failure.  I think you’ve seen an example in 
Northern Ireland over the winter 2010/11 winter when Northern Ireland got into some 
difficulties, that the form of ownership immediately made that a very political issue for 
them.  The same would be true of us and has been in the past in terms of how close 
we are to the political arena.  The potential for success can be affected by that 
because it can induce a risk averse nature in the business.  If you’re concerned about 
how things are going to play out politically and reputationally then you’d potentially 
be quite risk averse in the same way that anything close to government does tend to 
be risk averse.  Civil servants, the civil service is by its nature a very risk averse set up.  
The civil servants do have a role in the interface between us and our owner, between 
us and the government.  So there’s a bit of an influence there in terms of potential for 
success.” B001 
The view here is that political involvement (to a greater or lesser extent) drives a 
more risk averse set of behaviours. The same Director points out that Organisation A 
did not pursue business opportunities because of perceived low risk appetite of the 
political owners: 
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“I can think of business opportunities that we have foregone in the last few years 
because ministers would not back the things that we were proposing.  There’s a saying 
in the governments arrangements around [Organisation A] oblige us to take things 
which are novel or contentious to the government for the all clear.  It’s on a 
reasonably low threshold of value, business value.  We have, as I said, we have 
foregone some business opportunities because there was no risk appetite on the part 
of the politicians, the government of the day to back us in the business ventures that 
we were promoting.” B001 
He expands on this by pointing out: 
“I suspect that venture capital owners or other forms of equity owners would probably 
have a different risk appetite to any degree of political ownership.  That potential for 
success it probably does take you into that whole territory of risk equals reward and 
how far do you want to go with that.  There has to be a line in our business that you 
won’t cross in terms of the protection of public health and environmental protection 
but that’s increasingly the case in any sphere of business now.  Reputationally 
businesses can’t be seen to be anything other than diligent in environmental matters 
these days.  So you could argue that the form of ownership perhaps isn’t so critical 
with regard to these kind of reputational issues, public health and the environment.  
But it does I think have a big bearing on how much your owner’s prepared to back you 
with a business opportunity. “ B001 
The response perhaps highlights the Directors desire for “business opportunity and 
success” over and above the regulatory requirements to deliver safe drinking water 
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and protect the environment. The Director is willing to take more risk as a 
consequence of the financial incentives that are there as part of his contract.  
Regardless of ownership arrangements, if the leadership is incentivised to take risks, 
they will aspire to do this. 
The Managers` Response  
The senior managers put more emphasis on financing rather than ownership 
arrangements per se: 
“I'm not sure it's a form of ownership that is as important as how the company is 
financed or it's available access to financing. I think you should look at the models in 
England and Wales of privatisation. That was purely around securing capital from the 
markets to invest in large enhancement programs.” D001 
The same actor highlights some advantages and disadvantages of public versus 
private sector ownership arrangements: 
“I think some people argue that shareholder accountability drives better innovation 
etc, I may argue the opposite that I think actually shareholder models drive short-
termism and quick returns and as a consequence I think there are merits in public 
sector ownership that don't exist in private sector and probably there are merits in 
private sector that don't exist in public and probably by bringing economic regulation 
to our ownership model, we are trying to mirror some of the benefits of the private 
sector model within a public sector environment. I think the advantage of the public 
sector environment is that longer time thinking and doing what's right in the long 
term whereas short term shareholder pressure will always require a certain degree of 
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short-termism and risk taking that none of us can tell what the long term bill may be 
for.” D001 
The other senior manager talks about incentives and mimicking shareholder pressure, 
which is perhaps in-line with Director A002: 
“Regulators normally say that within the public sector model you can't mimic the 
shareholder pressure and it's very hard for us to comment on that because we haven't 
felt the shareholder pressure; but the incentives within both industries are broadly 
aligned in terms of what's got to be achieved for customers; and what's got to be 
achieved for compliance; and from a compliance point of view, what's got to be 
achieved for the environment or for drinking water. I think where the public and the 
private sector differ, certainly in the UK, we have in [Organisation A], because we're in 
the public sector, much more reputational incentive than we would perhaps have in 
the private sector with private shareholders. One of the things that drives us as well as 
the sort of stated incentives in the regime is the number of complaints in the minister's 
mail box, whether we have an operational sort of satisfactory relationship with the 
government and actually continuing to have the freedom to operate even though we 
are within the public sector and that means a lot to us. So it's actually, it drives certain 
decisions, it drives behaviours because we want to make sure that reputationally we 
don't lose any ground with the government or with the customers that much which 
would then drive back to complaints with the minister.” A001 
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Author`s Comments 
The ownership arrangements of Organisation A are public ownership, but incentives 
have been designed to promote behaviours seen as private sector behaviours (A002); 
meaning private sector behaviour is valued by Organisation A. The introduction of 
incentives for senior managers, promoting “private sector” behaviours suggests that 
private sector operating practises and management cultures are in some way more 
desirable and lead to outperformance of service levels. However, the literature 
review (Section 2.3) presents a number of contributions which demonstrate that 
private sector water utilities do not always outperform public sector water companies 
across a defined set of regulatory metrics. The responses given within the context of 
Organisation A`s sphere of operations suggest that: 
 Leadership incentives are important to influencing behaviours (as evidenced 
by A002 and B001). 
  Access to financing is of importance to both sustainable operational and 
investment activities (examples given by D001 and C001). 
 Public ownership incentivises a low risk appetite (example given by B001). 
 Reputational risks are as important in the political domain as service delivery 
and financing (examples given by A001). 
 Privately owned water service provides do not think longer term (as evidenced 
by D001) 
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 Private organisation leadership behaviours are desirable (Examples given by 
A002 and B001) but evidence (Section 2.3) suggests that public and private 
organisations can deliver comparable service levels.  
4.4.3 Perceptions of risks that should concern the business 
Arguably, the principle objectives of the water service provider are the delivery or 
safe drinking water and sanitation (Section 1 and 2.2). The WSP approach (discussed 
in Section 2.1) provides a mechanism to identifying and mitigating risk within a water 
system. Importance is placed on risk management interventions supporting delivery 
of safe water and sanitation.  The actors associated with Organisation A were asked 
questions to validate their understanding of the risk strategy within the organisation 
(Table 3.3) to determine how important WSP was to delivering safe drinking water 
and sanitation. 
The Regulator`s Response 
The regulator recognises the tension between delivering safe drinking water and the 
financial limits of the organisation: 
“I think primarily financial at the moment in that, I’m speaking from a water quality 
perspective, [Organisation A] can’t possibly deliver everything that it needs to deliver 
well in any financial climate really.  Consequently [Organisation A] has to make some 
quite tough decisions between equally valid spending areas that require funding.  Even 
you know in some cases the same issue but a different size,  Does it deal with say 
THMs at a plant in the northwest where the zone size is say 20 people or does it target 
a similar issue at a treatment works serving 10,000 people.”C001 
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The regulator also points to political influence as a risk to the operation of 
Organisation A: 
“I think that’s something we struggle with as regulators to be honest in terms of the 
way we pursue things and we’ve always taken the view that the size doesn’t matter.  
Somebody in the north of the country is entitled to the same level of water quality.  
From a personal perspective in terms of major risks I do find the endless political 
debate over [Organisation A]`s future fairly unhelpful.  I mean we’re seeing it in this 
current election in the manifesto, the future of [Organisation A] and the way it’s 
funded is endlessly debated.  We are starting to see [Organisation A] valued for the 
good company it is and in the potential of [Organisation A] being seen.  All these 
questions over its future can only serve to make that harder I think to realise the 
benefits.  Also I would actually have political interference down there as well.  It’s 
something I’ve seen first-hand in dealing with the bursts over the winter period.  The 
government certainly the current encumbrance are very keen to be seen to be actively 
managing issues.  My personal opinion would be to the extent where they’re actually 
interfering with the business of a company that is, yes it is providing a public service 
but it is equipped and has the skill sets best place to deliver the issues to resolve the 
issues.  So political interference is definitely one there.” C001 
The regulator would also like Organisation A to be more pro-active about managing 
risks within the water systems, rather than waiting for the regulator to spot them 
retrospectively: 
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“The regulator will try and push [Organisation A] much more to own its own risks on 
water quality rather than waiting for the regulator to come and tap them on the 
shoulder and say “Look, this needs something doing about it.”  To that end this is 
where we’re going, water safety plans but there’s still culturally within [Organisation 
A] I think a need to accept that these are [Organisation A]`s risks.” C001 
The Director`s Response 
Director A002 highlights that there are possibly two main categories of risk that 
Organisation A has to deal with: 
“There are those risks we have that are in common with any other water company. 
And then there are those risks and indeed, one could argue, opportunities that are a 
function of our ownership arrangements.”A002 
The common risks to all water companies include: 
“The most obvious risk is the risk of failing to provide a continuous supply of water 
that is fit for human consumption. As a business there is providing a product that is 
relatively continually ingested by customers right across the country, from many 
hundreds of different water sources and treatment plants. We are required to make 
sure that water is fit for consumption at all times, and clearly there is a view that there 
is always an inherent risk that something could go wrong at some point in the 
treatment process or the distribution system that could cause us to fail to deliver on 
that objective, and that I think that is the number one risk.” A002 
With ownership specific risks including: 
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“We have an owner in the [Organisation A] whose currency of value is different to that 
of private shareholders. Private shareholders primary motivations is the maintenance 
and growth of the value of their investment in the water company. Typically investors 
into water companies are looking for a reasonably low risk but predictable return from 
their investment. Our shareholder in the Government, the thing that matters most to 
them is the currency of votes. Because that is what politicians get elected on the back 
of votes, and growth in actual value is of secondary importance to those factors that 
could impact on voters’ views of the worth of the water company. So value therefore is 
an issue of value in the eyes of the voter or customer and that therefore tends to be 
more around issues of service than it does around issues of company value. Clearly 
charging would be something, charge levels would be something that affects 
customers’ and voters’ views.”A002 
The response by A002 concur with some of the views expressed by the regulator in 
terms of political interference and other examples of political influence given in 
Sections 4.4.1 and 4.4.2. Reputation and the currency of votes may be more 
important than risk mitigation. The importance of votes (to the politicians) may also 
influence choices made by the owners in terms of customer charges which may 
constrain capital funds required for successful operation. This point was also raised 
within Phase II (Section 5.5.2). 
Director B001 is consistent with Director A002 in terms of recognising the risks 
around provision of safe drinking water: 
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“The risk of supplying water that’s not fit to drink kind of category and that would 
manifest in areas where assets are not fit for purpose.  So if we’ve got an investment 
programme mapped out to overcome historical non-compliances.  It is a fact that we 
live with the risk of that non-compliance recurring until we’ve made the investment 
and got the right assets in place.  Similarly there’s always a risk in implementing an 
investment programme that there’s some disturbance to business as usual as you 
introduce new assets or new ways of doing things.  So there’s a kind of short term risk 
of supplying water that’s not fit to drink as you introduce new processes and new 
works.”B001 
Again, securing revenue is a critical risk factor and B001 points out that the 
introduction of retail competition adds to the risk of securing revenue to supply safe 
drinking water. 
 “Business risk of securing our revenue which is a little bit harder now with business 
separation and with a retail set up in the wholesale world which is about £300 million 
of our income per year not under our direct control.  It has caused us an issue in the 
year just ended where the wholesale revenue was less than we’d budgeted for in the 
year.  There’s no regulatory recourse on that, that’s a risk that we take.”B001 
The Manager`s Response 
Senior manager D001 suggests that financing investment will lead to a failure to 
deliver services to customers and impact on reputation: 
“I think the major risk that faces [Organisation A] in delivering its objectives right now 
is, will there actually be the borrowing levels there for the next three years to finance 
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the objectives we've got and if not, if the ministers shrink the size of the investment 
program, how many of the things that fall out of the program or objectives will affect 
the delivery of the [Organisation A]`s vision? Now, one assumption might be that they 
can delay some of the statutory programs but it's more likely that the ministers will 
delay the discretionary stuff like pressure for customers etc which will give us a 
reputational problem with our customers given that that's our highest priority.”D001 
Similarly Manager A001 also has concerns about financing the business: 
“I think one of the biggest risks that we have at this point is whether the government 
will continue to lend to us. The government have already withdrawn the ability for us 
to borrow for the 2011/12 year. It has committed to lending to us to the full extent set 
out in the final determination over the 11-15 period, but just not in the 2011/12 year. 
So that means that the 140 million that was due to be lent to us this year is deferred.” 
A001 
These examples provide further evidence that the leaders within Organisation A are 
concerned with financial risk and, in particular, political influence over access to 
financing which makes it very difficult to plan strategic investment over a longer time 
horizon. 
Author`s Comments 
The answers given by the actors suggest that they are most concerned with the risk to 
service delivery with financing and political interference affecting Organisation A`s 
ability to deliver safe drinking water and sanitation. The inference is that: 
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 Safe drinking water and sanitation are the priority. 
 Unexpected changes to finances impact on operations and investment plans. 
 Political Inference can lead to rapid changes in the investment plan (mainly 
due to restriction in funding through caps on customer charges and/or 
deferral of borrowing). 
 The introduction of retail competition adds further uncertainty to previously 
guaranteed income streams, leading to further risk of service delivery. 
 Failure to deliver appropriate levels of service may do significant harm to 
public health and cause reputational damage.  
4.4.4 The characterisation of risk at different levels of accountability 
The influence of risk management culture on risk management strategy has been a 
consideration within previous bodies of work (Section 2.4) and is of interest to this 
study (Chapters 1&2). Competing demands on staff within organisations leads to 
prioritisation of objectives (Section 2.4). In this segment of the interviews, the actors 
were asked to comment on the priority given to risk management within the context 
of competing business objectives (Table 3.3).  
The Regulator`s Response 
The regulator recognises that water safety plans were delivered to a high standard in 
Organisation A, however, the perception is WSPs was a tick box, project management 
exercise: 
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“I think in terms of churning out water safety plans as an exercise in project 
management, [Organisation A]`s done an excellent job, a really excellent job and 
we’ve nearly got our full complement of plans.  But I think in terms of actually 
producing something that was meaningful in terms of protecting, well identifying risks 
to water quality and protecting consumers I think the early plans were somewhat 
lacking.  I think we have seen a shift lately from “This is just another exercise in 
producing something that’s going to sit on a shelf” to producing something that is 
really going to actively take a part in managing water quality risks and that we will 
keep updated as we go forward.” C001 
There is an acknowledgement that Organisation A is starting to recognise the 
importance of using the plans but this is at an early stage. The regulator goes on to 
say that buy in is improving and ultimately the investment plans shall be based on the 
WSP outputs: 
“The buy-in from particularly local asset planners has grown.  I think there’s still some 
work to do in the accessibility of the plans but they’re aware that the water safety 
plan is the way to secure investment to address water quality risks.  I think we still 
have some work to do in terms of making sure that we are clear and [Organisation A] 
is clear exactly how this is going to work to inform the next investment period.  I’m 
very keen, I think we’re all very keen to move away from the failure driven 
compartmentalised drivers that have been used in the past to drive investment to 
something that’s better thought out where different risks are evaluated against each 
other. 
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The Director`s Response 
The directors were quite clear about the responsibilities of personnel for risk 
management with sections of Organisation A. Here, an example of managing program 
risk is given by Director B001: 
“You do start to put an indicative level of value against an emerging risk and you track 
it closely to the point at which you would want to build it into your LBE, Latest Best 
Estimate, of value of the programme.  Once you get past that emerging stage we deal 
with risk in the capital programme at three levels.  At the very granule level each 
project has a detailed risk register that’s owned by the project manager and which 
shows the allocation of risk between the client and the delivery partner.  But there are 
some areas of risk that we instruct the project managers not to allow for.  An example 
of that would be we go through an auctioneering process, we decide on a particular 
type of process to build into a water treatment works or a waste/water treatment 
works.  There’s a good degree of governance around that and sign off by operational 
colleagues as well as by people in my team at the time of saying we’ve concluded on a 
particular type of asset to be built to solve this problem.  We then proceed with that 
project.” B001   
The example describes the governance of risk within the capital program and 
illustrates that B001 recognises risk accountability sitting across a number of 
individual levels within the business. 
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The Manager`s Response 
Manager A001 is accountable for managing the risk processes within Organisation A 
and perhaps unsurprisingly can describe the processes very well: 
“Of course you’re talking to the person who is accountable for corporate risk we tend 
to abide by the risk scoring that we use for corporate risk management so we have a 
five by five matrix which sets how the likelihood in impact of a risk occurring and we 
have a defined scoring mechanism for that with criteria etc.” A001 
And; 
“I'm accountable for corporate risk management and with the risk team anything that 
I do for Scottish Water is mirrored in terms of what I do for my own area, for my 
business objectives. So we do look at, I should say we look at both risk and 
opportunity, but we do look at the risks that we're running, we look at the impact that 
they might have and we look at the likelihood that they might come up. We do that at 
the corporate level we do that for each directorate and we do that for the big 
processes and the big project across the business, so for example SR15 has its own 
corporate risk register, not corporate sorry, has its own risk register.” 
A001 is clear about the system for identifying and ranking risks. These processes are 
managed through the corporate risk team and registers for each business unit are 
completed. Manager D001 provides further evidence that risk management tools 
were used in planning future investment: 
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“We then undertake a risk and opportunity management plan, piece of work which 
looks at partly subjectively, partly objectively what alternatives do we have, both from 
the point of view of cost or scope. And we do some Monte Carlo simulations and 
everything else around that that eventually comes out with a view that what numbers 
are the eighty percent probability of it costing less or twenty percent probability of it 
costing less and what number have we bid, but what number is in our plan at the 
moment. Therefore have we pitched it correctly given the whole expectation of the 
regulatory model” D001    
And evidence was given that suggested the corporate risk register (mentioned by 
B001) was used to inform and test the investment plan: 
“in terms of corporate risk approach you look at what's on the company corporate risk 
register, you look at what your future objectives are going to be, you identify where 
you think the risks of that plan are and we then use a slight bit of independence 
around the implementation planning teams to say right, we'll validate that this plan is 
deliverable, what are your concerns before we submit it all.” D001 
Author`s Comments 
Senior management and directors are aware of, and use, risk management processes 
in delivering and informing business objectives. There was an emphasis on evidence 
based risk management decisions particularly around the delivery of the investment 
plans (the examples given by Director B001) and the long term investment strategy 
(examples given by manager D001).  The regulator pointed to the WSP as the way 
forward, acknowledging that progress had been made and suggested that more 
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needed to be done to achieve the ultimate goal of the WSPs informing investment 
choices. 
4.4.5 Governance Structures that influence risk management approaches 
Section 2.4 discussed some of the behaviours, cultural features (Johnson, 1992; Drew 
and Kendrick, 2005; Baumgarter, 2009; Rizak and Hrudey, 2007) and interplays 
between governance, regulation and risk (Laeven and Levine, 2009). Studies such as 
McKenna and Martin-Smith (2005) emphasised the importance of leadership in 
decision making when operating within organisations that have complex adaptive 
systems and domains of high uncertainty (Tetenbaum and Laurence, 2011). The 
conversation with the actors sought to establish the appropriateness of the risk 
management processes/governance (and leadership) of risk management required to 
ensure the delivery of safe water and sanitation within the stewardship of 
Organisation A (Table 3.3). 
The Regulator`s Response 
When it comes to governance processes, the regulator has a sense the regulators 
themselves are being actively managed by Organisation A: 
“We accept we are being managed some of the time, I mean our expectations and the 
information we’re getting is being managed.  But we are able to deal with that but 
they do serve a useful purpose in pointing us in the right direction and a lot of sense 
checking in terms of what’s coming out of the organisation, a useful filter as it were.  
In terms of the wider government structures in the water industry, certainly we have I 
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suppose not as close a relationship as I feel perhaps we should do with the water 
industry commission.”C001 
With this example there is an acknowledgement that working more closely with other 
regulators would be beneficial to the longer term operation of water service. 
The Director`s Response 
The Directors believe that governance is “strong” within Organisation A: 
“I think we are a business that is very strong on governance. I'm not saying that there 
aren't areas that are maybe under-governed but generally we have a very strong 
governance framework from board down, real clarity on who is accountable, the 
board, what gets handled through the board, committees of order and remuneration, 
what's delegated to the executive team, to functional director and then down through 
the management ranks.”A002 
And; 
“I think our governance structures are very well defined.  So from a board level we’ve 
got the corporate risk register which is looked at quarterly by the board, reviewed by 
the ELT.  Not just collectively but individually so the finance and regulation manager,  
who looks after updating the corporate risk register, sits down with each director once 
a quarter to go through it.  To go through the risks that have my name against them 
or any other directors and we talk about where that risk is in terms of its score or 
likelihood and impact.”B001 
And; 
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“We generally have plenty safeguards in place for managing risk, whether that's 
through the delegated levels of authority for financial expenditure, whether it's capital 
approvals arrangements, I think the chance for us is actually in the opposite direction 
which is trying to work out where are we over-governed, where should we take a 
lighter touch approach that would be more appropriate to managing risk rather than 
minimising risk”B001 
Both directors gave detailed answers describing the risk management processes and 
governance arrangements, from the frequency of the board reviews, audit committee 
reviews to challenge sessions within business units. 
The Manager`s Repsonse 
The manager responsible for the risk processes within Organisation A is very clear on 
the processes and accountabilities. The manager also discussed risk appetite, setting 
the corporate view and then setting it at business unit level. There was 
acknowledgement that the risk appetite may not be set correctly for every section of 
the business: 
“So we've succeeded in passing the risk ownership onto the right people in the 
business, so we as a risk team don't own the risks. We've established risk appetite with 
the board, so that's now producing a different conversation in the business and that 
will help us understand more about the risks we're willing to take in the business and 
the risks we're not willing to take in the business, and so we will have to correlate as 
we monitor risk appetite, what we do now is, we report to the Audit Committee every 
six months whether we have breached our risk appetite levels ad over time that will 
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allow us to correlate whether we have set risk appetite at the right level because if 
we're never breaching risk appetite in some areas then we're clearly not taking 
enough risk within the business, whereas if we are always breaching we're either 
taking too much risk or we have set the risk appetite at the wrong level, we've been 
too risk averse at the board. I think, we have a risk forum, we have a risk working 
group, so the risk professionals in the business, a sort of risk community; they work 
together.”A001 
Manager D001 feels that Organisation A confuses governance, management and 
control. This manifests itself in a significant number of meetings where decisions are 
made by committee rather than by the accountable person: 
“I think we confuse good governance with management and we create lots of steering 
groups and boards and all sorts of things that have this badge governance but they 
end up doing management. I think we've got to be clear, the difference between 
governance and management. I think we have become probably overly controlling. I'm 
not sure that really means there's a feeling of trust inside the business. I think we're 
almost too supportive of people. It drives a lack of accountability rather than, you 
know, it's easy to just trot up to a meeting and wait till the others make a 
decision.”D001 
D001 goes on to suggest that the meeting culture within Organisation A acts as a 
blocker to delivering services and acts as a mechanism to defer responsibility: 
“Because good governance is asking questions, it's not telling people what to do. It's 
assurances, you know. If we have good governance then the board are confident that 
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the business can deliver, the ELT are confident they know what's important and what 
the risks are and what the opportunities are, but they don't know how to deliver them. 
Somebody else's job is do it. And I think we confuse governance and management, 
instead of the start. I think we've   created far too many steering groups and control 
groups that actually get in the way of people doing their job but they've become a 
crutch to people and if you remove them now people will think they're being hung out 
to dry or something daft like that which, it would be the intended but it could be the 
unintended consequence.”D001 
Author`s Comments 
There is agreement between the directors and the manager A001 that Organisation A 
is governed well. All are very clear on the hierarchy from board through audit 
committee to more local governance arrangements. The actors gave examples of 
governance processes that were designed to identify, reach consensus, record and 
monitor emerging risks. In contrast manager D001 challenges the definition of 
governance and suggests that: 
 “we confuse good governance with management and we create lots of steering 
groups and boards”. D001 
The answers given by the actors support a view that multiple meetings take place. 
D001 goes on to suggest that Organisation A exhibits high levels of control rather than 
devolving accountability for risk management decisions. The outcome is that the 
meetings are used as a mechanism to either defer decision making and/or block 
others from making decisions. Management by committee has the potential to slow 
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down decision making to the point where risks decisions are delayed resulting in 
failure. 
4.5 Emerging themes and conclusions  
Political influence 
The actors acknowledge political influence may overrule existing decisions (Section 
4.4.3). The directors highlight the example of political intervention in December 2011 
in-line with the Government announced that Organisation A would not increase 
charges in April 2011 when the planned price increase of Retail Price Index (RPI) 
minus a percentage value. The actors emphasised that this had two initial 
consequences. Firstly, the decision was not in line with the regulatory contract agreed 
through the Water Industry Commission (WIC) which undermined the authority of the 
WIC. Secondly, there was an immediate impact on the balance sheet of the 
organisation which means a circa £80m shortfall in financing. The organisation had to 
take action to ensure the business plan reflected the changes in capital availability. 
The shortfall in capital could be adsorbed in the short term by deferring investment in 
strategic projects but it was unclear what effect this would have on the long term 
performance and risk to the business.  
Acquiring capital funding 
This is a theme that came through all of the interviews. The directors and senior 
managers reflected that the decisions of the business owners can limit or release 
capital very quickly (Section 4.4.2 and 4.4.3). Uncertainty around available funding 
impacts on the business planning process, asset maintenance and long term asset 
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strategy (Section 4.4.3). D001 stated that the easiest way to manage the shortfall was 
to:  
“play tunes with capital maintenance”. D001 
It was also noted by the regulators that they had concerns over inflexibility within the 
investment plan (Section 4.4.2).  
The drive for efficiency  
The ability of the organisation to out-perform the efficiency targets as measured by 
Operational Performance Assessment (OPA) was noted (Section 4.4.1). A002 referred 
to OPA and the importance this is given within the culture of the business.  The 
regulators raised concerns that funding was restricted and that operational resources 
were stretched which may lead to operational risks translating into incidents or 
events. The regulators felt that investigations into process failures were not 
sufficiently robust and in many cases possible root causes were missed. For example 
in one investigation:  
“the event was closed on the basis of sampling error, however on further investigation 
by the regulator it was clear that the failing asset had not been cleaned”. C001 
The regulator suggested that the asset itself was a possible cause of the failure but 
the drive to reduce cost prevented the asset from being maintained to an operable 
state. 
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Management Culture 
The management culture plays a significant role when approaching risk management 
(Sections 4.4.1 through 4.4.5), wither its influencing the processes (Section 4.4.2 and 
4.4.3), the responsibilities (Section 4.4.3) or governance (section 4.4.5). The responses 
of the actors suggests that the regulators expect investment to be based on 
improving and maintaining water and wastewater quality through risk appraisal of the 
assets (Section 4.4.4). While the business aspires to going beyond the objectives of 
regulation (Section 4.4.1), the regulators feel that the business is driven by targets 
(Section 4.4.3) which means that the management focus may not be fully on 
understanding the risks within the business. The directors highlight that the top 40 
managers are incentivised to make efficiencies (Section 4.4.2) which drives 
management culture to reduce cost and suggests that full attention might not be paid 
to risk management. The managers highlight that risk management practise is 
delivered through meetings and is a chore (Section 4.4.5), it may be seen as a 
distraction to the delivery of the financial targets that the management are 
incentivised to achieve (Section 4.4.2).  
The inclusion of risk appetite (Section 4.4.3, 4.4.4 and 4.4.5) may provide the 
management with a nebulous target for risk management that allow the management 
some internal mitigation to achieving the regulatory targets. This is noted by the 
regulators when they suggest that risk management (and water safety planning) is 
perhaps seen as a tick box exercise (Section 4.4.4) rather than a way of identifying and 
addressing underlying risks. The management might want to consider focusing more 
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on the outcomes of the water safety planning to identify and manage risks rather 
than relying on a risk appetite statement which is largely psychological (Section1.7.4) 
and nebulous. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
140 
 
Chapter 5: Research Activity – Phase II 
5.1 Purpose of Phase II 
The Phase II research activity builds on the output of the literature review and Phase I 
of the case study exercise. Table 5.1 summarises the research agenda of Phase II. The 
interview responses in Phase I suggested that financing and political decisions affect 
the risk management choices within Organisation A and impact on the risk tolerance 
of the business (Section 4.5). The elicited responses where from one organisation and 
its regulators which means that the particular elements that the business sees as 
important may be peculiar to that country, regulatory system, ownership 
arrangements or strategic business plan of the water service provider. The Phase II 
research agenda seeks to understand if the themes discussed in Phase I and the 
literature review are consistent (or differ) across a range of other organisations and 
countries.  In doing so, the output of Phase II can be used to develop tools or 
guidance (Chapter 6) that inform organisations who wish to make improvements to 
the risk management effectiveness within their business without impacting on 
efficiency, environmental, regulatory or public health commitments. 
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5.2 Scope of Phase II 
The Phase II case study work focused on a wider group of organisations which are 
described (but anonymised).  Respondents with job roles from Chief Executive 
through to operational staff where interviewed across the water service providers, 
along with a number of regulators (predominantly water quality regulators) who 
monitor the performance of the water industry for the range of countries included in 
the study.  In addition to the interviews, and in line with the principles of case study 
methodology (Yin, 2009; Neuman, 2003), other documented evidence was examined 
(Section 3.4). Phase II sought to expose how actors with different levels of 
accountability within an organisation approach risk management and how this is 
aligned (or not) to regulatory objectives (Section 5.4.5). The inclusion of organisations 
and regulatory authorities across a small number of countries, with differing 
regulatory frameworks and water services ownership arrangements allows for a 
qualitative comparison across a limited number of operating models (Section 3.4.1). 
The output of the Phase II research agenda therefore offers a limited qualitative 
assessment between, and within, organisations with the same principle purpose of 
supplying safe water. The analysis informs suggestions for improving board 
engagement (Chapter 6). The output may be applied to a wider range of water service 
provision ownership arrangements and regulatory frameworks. 
5.3  Phase II Specific Methodology 
Consideration was given to the selection of target organisations, actors and countries 
that operated within different ownership arrangements and regulatory frameworks.  
The selection process used a range of elements which had been identified through 
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the literature review and the Phase I research activity. Table 5.1 lists the selection 
criteria used. 
Table 5.1: Phase II Interview Candidate Organisation Selection Criteria 
Features identified 
in Chapter 2 and 4 
Identified In 
Literature Review 
Identified in Phase 
I Research Activity 
Importance 
Ranking (1-10)  
Ownership 
arrangements  
Section 2.3 Section 4.4.2 1 
Regulatory 
framework 
Section 2.2 Section 4.4.1 and 
4.4.2 
1 
Service coverage Section 2.2, 2.3 and 
2.4 
Section 4.4.1 2 
Market structure Section 2.4  Section 4.4.1 and 
4.4.3 
1 
Quality of service Section  2.2, 2.3 and 
2.4 
Section 4.4  1 
Tariff setting 
arrangements 
Section 2.3 Section 4.4.2 and 
4.4.3 
3 
Area of coverage Section 2.3 Section 4.4 5 
Population served Section 2.3 Section 4.4 7 
Number of operators 
per country 
Section 2.3 Section 4.4.1 and 
4.4.2 
8 
Volume of water 
abstracted 
Section 2.2 and 2.3 Not mentioned 6 
Volume of water 
abstracted for 
drinking water 
Section 2.2 and 2.3 Section 4.4.1 8 
Average consumption 
(litres per day per 
person) 
Section 2.2 and 2.3  Section 4.4 9 
Water service, 
average price 
Section 2.3 Section 4.4.3, 4.4.4 
and 4.4.5 
4 
Average invoice per 
customer per annum 
(in Euros to allow for 
direct comparison) 
Section 2.3 Section 4.4.3, 4.4.4 
and 4.4.5 
5 
Sectoral Employment An important feature 
in defining the size 
and shape of the 
organisation 
included in the case 
study. Indirectly 
mentioned in 
Section 2.3 
Not mentioned  10 
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The ranking in Table 5.1 has been assigned by carefully considering the relationship 
between the evidence identified from the literature review, the initial output of Phase 
I (Chapter 4) and by drawing upon professional judgement.  It is accepted that the 
weightings are subjective and as such are influenced by individual experience which 
may differ from that of readers. The ranking is not a quantitative measure but rather 
a qualitative measure used as a guideline to aid the differentiation of the features of 
interest when considering the organisations and countries chosen for Phase II.  
The “multi-criteria” selection process was the first practical step in identifying targets 
for the case study work. The data used in the analysis and summaries in Table 5.2 is 
derived from a range of sources which include the Pinsen & Mason Year Book (Owen, 
2011), Regulation of Water and Waste water Services (Marques, 2010) and web based 
sources (company and regulators` websites).  
The metrics were examined along with a number of practical considerations which 
included; access to the target countries, organisations and actors within 
organisations; security issues; confidentiality conflicts; conflicts of interest; and 
possible language barriers.  
Table 5.2 presents the proposed countries for the Phase II research activity identified 
through the qualitative multi-criteria assessment process. The data contained within 
the Table demonstrates the range of differences in operating environments that exist 
within the target countries. For example Scotland is a relatively small country with a 
homogeneous and well-defined operating environment (tariff structure, regulatory 
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arrangements, market structure, etc.) compared to Canada which is a large country 
which operates multiple arrangements for water management on a province by 
province basis.  
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Table 5.2: Candidate Jurisdictions for inclusion in Phase II 
 
Country Regulatory Model Market Structure Tariff Setting Quality of Service
Area of 
country
Population
Population 
Density
Volume Water 
Abstracted 
Volume 
Abstracted for 
Drinking water
Ave 
Consumption
Water 
Losses
Water 
Services 
Average 
Price
Ave Invoice 
per 
Customer 
per Annum
Sectoral 
Employment
Water 
Waste Water 
services
Waste 
Water 
Treatment
Water
Waste 
Water
Water
Waste 
Water
Units N/A N/A N/A N/A km2 x Million inhabitants/km2 % % % % Public % Public N/A N/A Million m3 Million m3
Litres per Day 
per Person
% Euro/m3 Euro N/A
Canada (Excluding Prince Edward Island)* Self Regulated
Public Ownership and 
operation
No National structure. 
Local arrangements 
based on 3 levers. Fixed 
according to 
consumption, fixed 
regardless of 
consumption and/or 
variable inked to 
consumption.
Level of service 
generally regarded as 
good. Level maintained 
under threat of revoking 
operational licence or 
contract.
9984700 33.3 3.2 85 85 80 100 100 9000 9000 5400 4200 343 22.5 0.72 235 300000
England and Wales
Sector regulated by 3 
independent regulators on 
Water Quality (DWI), 
Environment (EA) and Financial 
(OFWAT)
Private Operation
Tariffs are based on a 
fixed element and 
variable element . 
Domestic and 
Commercial customers 
are charged differently. 
Tariffs are set through 
OFWAT.
Service levels regarded 
as very good and are 
monitored through 
regulators. Minimum 
levels of service may 
lead to compensation 
payments which acts as 
an incentive.
156200 53.7 343.8 99 96 93 0 0 25 10 5469 4267 147 22 1.5 390 35000
France
Similar to many EU countries, 
France does not operate a 
sector specific regulatory 
agency for water service. There 
are a number of agencies that 
have quality, environment and 
economic interests in water. 
The compex nature of the 
market makes it unfeasable to 
implement economic 
regullation.
Municipalities (circa 36,500) 
are responsible for delivery 
of services. Many of the 
municipalities operate 
concession agreements 
and/or deligated 
management and leasing 
agreements.
Tariff setting is complex 
due to the large number 
of municipalities and in 
particular the 
interconnecting networks 
and inter-municiple 
agreements. As a general 
rule the tariffs are set by 
the administrative 
authority and approved 
by the municipality but 
linked to the service 
contract and indexed.
Service leveles are 
regarded as excellent 
with France regarded as 
a global leader in water 
service provision.
543965 64.4 112 99 80 80 75 52 14900 14400 3350 600 165
Not 
Available
3 177 Circa 500,000
Portugal
Regulated by the institute for 
the regulation of water and 
solid waste (IRAR)
Predominantly Public 
ownership with around 20% 
private sector service 
provision. Of note is the 
operating structure which 
delivers wholesale and end 
user systems separately.
Tariff setting by 
operators is commonly 
proportioned between a 
fixed component and a 
variable element which is 
based on the volume of 
water and the property 
size. 
Services are generally 
regarded as high quality 
with the IRAR 
conducting an annual 
benchmarking exercise 
which compares the 
perfomrance of the 
service providers.
92300 11 111 91 75 66 80 20 523 314 862 560 153 35 0.33 130
Scotland
Sector regulated by 3 
independent regulators on 
Water Quality (DWQR), 
Environment (SEPA) and 
Financial (WIC)
Public Ownership  
Tariffs are based on a 
fixed element and/or 
variable element . 
Domestic and 
Commercial customers 
are charged differently. 
Tariffs are set through 
WIC. Competition has 
been introduced to the 
non-domestic customers.
Service levels are 
regarded as excellent 
with respect to 
reliability and continuity 
of service. Some issue 
remain problematic, for 
example water losses.
78800 5.1 65 100 100 100 100 100 1 1 838 523 160 37 1 380 3700
*Prince Edward Island (PEI) has a multi-
sectoral regulatory agency  that acts as an 
independent governance group on 
matters relating to such things as tariff 
setting.
Service Coverage Ownership Number of operators
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There are some limitations which have be taken into account when selecting the 
organisations of interest for Phase II. The performance measures of the 
organisations`, management cultures and risk management systems may be 
influenced by geographically specific challenges which are taken into account during 
Phase II. Canada is made up of a number of provinces, each with differing regulatory 
arrangements, geographies, population densities and raw water quality variations. 
The provinces have adopted different ownership arrangements for water service 
provision and governing bodies operate different tariff structures. Canada provides a 
rich and diverse set of circumstances. Scotland in contrast to other case study 
candidates, is a relatively small country by population (circa 5 million people) albeit it 
accounts for approximately one third of the land mass of the UK and has a large 
number of islands, island groups, small rural communities and large urban centre 
which provides a range of water management challenges. Scotland`s public water 
services are managed by a single organisation, Scottish Water, and are regulated by 
three regulatory bodies as previously discussed in Chapter 1. Portugal is another 
smaller country having a population of slightly more than double that of Scotland 
(circa 11m). Ownership arrangements for water services in Portugal are based on a 
public ownership model but provide another variant to Scotland and Canada. In each 
case access to organisations within each target country was possible and there were 
no barriers to entry, security concerns or ethical considerations the precluded these 
countries from being appropriate Cases in the study.  
Other countries considered included Chile, the USA, China, other Asian countries, 
African and Middle East countries. Chile is moving its water service provision to a 
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privatised model similar to that of England and Wales with around 75% of the water 
and waste water markets privatised to-date (Owen, 2011; Marques, 2010). Chile 
would provide and alternative case study to England and Wales for comparison. 
Unfortunately, Chile was not included as access to the appropriate actors was not 
possible, authorisation was difficult to secure. The USA was considered and provided 
a similar diverse set of arrangements to that of Canada, differing in regulatory 
approaches with more federal control in the USA compared to that of Canada`s 
devolved provincial system. The USA has similar challenges to Canada in terms of 
geography, water quantity and quality. The USA was not included in this study but 
could be included in any future work. China, Asian countries, African countries and 
middle east countries were considered but there were challenges in terms of getting 
access to the right organisations, language barriers, documentation and actors within 
these regions. Veolia and Kelda water are two organisations included in the study and 
operate across Asian, American, South American and African countries so some 
limited insight into geographical variations can be drawn from the experiences of 
these organisations. Veolia in particular highlighted in the interviews that their 
corporate risk management systems are cascaded across the organisation and 
countries of operation (Section 5.5). Veolia suggested consistent application of risk 
management systems across geographies and management cultures presented 
challenges such as interpretation of the documents, implementation and buy-in.   
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5.3.1  Selection of actors within organisations 
Actors were chosen from a range of vertical and horizontal hierarchal positions within 
the case study organisations. The horizontal approach allows for a comparison of 
opinions across the various actor groups (Directors, Managers, etc). The vertical 
approach allows an examination of opinion within organisations. The vertical and 
horizontal approach informs a richer analysis of opinion of the features under 
examination, within and across organisations.  
A similar horizontal/vertical selection strategy was adopted in Phase I (Section 3.4.1 
and Table 3.3). However in Phase II the number of vertical levels was increased to 
include operational staff below management. The inclusion of further levels of 
accountability allowed the researcher to investigate how risk management was 
adopted by operational staff. Access to some agencies and staff was difficult and, 
when access granted, time restrictions applied. Interviews were recorded with prior 
agreement, however in some cases the actors did not wish to be recorded which 
meant that full interview transcripts were not produced for all interviews. Interviews 
not recorded rely on field notes and observations (Section 3.5). Table 5.3 lists the 
interview groups.  
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Table 5.3: Selected roles and their relative positions of accountability with 
organisations.  
Role Purpose Numbers 
interviewed 
Countries 
Covered 
Transcript Available 
Chief Executive To gain 
understanding of 
strategic leadership 
2 UK; France Yes 
Finance Directors To Understand the 
role of Finance 
2 UK; France Yes 
Operations 
Directors 
To understand 
operational 
priorities 
6 UK; France; 
Canada; Portugal 
Yes 
 
Senior/General 
Managers 
To understand day 
to day priority 
6 UK; France; 
Canada; Portugal 
Yes 
Risk Managers To gain insight into 
the influence and 
effectiveness of the 
risk manager 
4 UK; France; 
Canada; Portugal 
Yes 
Regulators To better 
understand the 
regulators view of 
risk and how the 
organisations 
embrace risk 
management 
4 UK; Canada Yes 
Operation Team 
members 
To understand how 
risk management is 
implemented at a 
local level 
5 UK; France; 
Canada; 
No – The operators and Team 
Leaders did not want to be 
recorded but notes were 
taken. 
 
5.4 The case studies 
This section describes in detail the five organisations participating in Phase II. Case 
study information includes reference to regulation and ownership arrangements 
specific to the respective organisations. The data sets include some performance 
metrics taken from published company records.  
5.4.1 United Kingdom Case A 
Case A is a publically owned water service provider delivering drinking water and 
wastewater services to circa 5m customers. The majority of the UK water industry 
was privatised in 1989 but water service provision in this region was a devolved issue 
and the population voted to opt out of the privatisation program for water.  In 1996 
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three water authorities were established and eventually in 2002 a single water 
company was created with the task of driving in cost efficiency, improving services 
and delivering compliant drinking water.  In the first four years of operation the water 
company achieved some 40% cost saving and reduced staff numbers from circa 7,500 
to 3,800 while improving on water quality.  The organisation operates 267 treatment 
works at the time of writing this thesis and in 2012 and undertook 64,731 test with 
some 709 water quality events being reported. A water quality event is defined as an 
observation that may or could lead to a failure in the water treatment process. 
Twenty three of these events were classified as serious and defined as incidents, 
where an incident represents a significant or notable failure of the water treatment 
process resulting in a breach of the regulation and has the potential to cause harm to 
human health.  The number of events and incidents needs to be seen in context and 
the 2012 Figures represent a reduction in the number from 2011 (892 events and 84 
incidents).  
Table 5.4 summarises some of the reported annual financial metrics from 2008 to 
2012, providing an overview of the financial performance running in parallel with 
water quality improvements. Case A is a publically owned institute and therefore does 
not make a profit or declare a shareholder dividend. To allow comparison with other 
Cases, “surplus” has been included which is the difference between operational costs 
and the income generated through regulated charges. This is the closest comparator 
to profit and offers some indication of equivalence or performance, here it is referred 
to as profit before tax and has been calculated in the same way as the calculations 
used for profit before tax for the private water companies. The data submitted in 
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Table 5.4 is verified and approved by Case A`s finance department. Gearing is a factor 
of interest, as it indicates the amount of borrowing in relation to assets as a 
percentage and helps inform the amount of financial risk that the organisation is 
carrying with respect to borrowings.  
Table 5.4 Extract of some financial information reported by Case A 
Financial 
Metric 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Operational 
Expenditure 
(£m) 
290.3 301.9 328.5 340.8 349.9 
Capital 
Investment 
(£m) 
700.4 653.1 449.1 461.7 504.4 
Profit Before 
Tax (PBT) 
(£m) 
192.4 174.0 114.7 73.8 67.8 
Cash Reserves 
(£m) 
133.4 133.4 133.4 133.4 133.4 
Gearing (%) 55.4% 53.2% 50.3% 48.4% 47.6% 
 
Table 5.4 shows operational costs (OPEX) increasing in real terms as capital 
investment (CAPEX) decreases. The total costs (TOTEX) to the business go from 
£990.3m to £854.3m in 2012 with a dip to £777.6m in 2010.  PBT has been decreasing 
but this is perhaps not surprising as operational costs increase and efficiencies within 
the business become more difficult to find. The cash reserves are static as the 
regulatory contract requires the organisation to hold this reserve to deal with 
epistemic risks such as flooding, climate change and more recently the introduction of 
retail competition which puts at risk some £300m per annum of income (See Section 
4.4.3, the example given by B001). £300m of retail income lost would impact on the 
wholesale company’s ability to operate and certainly exceed the risk tolerance value 
which can be taken as £133.4m (see Chapter 6). In addition to this risk, austerity and 
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political pressure (Section 4.4.3 to 4.5) may result in a proportion of the £133.4m 
being diverted to other government initiatives, reducing the risk tolerance value, 
leaving the water company very exposed to risk. 
5.4.2 United Kingdom Case B 
Case B is located in the UK but this time in England. The organisation was specifically 
chosen as its ownership arrangements are based on a fully privatised model. 
Privatisation occurred in England and Wales in 1989 and a fully history of the lead up 
to an implementation of privatisation is recorded in “The Official History of 
Privatisation” Volume II (Parker, 2012). Although the ownership arrangements 
differing between Cases A and B they share the same general customer base size of 
circa 5m people. What differs substantially is the geographical location where Case A 
manages water supplies that cover approximately one third of the land mass 
(including a significant number of islands) of the UK which requires a larger number of 
treatment works (267 at the time of writing) and assets supplying a range of 
population centres with differing populations densities. Case B occupies a smaller 
geographical area and has a smaller number of treatment works (91 at the time of 
writing), compared to Case A. Water quality in England continues to improve but at a 
slower rate than other parts of the UK.  This is because substantive improvement was 
achieved post privatisation in 1989 (Parker, 2012) and before 2002; the water quality 
comparison starts at 2002. 
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Table 5.5 summaries the financial performance of Case B and here, profit is included 
rather than surplus. The amount of profit generated will inform the dividend paid to 
shareholders. 
Table 5.5 Extract of some financial information reported by Case B 
Financial 
Metric 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Operational 
Expenditure 
(£m) 
453.3 495.3 495.9 553.8 590.3 
Capital 
Investment 
(£m) 
377.8 362.3 262.0 300.3 404.3 
Profit Before 
Tax (PBT) (£m) 
172.9 152.1 126.1 117.7 77.7 
Cash Reserves 
(£m) 
235.3 840.8 756.5 827.9 842.7 
Gearing (%) 60.4 65.7 67.5 73.7 79.7 
 
The financial picture for Case B is very different from A. The OPEX costs are higher and 
the CAPEX costs lower. TOTEX goes from £831.1m to £994.6m compared to that of 
Case A which is £990.3m to £854.3m.  This is against a backdrop of Case A operating 
267 assets compared to Case B`s 91. Case A is possibly underfunded for the number 
of operational sites it has, meaning there may be significant underlying infrastructure 
risk (under investment, reduction in capital maintenance, and too few operational 
resources) or Case B is resource rich. The answer probably lies somewhere in 
between and a supplementary study could be undertaken to benchmark the risk 
profiles of the organisations.   
The cash reserves of Case B, by 2012, are £842.7m which is close to matching the 
OPEX figure of £854.3m. Overall the cash position for Case B is better than Case A and 
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the ratio between OPEX and cash reserve suggests Case B has a much better risk 
tolerance than Case A. 
5.4.3 France Case C 
Case C offers another variation in ownership arrangements and is French based. The 
organisation operates across a range of countries and continents. It is a private 
organisation, and at the beginning of this project provided water and waste water 
services directly (owning at least two water companies in England). Changes in the 
operating arrangement were initiated in 2011 as part of a strategic review which led 
to the decision to withdraw from owning and operating water service. The 
organisation is now built around capital investment delivery, asset maintenance and 
third party operations. Although the organisation no longer owns a water company, it 
is still a relevant candidate for this research project. The changes to operating mode 
where promoted by challenging market conditions risking the organisations financial 
health with a potential breach of risk tolerance (Section 1.7.4 and Chapter 6). The full 
set of financial results are not readily available for comparison however in 2013 it was 
reported that the overall net income (including the sale of businesses) for the group 
was circa 223m Euros compared to 58m Euros in 2012. This at least gives an 
indication of the scale of difference between operations with Case A through to C. 
This particular Case (C) has specific challenges in marshalling efforts to ensure risk 
management is not only consistent at board and group level but that it is applied 
consistently through the divisions, countries and regional business units.  
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5.4.4 Portugal Case D 
Case D is based in Portugal and has a close to 2.9m customers, so a slightly smaller 
customer base than Cases A and B.  It has around 736 direct employees compared to 
the 3500 of Case A and the 2500 of Case B. In 2012 the water quality compliance was 
reported at 99.6% overall (this includes microbiology and chemical compliance) this 
compares to 99.81% for Case A and 99.95% for Case B. The organisation operates 2 
principle treatment works (Case A has 267 and Case B has 91).  Case D operates 
within different ownership arrangements compared to A, B and C in that it is part of a 
larger public holding company (but still publically owned). Portugal has undergone 
reform since it emerged from dictatorship in 1974 after the “Carnation Revolution”. 
Change took place and led to Portugal’s inclusion in EU by 1986 but it was not until 
1991 when the EU Commission passed the Urban wastewater directive that real 
change occurred in the way Portugal managed its water services. It was in 1993 that 
the government introduced a policy to actively promote multi-municipal companies. 
This was delivered through the statutory instrument 379/93. A public holding 
company, Águas de Portugal was formed in the 1993, which was to be the majority 
shareholder of a newly created multi-municipal company that partnered with the 
participating municipalities. The government provided financial support through EU 
structural funds to those municipalities that agreed to participate in the new multi-
municipal companies. It took until 1995 to fully establish the operating arrangements 
of the new business model for water service provision. It was not until 2004 when the 
then Institute for the Regulation of Water and Solid Waste became The Water and 
Waste Services Regulation Authority, that concise performance reports on the 
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Portuguese water sector were published3. The executive summary report contains 
water quality information going back to 2004 up to 2011 and demonstrates an 
improvement across a number of parameters, which serves as an indicator that water 
quality in Portugal shows improvement. Table 5.6 summarises the comparative 
financial information of the general operation of Case D over the same five year 
period used in Tables 5.4 and 5.5. The gearing values were not accessible within the 
published data for Case D. 
Table 5.6 Extract of some financial information reported by Case D 
Financial 
Metric 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Operational 
Expenditure 
(£m) 
96.2 96 96.9 92.9 90.4 
Capital 
Investment 
(£m) 
21.5 22.0 19.4 9.8 10.7 
Profit Before 
Tax (PBT) 
(Euros m) 
30.2 30.9 37.6 35.0 36.0 
Cash Reserves 
(£ m) 
7.0 26.0 30.1 37.8 38.6 
Gearing (%) Not 
Reported 
Not 
Reported 
Not 
Reported 
Not 
Reported 
Not 
Reported 
 
Note: The Figures in Table 5.6 are taken from the annual reports which are in 
Euros. The data has been converted into pounds to allow direct comparison 
and an exchange rate of 1 Euro = £0.82 was used as this was the reported 
exchange rate at the time of writing. 
Case D has two drinking water treatment works with an annual OPEX of £96m to 
£90.4m. Although efficiencies have been achieved, the average OPEX per asset is 
£48m to £45m compared to Case A with an average OPEX of £1.08m to £1.31m per 
                                                             
3
 ANNUAL REPORT ON WATER AND WASTE SERVICES IN PORTUGAL 
(2012), The Water and Waste Services Regulation Authority. 
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assets (based on the figures in Table 5.4 and 267 assets) and Case B with an average 
OPEX of £4.98m to  £6.49m (based on the figures in Table 5.5 and 91 assets). The 
implication here is that Case D is very well funded for the operation of two treatment 
works and yet the drinking water quality compliance is lowest of all Cases (See Table 
5.8), even water quality compliance is trending up for Case D since 2004 (See Annual 
report on water and wastewater services in Portugal 2012).  According to the report, 
improvements in quality have been attributed to aspects such as better pH control 
and disinfection; however there is still opportunity for improvement. Aspects such as 
asset resilience, catchment management, treatment design and distribution could be 
investigated to further enhance protection of public health.  
5.4.5 Canada Case E 
Case E is a publically owned utility business based in Canada. It serves a population of 
circa one million people and supplies water and wastewater services. The company 
differs from the others in the study, in that it provides electricity as well as water 
services. Another strategic difference is that the organisation has been allowed to buy 
other companies in North America. The companies procured have similar core 
services to Case E. The company finances are a little bit more difficult to decipher as 
the organisation reports operational costs and investment for the whole group rather 
than for the individual business units or by utility type (water or electricity). Table 5.7 
summaries, the available financial data. 
Water quality compliance is also reported differently to that in Europe. Care has been 
taken to translate the available reports for a direct comparison between the five 
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utility companies. The business owns 4 water treatment plants and operates a further 
19 under concession contracts, similar to those operated by Case C. 
Table 5.7 Extract of some financial information reported by Case E 
Financial 
Metric 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Operational 
Expenditure 
(£m) 
127 136 119 127 176 
Capital 
Investment 
(£m) 
40 101 58 58 78 
Profit Before 
Tax (PBT) 
(Euros m) 
35 37 35 28 58 
Cash Reserves 
(£ m) 
43 60 6 56 171 
Gearing (%) Not 
Reported 
Not 
Reported 
Not 
Reported 
Not 
Reported 
Not 
Reported 
 
Note: The Figures in Table 5.7 are taken from the annual reports which are in 
Canadian Dollars. The data has been converted into pounds to allow direct 
comparison and an exchange rate of $1 = £0.54 was used as this was the reported 
exchange rate at the time of writing. 
Case E is similar to Case D with respect to size and the OPEX costs needed for running 
the business are higher per asset than Cases A and B. The efficiencies of water service 
providers (in terms of cost) are covered in other studies (Saal, et al.,2007; Ruester and 
Zschille, 2010) and this thesis contribution does not intend to cover this topic in 
detail. 
By 2012 Case E`s cash in the bank is close to 100% of the OPEX value (similar to that of 
Case B) with Case D having cash in the bank closer to 50% of  its OPEX and Case A 
having cash in the bank equivalent to 38% of OPEX but the largest number of assets. 
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The relative values of OPEX to Cash in the bank suggest that Cases B and E have the 
greatest chance of tolerating risk with Case D having a slightly lower tolerance and 
Case A having the lowest tolerance to risk (within the group of organisations included 
in the study). Case C, in selling off higher risk asset intense businesses has improved 
its cash flow and reduced the number or assets, in doing so has improved its risk 
tolerance (Section 5.4.3).   
5.4.6 Comparison of selected metrics of Cases 
Table 5.8 compares cross section of metrics for each organisation in 2012. Similar 
Tables can be produced for any given financial year but a snapshot for 2012 is the 
most recent and update set of Figures at the time of writing. The data is not readily 
available for the multinational Case C (Section 5.4.3). Therefore it could not be 
included in the comparison. 
Table 5.8 Comparison of a range of business performance metrics for four of the 
participating organisations at the financial year end 2012. 
 
*This includes total staff for the organisation which includes provision of power 
services. The number of staff associated with provision of water and waste water 
services will be lower.  
Population 
Served 
(million)
Number 
of 
Employe
Operating 
Costs (£m)
Capital 
Investment 
(£m)
Profit 
before tax 
(£m)
Cash 
reserves 
(£m)
number of Treatment 
works Operated (and 
or Owned)
Water 
Quality 
Compliance
Volume of water 
Produced per 
annum(Mega Litres)
Cost per 
cubic 
meter ($)
Participant A 5 3500 350 504 68 133 267 99.81 475 1
Participant B 4.9 2500 590 404 78 843 91 99.95 475 1.5
Participant D 2.9 736 90 11 36 39 2 99.6 210 0.33
Participant E 1 2700* 176 78 58 171 23 99.7 125 0.72
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The data presented in Table 5.8 gives an insight into the relative costs and staff 
requirements needed to supply water and waste water services. All of the 
organisations operate their finances as profit and loss accounts irrespective of 
ownership arrangements (although profit is generally referred to as surplus). The 
difference is that the privately owned businesses will pay out a dividend to their 
shareholders whereas the publically owned organisations will pay the “profit” or 
surplus back to the municipality or governing organisation. All organisations deliver a 
reasonable profit. The cash reserves give an indication of the risk tolerance values of 
the Cases (Section 1.7.4 and Sections 5.4.1 to 5.4.5). The definition of risk appetite 
(Section 1.7.4) requires that the financial impact of risk is less than the risk tolerance 
value. Reporting risk tolerance in a meaningful way is discussed in Chapter 6. During 
the course of this study there was no evidence to suggest any of the organisations  
have calculated the cost of a water quality failure and how this would impact and 
influence the risk appetite and (or) risk tolerance. Further analysis into the cost of 
failure using a range of scenarios would be a valuable exercise to undertake, and 
could inform future risk analysis activity. The closest the Cases come to defining risk 
appetite, is to deliver a risk appetite statement that include a generic statement to 
protect public health.  
It is notable that in the literature review Parker (1999, 2003) suggests that water in 
the UK is cheap, but the data presented here in Table 5.8, Table 1.1 and Table 5.2 
provide evidence which confirms that UK water costs are still high relative to other 
regulatory and ownership models. Case study D has the cheapest overall costs of 
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provision of water with Case study E being the next cheapest. Case Study B (the 
privatised service provider) is actually produces the most expensive water by volume.  
Cases A, B and C submitted actual copies of their risk registers as part of the data 
collection exercise. Four out of the top five risks on the registers submitted are 
finance related with only one risk referencing public health. This is in contrast to the 
strategic business plans which put public health as the top priority. Financial risks 
appear to be of higher importance in the minds of executives and senior 
management, than other strategic risks. 
All of the participating organisations have documents that could be described as 
strategic business plans. Organisation A, B and C`s business plans are detailed to a five 
year time horizon and these plans map out the investment profile which splits the 
capital expenditure into new asset delivery and capital maintenance. Cases D and E 
have documents that consider a shorter planning time horizon (less than five years 
but greater than one year) with aspirational statements for the longer term future 
service improvements, rather than a defined strategy. In all cases the company 
documents refer to risk management and list major categories of risk, for example, 
climate change impact, financial risk, supply demand balance and aging 
infrastructure. In all cases the risk appetite is not defined or quantified in a way that is 
easily understood. There is no evidence to suggest how risks have been ranked.  The 
documents generally refer to Enterprise risk management, monitoring and controlling 
“controllable risk” while considering a response to “uncontrollable risk” (this example 
is taken from Case E`s business plan). More could be done within the business plans 
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to emphasise the importance of risk management and the opportunity that risk 
management and water safety planning can offer in terms of public health protection, 
environmental stewardship and investment planning. 
The financial, business and quality metrics indicate that all Cases in the study have 
improved drinking water quality while making a profit (or surplus).  
5.5 Phase II interviews 
A total of 29 respondents with job roles from Regulators, Chief Executives through to 
operational staff were selected to be take part in the interview process.  The intention 
of the interview program was to elicit a response between organisations at similar 
levels and at the same time explore the responses vertically within the participating 
organisations. By adopting a vertical and horizontal interview strategy, a deeper 
appreciation of the pervasive nature of risk management, with respect to regulation 
and ownership arrangements, can be gained within and across the participating 
organisations.  
Interpretation of the interviews considered text in the Case’s business plans with 
respect to the risk management objective in order to establish the consistency of the 
interview responses with respect to the documented corporate strategy.  The 
tensions and interdependencies between the various interviewees were examined 
and some suggestions for improving board engagement, regulatory choices, 
ownership arrangement considerations and risk management have been proposed 
(Chapters 6 & 7).  
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The interviews were conducted either in person, where practical, or by phone. It was 
appreciated that the actors within the various organisations had multiple pressures 
on their time and it was not always easy to get sufficient time with the individuals. It 
is with great thanks that the individual actors appreciated the aspirations of the 
project and were willing to give up sufficient time to talk to the researcher which 
enabled a full and frank discussion of the study theme. 
The majority of regulators and senior managers were happy to be recorded on the 
basis that the conversations would remain confidential, where this is the case the 
recordings were transcribed and the transcriptions were used in the analysis. Field 
notes were taken when interviews were not recorded. The principle researcher 
supplemented the notes and transcripts with observation. Case D did not agree to 
interviews; rather the organisation supplied a collective written response signed off 
by their board. The response has still been included as this “corporate” view is still 
regarded as legitimate. Within the context of critical realist thinking (Easterby-Smith, 
2008, Neuman, 2003). 
The actors that took part in the interview were anonymised in line with the agreed 
ethics proposal (Appendix I). An interview identification key was developed (Table 
5.9) to aid the researcher in making meaningful interpretation of the interview 
response. The interview identification system allowed for easy grouping of interview 
responses across similar roles across organisations and geographical locations.  
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Table 5.9 Interviewee identification key 
Part One Part Two Part Three Part Four 
A = Organisation A 1 = 1st Interviewee  
in an organisation 
D = Director T = Transcription 
Available 
B = Organiastion B 2 = 2nd Interviewee 
in an organisation 
M = Manager F = Based on Field 
Notes 
C = Organisation C 3 = 3rd Interviewee 
in an organisation 
R = Regulator O = Personal 
Observation 
D = Orgniasation D ……. O = Operator W= Written Response 
given with board sign 
off. 
E = Organisation E    
 
For example a director from organisation E can be represented by the code E1DT if 
the director for the first interviewed and the transcript was available. 
5.5.1 Strategic Objectives 
The strategic objectives of the water service providers, irrespective of ownership 
arrangements are centred on the provision of drinking water, removal and treatment 
of waste waters and the protection of the environment. One company (E) provides 
electricity and so has additional strategic objectives around security of supply of 
energy to customers.  All participating organisations aim to deliver these objectives as 
cheaply as possible, where available finance is used for operational activity, capital 
maintenance and investment in new infrastructure to replace existing infrastructure 
and deliver new assets. For the purposes of this project it was of interest to 
understand the tensions (if any) between the differing objectives. The same questions 
were put to the regulators in order to better understand if the strategic actions 
proposed by the Cases met the expectations of the regulators when it came to 
delivering the regulatory priorities for water services. Organisations may translate 
regulatory requirements into strategic objectives that do not deliver the expected 
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outcome required by regulation and this in turn changes the risks that the business 
carries (good or bad). In general the board members and senior managers of all of the 
organisations were consistent in their response about the drivers for their 
organisations. For example: 
“We clearly have a drive to protect public health and the environment so the 
core kind of essence of the business, and that is very much reinforced by the 
obligations placed on us by legislation regulation and the ministerial objectives 
that are set for the business for each price review period” (A2DT)  
And; 
“Public health is obviously a driver for us, we have had considerable growth 
within the city and that has caused a number of problems with us in order to 
keep up at the time.  We have limited resources, we are on a closed basin, 
there is a lot of issues with water quantity as well that needs to be looked at.  
Regulation would be driver for us, Climate Change and Finance and resilience, 
also looking at workforce, maintaining ageing infrastructure and 
environmental protection.” (E1DT) 
The written response from organisation D was very concise and is a short list of 
drivers with no explanation of why they are important. 
“Business sustainability, business profitability, water quality, water quantity, 
reliability of water supply, reputation & trust.” (D1DW) 
All of the organisations alluded to financial sustainability as a significant focus. 
“If not managed properly, the financial resources needed to ensure the 
achievement of the operational drivers might have a negative impact on the 
business sustainability and profitability.” (D1DW) 
And;  
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“I feel the most tension on at the moment is financial. So when we talk about 
putting the customer at the heart of what we’ve got to do, that has to be 
tempered by a realisation and an understanding that we are a commercial 
organisation.” (C1DT) 
As well as; 
“We are always balancing an attention between what the customers want us 
to deliver, what do politicians want us to deliver, how much are they prepared 
to pay for it through their bills and how do we then find the cash to finance 
that, and the source of cash is not just customer bills, it’s borrowings.” (A1DT) 
Regardless of the ownership arrangements of the water utility there is a common use 
of the term profit within all organisations including A, D and E who are publically 
owned. Suggesting there might be a cultural shift in the desire for the organisations to 
see themselves as operating using the principles of private enterprise and is 
consistent with the responses given in Section 4.4.2, where Organisation incentivised 
the senior staff to operate the business as a private enterprise. Pointing to leadership 
teams within the organisation promoting a management culture centred on perceived 
private sector behaviours (Section 4.4.2).  
The business plans (with the exception of organisation C) are centred on investing in 
infrastructure that will make improvements with water quality compliance. Case C, as 
described in Section 5.5.3 has moved away from owning assets to acting as an 
operator and as such does not have a capital investment plan that is comparable to 
the other organisations. Within the other Case`s strategic plans there is a tension 
between investing for improved drinking water quality and affordability. The 
regulators` responses support the comment expressed by the actors of Organisation A 
167 
 
(Section 4.4.2 and 4.4.3), that capital maintenance may be de-selected to save money 
in the capital program For example: 
“We have been at treatment works audits, getting details of scheduled 
planned maintenance, there is quite a lot of gaps and we have not really had 
information about when maintenance is being carried out, so I think there is 
some issues with planned maintenance and some of the water quality 
incidents we see are because a crucial piece of monitoring equipment was off-
line for maintenance or the standby pump was not available.” (A1RT) 
And; 
“They (The Company) are not charging the full economic rate there is no real 
long term financial strategy to maintain infrastructure or to allow 
developments in infrastructure.  Most of the small communities have a 
financial plan that we describe as “pray for a grant” where the government is 
the banker of last resort and they stick their hand out and expect to be bailed 
out of the hole that they are in.” (E1RT) 
The regulator from Case E goes further to suggest that there is little or no long term 
strategy to invest in and maintain infrastructure operated by smaller community 
based service providers. The service providers appear to rely on the government to 
cover the costs of the infrastructure. Application of water safety planning with a view 
to investing in risk mitigation would offer opportunities for improvement to resilience 
of water supply (Macgillivray, et al., 2008) rather than relying on government 
intervention. (Case study Case E). 
Table 5.10 and Figure 5.1 provide a summary of the number of references coded 
within the transcript interviews relating to strategic planning. The table contains 
additional example quotes from each interview. The evidence suggest that the 
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directors in Cases E, B and C aspire to build longer term plans that address the drivers 
and priorities discussed here in Section 5.5.1. The clusters of coding around reactive 
management and short term planning are dominated by responses from the 
managers and regulators who feel that the businesses tend to manage the current 
problems, for example leakage in Case E`s country; where Case E`s actors observe 
that more effort is put into fixing leaks short term rather than focusing efforts on 
replacing old pipes for new. The view is that if pipes were replaced, there would be a 
more resilient system and less money would be spent on reactive leakage activities, 
saving money longer term. However, in Case E`s case, the governing body (the local 
municipality) did not approve the longer term strategic plan for asset (pipe) 
replacement due to competing political priorities (roads, schools, etc.). This meant 
that Case E was forced to maintain reactive management activities. Reactive 
management as a feature of management culture is discussed further in Section 5.5.3 
and political intervention discussed in Section 5.5.4.    
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Table 5.10: Code summary for strategic objectives. 
Long term planning Reac tiv e management Short term planning Effic ienc y targets
Code description
Long term planning is 
seen as an important 
activity within the 
organisation.
Reactive management is 
evident within the 
organisation.
Short term planning is 
the norm within the 
organisation.
There is a strategic drive 
for efficiency within the 
organisation.
Actor Example Quote
E1DT 11 0 0 1
We put together a five year long term business plan which we maintain 
going forward which drives all our business decisions and that long term 
plan is built around growth. 
E2DT 3 9 5 0
I always walk away thinking if we could put those resources into the stuff 
that we know that really makes a difference we’d be far better at managing 
out risks.
E3MT 0 0 3 0
being a plant manager is not a menial task and neither is being a water 
quality engineer and yet we only had limited numbers of people so 
everyone was trying to cover what we could and after a while that’s not very 
sustainable. 
E4MT 2 0 0 4
We do long term planning as well, and various terms of long term planning, 
there is a ten year forecast looking forward and then a fifth year plan for 
putting in new Waste Water Treatment plants and that type of thing.
 E5RT 0 1 2 0
it’s sort of sight-unseen, so they may be dealing with leaks on a regular 
basis, so all winter there’s sixteen leaks, they’re spending most of the time 
fixing leaks rather than spending the money to replace those water pipes.
 E6RT 3 2 1 0
Over the last 20 years that planning horizons by the politicians has come 
significantly shorter, we are now looking at 3-5 years, rather than making 
the strategic plans that they would have done in the past.
 B1DT 14 23 13 5
Which obviously diverts resource away from areas where we might be at 
greater risk but which are less visible to our customers or investments at a 
strategic level within the business.
 B2MT 3 5 2 0
it’s constantly about managing the tension between all those different 
objectives and we do that using our strategic risk value process as well as 
we have a sustainability strategy.
 B3MT 3 7 3 4
if you tried to look into things and plan a bit further to the future you 
wouldn’t have the additional cost or the additional time that the risk 
realising would take up from you.
B4MT 1 0 1 0
The risks that are actually managed at the moment tend to be dominated 
by slightly shorter time scale.
 C1D 2 1 1 0 we are in somewhat of a state of flux.
C2MT 2 0 0 3
looking at where do we want to be in three, five years? How do we get 
there? And what could happen that could compromise us getting there?
D1WT 0 0 0 0 No Examples.
 D2WT 1 0 1 0
one of its goals being to manage risks connected with our service level, 
identifying critical points in the network and creating specific measures to 
assure that risks are known, minimized and managed in our daily routines.
 A1DT 3 0 0 0
our strategy is going to be over a period of years on an incremental basis 
to just build in more and more connectivity so we have a grid really covering 
Ayrshire right through to Dundee and potentially further north but there is 
more of a question mark about that. 
 A2DT 5 0 0 3
one of the things that we are doing for the first time, is we are in the 
process of developing 25 year projections for the business, historically we 
have operated on a 4-5 year regulatory periods and that was an 
improvement from when it was done on an annual basis, for the first time 
we are looking at planning from 2015 – 2040
A3DT 22 4 3 8
What our economic regulator agreed with us was that we should enter into 
what are called “strategic land management projects”, so this is about 
trying to identify the source of these pollutants and eliminate at source 
rather than stripping out of the water at the treatment plant. 
A4DT 0 0 0 1
 Well if you listen to the regulator, you would say it’s been wonderful on 
savings costs and it also costs an absolute fortune.
A5MT 4 2 0 11 we really need to target our money affectively across the country.
A6MT 9 5 9 1
well management is at fault, because they never actually encouraged the 
escalation and the same management is at fault in terms of if you have 
knowingly neglected. 
A7MT 3 1 5 0
there is a drive to do a lot in a short period of time, rather than investing for 
long term sustainability, and it is how do you strike that balance, how do 
you get somebody who is in post today that might be retiring in five or ten 
years time to think about the legacy that he is leaving behind for the person 
that takes his place.
A8RT 1 4 2 3
I think one of my concerns at the minute is maintenance, well our concerns 
as well.  We have been at treatment works audits, getting details of 
scheduled planned maintenance, there is quite a lot of gaps.
A9RT 1 1 0 2
I think a lot of it seems to be driven by again the team leaders and the 
team managers, but I have seen a move for the team managers to really 
sort of try and take things where they see frustrations and tensions and 
lack of money being spent on maintenance which actually is a big tension 
in operations at the moment, taking into their own hands and setting up 
maintenance service contracts themselves, which I argue should not be 
down to them really, I mean it is great they have done it, but really it should 
be handled centrally, they are seeing risks and because they don’t want 
the plant to fall flat on it’s face they are trying to address these themselves 
the best they can.
Total Reference Count 93 65 51 46
Code description and number of references (n)
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The coded references within the interviews suggest that decentralised regulation 
combined with small locally operated water management systems (publically owned) 
suffer from a lack of short term planning and investment. This is explored in more 
detail in Section 5.5.2., reflecting the observations made in Sections 1.2, 2.2, 4.4.2 and 
4.4.3. The general view of the operators across all case study organisations was that 
that there was no real focus on long term planning. The operators felt that: 
“We escalate issues such as faulty equipment, for example on-line pH meters but 
nothing gets fixed. Why bother if the organisation cannot prioritise fixing such critical 
early warning systems?” B5ON. 
And:  
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“We have been waiting for new control systems for years. The business says this is a 
priority but all their worried about is saving money.” E7ON.  
5.5.2 Financing investment in infrastructure 
Financing water services is an influencing feature identified through the literature 
review (Section 2.3) and Phase I (Sections 4.4.2, 4.4.3 and 4.4.7). The significance of 
financing water services was further re-enforced across all of the case study 
organisation and by the regulators (Figure 5.2 and Table 5.11).  
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Table 5.11 Code summary for finances 
A : Finance C : Affordability D : Charging mechanisims E : Economics of capital investment F : Economics of operation G : Asset Investment Planning J : Financing of services K : Aquisition of capital
Code description
Finances is seen as an 
important driving factor.
Affordability is seen as a 
driver for 
policy/regulation
Charging mechanisims 
are considered a 
regulatory feature and an 
important success factor 
for delivering water 
services.
Economics is considered 
important to delivery of service 
and has an influence on risk 
management.
Economics  of operation 
is considered important 
to delivery of service and 
has an influence on risk 
management.
Planning asset 
investment (either new 
assets or capital 
maintenance) is 
considered important to 
service deliver and risk 
mitigation.
Financing of services is 
a sub-set of financing, 
charging mechanisims 
and economics.
Securing additional 
capital is seen as 
important to ongoing 
service delivery.
Actors Example quote
A1DT 1 14 3 2 2 2 2 0
We are always balancing an attention between what the customers 
want us to deliver, what the politicians want us to deliver, how much 
are they prepared to pay for it through their bills and how do we then 
find the cash to finance that, and the source of cash is not just 
customer bills it’s borrowings
A2DT 3 9 10 0 1 1 2 5
any increase in charge is difficult for customers, so that pressure to 
keep charges at what is perceived to be an affordable level is 
obviously tension with the rates at which we can improve the 
business.
A3DT 8 8 4 0 0 5 10 2
the borrowing requirement is set, so that gives us an efficiency 
challenge within operating cost and in capital efficiency.
A4DT 0 8 11 1 2 0 2 3
Up here, where 85% of our cost charges, the last thing you want to 
do is feed that through charges and where debt and borrowing is 
constrained we want the smallest effective programme we can 
possibly put in place, so that links to charging mechanisms.
A5MT 5 9 2 0 1 1 0 0
I think like all businesses, regardless of whether we are in the private 
sector or the public sector, there is always going to be affordability.
A6MT 2 0 0 0 1 4 6 1
I think then you get the kind of other key risks are probably around 
the financial, so the inability to meet our finance and requirements, 
whether it be bad debt, whether it be borrowing, whether it be revenue 
streams, or the fact that we have no other source of getting money 
other than the customer and the government at the moment
A7MT 0 0 0 0 2 1 2 0
 we need to get better in terms of asset performance, understanding 
our assets, understanding how well they are performing and what 
stops them performing well, and I think we carry quite a lot of risk 
around the balance of investment and maintenance, with financial 
pressures, the first thing that tends to go within the business is 
routine maintenance, and we kind of tend to step back on that, and 
don’t understand what the risk is in doing that.
A8RT 0 3 0 0 1 4 0 0
I think we will always end up with a barrier that there is not the 
funding for that so it’s not necessarily being addressed, we have 
highlighted the risk and there might be some operational control 
measures, so I think the real test is going to be how successful it is 
in terms of what comes out of them.
A9RT 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 1
Financial constraints, to some extent are a bit of a straight jacket. 
Politically bills are not going to be allowed to go up, you could argue 
that the bills may have needed to go up in the past possibly, and we 
would be in a better position now if they had done, and we had cut 
fewer corners with investment.
B1DT 9 2 2 0 1 1 18 1
The areas that I’m most concerned about are our understanding of the 
assets, their level of deterioration and what the long term investment 
needs are in the context of economic climate, affordability to 
customers, tariffs, social tariffs, financing, all of that. I think we’re 
facing a bow wave of investment in the next ten to twenty years to 
maintain current standards of service.
B2MT 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0
managing the assets or putting trigger plans for liability maintenance, 
your ICA maintenance or whatever. It’s just the mind-set from not in 
the corporate governance world, I mean, I’m in the practical process 
world.
B3MT 0 1 0 0 0 3 3 0
There’s obviously always the tension with what you have to do and 
what you feel that you can do within the budget that you’ve been 
given.
B4MT 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
I would say there’s inevitably tension, stuff I’ve previously come 
across and thought about are tensions between affordability and 
reliability, resilience, efficiency. 
C1DT 1 7 6 0 0 1 27 0
That would be a key area for us as well, of risk, on our operating 
model; five years, ten years service contracts, how do you value what 
the inflation is going to do or what commodity prices are going to do
C2MT 8 0 0 1 2 0 6 0
Their intention is to reduce their debt so they had to sell something 
that was quite easily sellable and that would bring a lot of cash. 
D1WT 0 1 2 0 0 2 2 0
as a preliminary approach one may say that the key areas are: 
assets’ ageing; lack of water availability at sources due to climate 
changes; difficulties in obtaining financing support; increase in the 
price of energy.
D2WT 0 0 0 0 0 3 2 0
Of course, the company also benefits with risk management as we 
can be able to do better choices in terms of the use of the resources 
(financial and others)
E1DT 1 14 22 9 5 2 5 9
We do have a separate source of funding now, that is going to run out 
at some point in time, once that company is 100% publically traded 
there is going to be nothing left to sell, that is going to change our 
business model a little bit and how we borrow money.
E2DT 4 4 3 0 0 0 0 0
when we’re doing those things, obviously we want to be cost effective 
and we’ve been pretty strategic on how we’ve leveraged the most 
benefit that we can for those kinds of work. We’re cheapskates, we’ll 
pick and choose very carefully who we partner with and we try to get 
a lot of leverage on what we do.
E3MT 0 2 1 9 1 0 1 0
you really don’t know what the growth will be each year, so you try to 
budget assuming a certain growth and if that growth does not happen, 
you don’t have the finances.
E4MT 5 0 2 0 0 1 8 0
The rate of growth is a big risk for us and financial, those two are key 
from the Director, that is where the focus is, trying to manage those 
two, heavy emphasis on financial for us, the other things would be 
public health, environmental impact and limited resources.
E5RT 3 0 0 0 0 0 7 0
Most do not charge enough for their water. So they use their own 
taxing system. Then there’s the gas tax program, which I don’t really 
know a whole lot about but essentially money that the municipalities 
get back from the taxes that we obtain for gas use in the province. 
Most gas tax, it goes to the municipalities and the municipalities 
have to indicate what they’re going to use it for.
E6RT 2 9 3 0 2 0 23 0
He was going to raise the charge from 35 cents a cubic metre to 50 
cents a cubic metre, there was outrage at this.
Total reference count 52 92 71 22 22 31 133 22
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Board members involved in the study appear most interested in the financial stability 
and wellbeing of the organisation they lead. Organisations, and in particular smaller 
municipal organisations, tend to have limited powers to raise capital through 
borrowing.   
“we are funded through the water rates 100% we don’t get subsidised in any other 
way and we are expected to make a return on capital investment, a fair return on 
capital investment” E1DT 
And; 
“We are financed through customer charges, we don’t borrow from government.” 
E1DT 
Funding available can be insufficient to maintain current levels of service and fall 
below the investment levels, particularly when the tariffs for customer charges are set 
directly by the governing body which is normally the elected official. The tariffs are 
lower than the combined OPEX and CAPEX requirements to maintain serviceability as 
the elected official is often under pressure to keep charges low by the electorate; 
“This guy got voted out at the next election because he wanted to raise the charge, so 
it is absolutely politically charged and because it is the individual municipal small town 
hamlet that is responsible for it, you have only got about 150 voters for them to get 
fed up and you are pushed out, whereas if that had been about 100,000 voters and 
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there were only about 150 that were fed up then it would have made no difference” 
E6RT 
 The regulator highlights significant political influence on tariff setting, particularly in 
small locally run systems. This is further evidenced in Case E, For example, the charges 
for water to the customer were quoted as circa 35 cents per cubic metre compared to 
the treatment and infrastructure costs which are close to $2 per cubic metre. This is 
not sustainable and operational and systems risks will be more likely within under 
invested systems. It was also found that shortfalls in capital for investment lead to a 
reduction in planned capital maintenance, which again will increase operational risks 
(Section 4.4.2 and 4.4.3).  
Board level discourse on financial risk is about the financial consequences of risk 
rather than financial risk per se. Tensions are noted between investing in the water 
network, maintaining operability and paying out a dividend to shareholders in the 
privatised business models. The ability of the water company to raise sufficient funds 
to remain in operation and invest in infrastructure is at the core of protecting public 
health and managing risk. The strategic business plans set an agenda that is designed 
to meet water quality improvement goals as well as protecting the environment and 
securing water volumes. The importance of financing is reflected in the number of 
coding intervals that appear in the analysis.  The most frequently talked about issue 
was financial risk, for example: 
“I think the other major risk that faces the organisation in delivering its 
objectives right now is, will there actually be the borrowing levels there for the 
next three years to finance the objectives we've got and if not, if the ministers 
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shrink the size of the investment program, how many of the things that fall out 
of the program or objectives will affect the delivery of the organisation`s 
vision?” (A3DT) 
And; 
“Other risks that are around related to our public sector model, the way we 
gather revenue at the moment from customers is through council tax and 
councils are in discussion with government about changing the formula as to 
how that is actually calculated and how the organisation gets its contribution 
from it. We do quite well out of this formula at the moment because the bad 
debt element is weighted towards the councils than ourselves and any change 
to it will bring with it a reduction in revenue to us.” (A4DT) 
Although the examples here are from the same organisation, the theme is consistent 
throughout the participating organisations. For example Case C made a comment 
that: 
“At the start of the credit crunch, 2007, 2008, Case C had expanded rapidly, 
found itself in a position where it had debt that was seen as being too big for 
the size of the organisation, had a lot of debt. So strategically the decision was 
taken to sell the transport division. So that’s one, that’s going through as we 
speak. It’s not confidential, that’s well understood in the marketplace, basically 
Case C is going through a divestment process to reduce its debt, and that’s well 
understood in the marketplace.” (C1DT) 
And even in organisations D`s written response, financing is a prominent theme: 
“If not managed properly, the financial resources needed to ensure the 
achievement of the operational drivers might have a negative impact on the 
business sustainability and profitability.” (D1WT) 
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From a regulatory perspective financing is also seen as important but concern for 
operability arises when regulators become aware that agreed investment is not 
delivered to the timescales (or deferred) which put public health at risk.  
“The cost of providing water and wastewater service on a sustainable footing 
for them is extortionate, they basically just ignore it in the hope that it will sort 
itself out somehow, sometime.  The financial structures that are in place to 
allow sustainable systems is the biggest challenge.” (E6RT) 
And: 
“There is obviously the financial constraint there that perhaps means that the 
best solution for an area is not getting implemented and sort of corners are 
being cut or less ideal solutions being considered.” (A7RT) 
Some regulators noted that the publically owned water companies acquire income 
through customer charges supplemented by government borrowings, which while 
normally having a lower interest rate than private equity, can be limited or diverted 
to other public projects at short notice. The privately owned Cases in this project 
(Cases B and C) have access to funds through customer charges and the capital 
markets. They also have more flexibility to move capital from one project to another 
as priorities changed (See the response from the regulator in Section 4.4.2), whereas 
public organisations are generally committed to the projects specified in the 
regulatory contracts.  The political influence appears stronger with public companies 
and may constrain borrowing or charges, as the same regulator points out: 
“There is the financial side, financial constraints, to some extent it is in a bit of 
a strait jacket in that, politically, bills are not going to be allowed to go up, you 
could argue that the bills may have needed to go up in the past possibly, and 
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we would be in a better position now if they had done, and we had cut fewer 
corners with investment, I think one of the drivers for us is making sure 
investment is delivered and there is value received for that investment.” (A7RT) 
The evidence presented in Section 4.5 highlights a real example of a political decision 
that fundamentally changed the cost base of a water service provider. The decision 
had an impact within days. Making swift decisions about changes to financing will 
fundamentally change the investment, risk and therefore the way risk management is 
applied within the utility. To complicate matters, not only were the domestic charges 
frozen but the public utility was in detailed discussions with the local authority about 
how domestic customer charges would be recovered though council tax charges. The 
local authorities who collect the revenue wanted to change the formula which would 
remove protections for income to the water utility from citizens below the poverty 
line who could not afford to pay council taxes. This change in formula would reduce 
the income to the water authority further and increase stress on the investment 
programme priorities. Another pressure on finances came from recovery of income 
from the “retail” arm of Case A, which was now open to market competition (at the 
time of writing Case A lost a £350m retail contract to a competitor). The retail income 
was much lower than expected because of a variety of contractual issues which 
remain confidential and are out with the scope of this study. One of the directors 
observed that: 
“In difficult times like we are in at the moment, then any increase in charge is 
difficult for customers, so that pressure to keep charges at what is perceived to 
be an affordable level is obviously tension with the rates at which we can 
improve the business.” (A2DT) 
178 
 
And; 
 “One of the biggest risks that I’m currently running at the moment is to do 
with the way that we bill and collect charges from our household customers. 
Around 70 % of our revenue comes from our household customers; the charges 
for these customers are linked to council tax band and in interests of efficiency 
these charges are billed together with council tax and they are collected by 
each of the local authorities along with the council tax and then what is 
collected is then remitted to [Case A].  Since 1996 there has been a formula in 
place that governs how much of the cash that is collected by the local 
authorities is remitted to [Case A]. And it’s a formula that basically looks at the 
total cash collected across council tax and water charges and then it 
apportions the amount of cash that we receive in relation to the value of the 
water and sewage element of the bill as a percentage of the total bill of council 
tax and water and sewage charges together. Now this formula has given a 
very strong incentive to the local authorities to collect what is known as water 
only debt. The specific issue here is that if someone is in receipt of full council 
tax benefit, they don't get a council tax bill but they do get a bill for water and 
sewage charges albeit it that can be discounted by up to 25 %. Unsurprisingly 
because of the socio-economic characteristics of people who are low income 
earners and on full council tax benefit there is probably a higher level of non-
payment of water only bills compared to the non-payment of combined council 
tax and water and sewage bills. And that's why it has been particularly 
important that the councils have a very strong incentive to collect the water 
only debt because otherwise the risk to [Case A] is they may think ‘Well, it 
doesn't really matter if we collect or don't collect the water only debt because 
it's [Case A] who will bare the cash and bad debt consequences’. The local 
authorities are increasingly understanding their relative levels of collection of 
council tax and water debt and some of them particularly in the more 
economically disadvantaged areas have come to the view that this current 
billing collection formula works against them. So the risk to [Case A] is that the 
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councils successfully mount a case for the current collection arrangements to 
be changed. Not so much that they collect the cash but more the formula by 
which the cash is allocated between the councils and [Case A]. So that's the 
risk, the risk is that we could end up with relatively less cash than we've done 
previously.” (A2DT) 
The three identified pressures on income (Government capping customer charges, 
local authorities changing the charging formula and lower than expected retail 
income) will have a cumulative negative effect on the available finances required to 
deliver water and wastewater services. Assuming no other funding is available, the 
organisation must make choices that deviate from the agreed regulatory contract. 
They could choose to take resources out of frontline services, reduce spend on capital 
maintenance and/or stop capital investment projects. In this case the organisation 
took decisions around all three funded areas to ensure that the budget targets were 
met.  In the example Case A became cash constrained over a short period of time 
because of political decisions about funding mechanism. Ultimately these choices 
impacted on the funds and moved the business closer to the risk tolerance value 
(Section 1.7.4). The organisation was placed in a reactive situation (Section 5.5.1 and 
5.5.3) in which risks needed to be managed but there was  little evidence within the 
case study sample to suggest that the organisations adapt risk management practise 
to deal with the fluid nature of capital availability, which put this as a strategically 
higher priority than operational and public health risks, in the minds of the 
executives. 
Organisations operating private ownership arrangements have financial challenges 
which impact on the risk management choices. Case A faced specific challenges after 
180 
 
the financial crisis of 2008 but so did the private sector. The private sector was less 
constrained in the choices it could make to ensure ongoing sustainability of the 
organisation. Case C chose to re-focus business activity on servicing and maintenance 
which meant divesting itself of owning water assets. Two actors within the 
organisation observed; 
“[Case C] had expanded rapidly, found itself in a position where it had debt 
that was seen as being too big for the size of the organisation, it had a lot of 
debt. So strategically the decision was taken to sell the transport and water 
divisions. So that’s one, that’s going through as we speak. It’s not confidential, 
that’s well understood in the marketplace, basically [Case C] is going through a 
divestment process to reduce its debt, and that’s well understood in the 
marketplace. “(C1DT) 
And; 
“that decision was taken by Paris, the headquarters of the company in France. 
Their intention is to reduce their debt so they had to sell something that was 
quite easily sellable and that would bring a lot of cash. And also they wanted 
to re-centre themselves on their core skills and core jobs which is to run 
services and provide services to water companies rather than own assets. That 
was the intention behind it. The first drive is financial, reduce the debts of the 
company and restore the confidence of investors.” (C1MT) 
The decision for Case C meant that they de-risked the business by giving up asset 
ownership arrangements and focusing on service provision to the water sector. 
The constraints in funding have lead the two organisations with differing ownership 
arrangements to take very different decisions. Case A`s funding was dictated to by 
politics and they had to limit operational and investment activity as a result. Case C 
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has acquired too much debt and this meant it had to sell off elements of its business. 
All of the choices taken altered the risk profile within the respective businesses. Case 
A`s cash reserves were reduced thus reducing risk tolerance, for example, investment 
and maintenance was reduced increasing the probability of treatment failure. In 
contrast Case C increased its cash surplus therefore increasing its risk tolerance 
(Section 1.7.4) by selling physical assets that needed operational intervention, 
investment and maintenance (Section 5.4.3).   
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The frequency of references on the topic of financing, between groups (Figure 5.3 a, b 
and c), supports the analysis that the director community are most concerned with 
the financing of services. The number of codes and frequency across the range of case 
studies (perhaps with the exception of Case Study D) highlights that it is a common 
concern for executives across international boundaries, regulatory regimes and 
ownership arrangements.   
Managers show similar concerns to directors with a similar range of coded references; 
however the issue was mentioned less, with the frequencies across the codes being 
lower.  
Regulators, while still concerned with financing discussed this less, focusing more on 
public health and service delivery as high priority areas for water service providers. 
Only one of the regulators in case study E mentioned financing of services with a 
similar frequency to that of the director community. 
Summary 
To summarise, financing is an important driver for water service delivery and is 
directly influenced by regulation and ownership arrangements (illustrated in the study 
framework, Figure 2.5) and highlighted in both the literature review (Section 2.3), the 
Phase I research (Chapter 4) and here in Section 5.5.2. The interviews exposed a 
number of features of regulation and ownership arrangements that influence 
financing and have consequences for risk management. Table 5.12 summarises the 
financing arrangements highlighted by the interviewees across the case study 
organisations together with some of the implications for risk management. 
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Financing Arrangement Description Ownership Arrangement Regulatory Features Implications for Risk Management Evidence
Charging based on metering (domestic 
customers)
Tariffs are based on a charge per 
cubic meter of water supplied. 
Customers are metered and 
charged on volume of water used.
This mechanism has been 
used by public and 
private companies.
Some regulators favour this approach 
particularly in water scarce areas as it 
drives behaviours around water use 
reductions.
There is often a shortfall between income generated 
and the cost of delivering the water service. Meaning 
less money to invest in building and maintaining asset. 
Operational elements such as  Leakage and drinking 
water quality failures may increase as a result.
Case 
Study E
Charging based on metering (business 
customers)
Tariffs are based on a charge per 
cubic meter of water supplied. 
Customers are metered and 
charged on volume of water used.
This mechanism has been 
used by private 
companies in water retail 
markets.
Some regulators favour this approach 
when seeking to "improve the 
efficiency of the water companies 
through retail market competition".
There is often a shortfall between income generated 
and the cost of delivering the water service. Meaning 
less money to invest in building and maintaining asset. 
Operational elements such as  Leakage and drinking 
water quality failures may increase as a result.
Case 
Study A
Fixed annual tariff for domestic customers
Tariffs are based on the aggregated 
cost of service delivery and then a 
single annual charge is applied to 
domestic customers. 
This mechanism has been 
used by public and 
private companies.
The tariffs are normally agreed at a 
national level with the financial 
regulator with sign off from 
environmental and drinking water 
regulators, where they exits.
The tariff will be based on a strategic plan that will 
identify priorities for investment and affordability. 
Some strategic investment may not go forward and, in 
the case of public ownership, the charges are open to 
influence by political decision making. Meaning there 
may be a shortfall in financing.
Case 
Study A, 
B and D
Fixed annual tariff for business customers
Tariffs are based on the aggregated 
cost of service delivery and then a 
single annual charge is applied to 
business customers. 
This mechanism has been 
used by public and 
private companies in 
water retail markets.
The tariffs are normally agreed at a 
local level and usually linked to the 
water consumption of the business.
The tariff will be based on wholesale price of water 
and consumption. A shortfall in the wholesale 
operating cost may result from a gap in the revenue 
collected by the retail company relative to the 
wholesale operating costs, resulting in under 
investment in strategic assets.
Case 
Study 
A,B, C 
and E
Income recovery through third parties
Fixed tariffs sometime are 
collected through third parties 
(case study A uses a local authority 
system). 
Used principally by public 
utilities.
The income is usually defined by a 
calculation which can be influenced 
by the local authority, politicians and 
water company. There is constant 
pressure to reduce the amount of 
recovered income going to the water 
utility.
Under recovery of income will create a shortfall in the 
operational budget and investment plan, leading to 
under investment in strategic assets and a need to find 
further operational efficiencies (usually a reduction of 
staff numbers).
Case 
study A 
and E
government borrowing
Borrowing additional capital 
through the government. This is 
usually a cheaper from of 
borrowing but is restricted in terms 
of value. The borrowing in normally 
required to make up the shortfall in 
income recovery.
Used principally by public 
utilities.
There is little guarantee that the 
borrowing will be forthcoming. The 
value of borrowing is fully 
dependant upon the local or national 
government. The government may 
divert borrowing to other national or 
local priorities.
Additional Government borrowing may allow 
investment in strategic assets in the short term which 
should improve resilience.
Case 
study A 
and D
borrowing from capital markets
Borrowing additional capital 
through the markets. The 
borrowing in normally required to 
meet the service providers 
contractual obligations (investment 
and operational)
Used principally by 
private utilities.
There is no direct involvement from 
the regulators. The control of 
borrowing normally goes through the 
company board and shareholders. 
Borrowing capital is expensive and may lead to higher 
interest rate payments. Some private organisation may 
find a gap in cash flow and need to divest themselves 
of capital intensive element of their business to 
release capital (to repay loans) and reduce risk. Loss of 
control of strategic assets may be a national concern.
Case 
study C
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The range of financing mechanisms has implications for the operability of the water 
service provider. The biggest risk for financing is the creation of a funding gap. In the 
case of Case E, financing is based on growth projections: 
“The other thing is that we have model where growth pays for growth, so we have 
sort of  assessment that occurs and so you really don’t know what the growth will be 
each year, so you try to budget assuming a certain growth and if that growth does not 
happen, you don’t have the finances.” E4MT 
Tariff setting, either for metering or for fixed charges is open to political influence 
with pressure to keep charges artificially low (Case study A and E), leading again to 
under investment of infrastructure. Income recovery mechanisms (such as 3rd party 
collections (Case Study A) may also lead to financing shortfalls. Borrowing can be used 
to make up shortfalls where available (for example Case Study E candidates are 
unable to borrow) but interest charge payments may be applied meaning income is 
diverted to interest payments rather than investment.  
The financing options influenced less by political decision making appear to support 
longer term asset planning (Case Study B and C) but there is a risk that the private 
companies are forced to sell strategic assets (Case Study C) to make up a shortfall in 
capital. The loss of control of strategic assets may be seen as a risk to national 
interests but more research would be needed to confirm this. 
Overall Table 5.12 gives some insight into the range of choices of financing water 
service. Each system will have limitations and potentially lead to limited funding to 
deliver services. Retail competition in particular may have implications for risk 
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management as the loss of revenue of the reduction in revenue may restrict capital 
investment and capital maintenance increasing the likely hood of risks occurring 
within the water and wastewater systems. Similarly borrowing from capital markets 
may cost more meaning the servicing of debt is likely to be higher. It is worth noting 
that there is no evidence from the privatised company (Case study B) that they 
service the debts. If the debts are not serviced sufficiently then debt will build up 
within the business to an extent where the company cannot replay the loans and this 
will have a critical impact on the delivery of water and wastewater service. Servicing 
of debt should be of concern to risk managers within private organisations and 
mitigations put in place to manage debt effectively, in doing so, protecting the 
business from risk. 
5.5.3 Management culture and risk management 
Protecting public health and customer experience 
Board representatives, are changing the way they discuss providing water and 
wastewater services. Traditionally companies focused on the “protection of public 
health” however in the interviews conducted; there is a move towards considering 
the “customer experience”.  The importance of customer experience is also referred 
to in many of the strategic business plans. To put this into context here are some 
quotes from a range of actors at board level. 
 “I think more recently what we have been grappling with is what is it that 
matters to customers beyond the purely regulatory measure success, and we 
have been giving a lot of focus on what is it that drives customer satisfaction or 
customer dissatisfaction, so that is going a lot of work to try and make sure 
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that things never go wrong for customers and trying to increase the extent to 
which the system just works or if it breaks down, we would become aware of it 
breaking down and we fix the asset before it has an impact on customers and 
then to the extent that things do impact on customers, there is an increasing 
focus driven my measures of customer experience to make sure that we are 
resolving things first time and obviously where we are not,  that we have an 
exceptionally good recovery service” (A1DT) 
And; 
“Our shareholders for [Case E] is also our sort of rate setter as well and they 
are speaking on behalf of the rate payers in the city, folks who pay their water 
bills, and we have to convince our shareholders every five years that rate 
increases that we are proposing that are for infrastructure renewal or 
improvements are justified and prudent.” (E1DT) 
Together with comments from the privatised water companies: 
“In terms of service, we colloquially put that down as doing what we say we’re 
going to do. But also trying to put the customer and the client at the forefront 
of our service.” (C1DT) 
And; 
“To be operationally excellent in the basics of everything that you do and in 
doing that we should deliver safe water, become the most water efficient 
region and deliver our services at a price customers are willing to pay, able to 
pay and give attractive return.” (B1DT) 
Organisation C, in its written response, is the only Case that does not openly discuss 
customers, customer experience or valuing the customers. The response given 
focuses on meeting regulatory objective, financing and preparing for possible 
privatisation. Figure 5.4 depicts the frequency that customer experience is discussed 
across all actors.  
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It is unclear what impact the change to “customer focus” has on the management 
culture within the organisations in terms of risk management and the protection of 
public health.  
 
The drive for efficiency targets  
Conversations with actors involved in the study suggested that more priority may be 
put on achieving efficiency targets (including OPA) rather than fully appreciating the 
risks and mitigating them (Figures 5.5 and 5.6). The efficiency targets, where they 
exist are driven by the financial regulators and in response to the limits on finances 
(Section 5.5.2). The drive for efficiency is lead from the top and appears to be a 
pervasive within the management culture of Cases A, B and C, which are either 
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privatised (B and C) or public incentivised to behave like privatised organisations (A) 
(Section 4.4.2). 
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Regulators raised concerns that the drive for efficiency targets had unintended 
consequences for the overall management of significant operational risk. The 
following examples illustrate this point; 
“I think there is a very big focus in terms of OPA in terms of performance 
coming from the Water Industry Commission, seems to be the lead driver and 
that is obviously only a small number of water quality parameters versus the 
bigger picture of the regulations as a whole.” (A7RT) 
OPA (Figure 5.6) has been highlighted previously by Directors of Organisation A (See 
Section 4.4.2) and was a principle focus for Organisation A from OPA`s introduction. 
While the OPA figures improved from 2004 to 2014 (the OPA figure went from 162 to 
397). The drinking water quality regulator has concerns that the water quality 
element of OPA did not articulate the full range of risks to drinking water compliance. 
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In Phase II Case A continued to emphasis OPA but directors from Cases B and E also 
referred to OPA. When efficiency targets are included Case C is brought into the 
group of organisations concerned with efficiency targets and there is a slightly 
broader spread of comments from Cases B and E. The regulator observed: 
“What I have seen since I have been here is there seems to be a focus on 
regulatory failures in very small zones that can have a big impact in score and I 
have been quoted that if we have a failure of that in that zone it effects the 
OPA by some many points, whereas I tend to look at it and say well actually 
you have had five chloroform failures in this supply area, but it is not raising 
any alarm bells anywhere, because it is a big zone, so it is probably sitting 
there at 98% compliance.” (A6RT) 
The regulator suggests that the OPA calculations may mask some underlying risk not 
picked up by the water service provider. The implication is that significant public 
health risk is missed as the organisation strives to meet regulatory efficiency targets. 
The list of codes are subjective and qualitative in nature, however, it  is clear that 
there is a shift towards a domination of terms such as “target driven” and “Strategy 
Planning” as well as “trade-offs” and “risk, operations and investment”. The 
qualitative analysis of this limited number of interviews suggests “tone at the top” 
leans towards a target driven culture. Risk management and long term planning, 
while noted as a strategic business priority (Section 5.5.1) appear to be a secondary 
and of lesser importance compared to financing  (Section 5.5.2). The drive for 
efficiency is reflected in the literature (Parker, 1999; Saal and Parker, 2001; Abbott, 
2009) and, as discussed in Chapter 2, the efficiency performance calculations do not 
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necessarily take into account water quality improvements and/or underlying risks 
within the water systems.  
The culture of reactive management 
The strategic plans of the water service providers (Section 5.5.1) pointed to 
aspirations around the protection of public health and the environment. Many of the 
Directors emphasised the importance of long term planning (Table 5.10) with a total 
of 93 coded references across all transcribed interviews. Yet many of the actors felt 
that day to day decision making was driven by reactive management: 
“Rather than taking a balanced approach we react to those situations in a way which 
is disproportionate to the level of risk” B1DT 
And; 
“We tend to employ, certainly on the front line, people who are fire fighters rather 
than fire marshals.” B2MT 
And; 
“We’re only barely able to come above water and meet our regulations.” E2DT 
And; 
“it’s actually been fixing failures, so there is a big cultural shift to go from a company 
that is about fixing things that are broke to being a company that identifies things 
that might break and deals with them in advance.” A6MT 
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All these quotes are reflected in a frequency of coding at 65 (Table 5.10). The coding 
frequency is broken down by actor in Figure 5.7. 
 
There is a spread of references across all of the Participating organisations with Cases 
A and B having the greatest number of actors refer to reactive management. Director 
B1 mentions reactive management with the greatest frequency. Meeting regulatory 
targets within financial boundaries influences reactive management behaviour as 
explained by Director B1: 
“Where I struggle is that very often when cost pressures hit or we have an immediate 
problem we’ll tend to merge into response to that which is in excess of what is actually 
required because we’re very much influenced by our public perception of the 
organisation or by the threat of regulatory penalties.” B1DT 
194 
 
And; 
“Which obviously diverts resource away from areas where we might be at greater risk 
but which are less visible to our customers or investments at a strategic level within 
the business.” B1DT 
Director B1 makes the point that reacting to hear and now issues distracts from 
managing risks and diverts valuable resources from delivering the strategic plan; yet 
reactive management pervades many of the organisations involved in this study. 
What can be seen (Section 5.5.1 and 5.5.2) is that regulation and ownership 
arrangements provide a range of frameworks (OPA, charging mechanisms, etc) which 
influence the degree to which reactive management is adopted within organisations.  
Summary 
Customer experience, the drive for efficiency, reactive management appear to be 
features embedded in the management culture of the Cases of this study. Where the 
management culture “can be characterised as a set of behaviours that been 
deliberately encouraged by management with the purpose of delivering the corporate 
objectives.” (Section 1.3.3). As discussed in this section (5.5.3) the drive for efficiency 
is linked to decisions about financing, charging mechanism and political influence. 
Creating efficient services is s strategic objective of most water service providers 
(Saal. et al, 2007; Ruester and Zschille, 2010) but does not always take into account 
incidents, quality improvement or longer term sustainability which means more 
breakdowns of the system are possible leading to a greater requirement for reactive 
management and “Fire fighting”. In some cases (Case study E, Section 5.5.2) strategic 
objective such as pipe replacement are unfunded by the governing body which leaves 
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the business no choice but to act reactively (in this case to pipe bursts). Some actors 
noted that the activity related to reactive management is a distraction from what can 
be more serious risks that need attention (Quote of Actor B1DT above). Water service 
providers would benefit from promoting management cultures that are more focused 
on planning and pro-active management of risks, with a change of focus to emphasise 
the protection of public health more. 
5.5.4 Risk Management 
Risk management is the central issue of this thesis (Chapter 1 and 2). Accountability 
for risk management varies between and within the participating organisations of this 
study. Figure 5.8 (a, b and c) plot the frequencies of a range of codes split between 
the various actor groups (Directors, Managers and Regulators). 
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The code frequencies in the collated in Figures 5.8 (a),(b) and (c) together with the 
detailed comments of the actors were interpreted with regulators raised concerns 
with the weaknesses and lack of attention to ongoing risks, mitigation or risks and the 
application of suitable intervention. All of the board level responses discuss risk 
management and governance processes in detail, with the exception of Case D, who`s 
written response said; 
“Risk management culture in [Case D] is between levels 2 and 3 of maturity: 
risk management is well engrained in the culture of some processes 
/departments, but there is still the need to move to a more integrated level.” 
(D1DW) 
The response from Case D was limited and they did not provide any further evidence 
to support their statement that the organisation is between level 2 and 3 of maturity. 
The boards articulate the risk management structures and processes within their 
organisations. As the conversation moves down through the organisations subtle 
changes are noted in the importance that actors place on the strategic objectives and 
approaches to risk management. 
For example, the risk manager in Case C feels that, while risk management is taken 
seriously, the focus is on the cost to the business rather than a more holistic view. 
“I think it’s taken quite seriously at operational level in the organisation, 
people understand what it is. They’ve been through the workshops, they 
understand the risk register is not meant to be just ticking the boxes. It’s a list 
of what I’m worried about, basically. Most of them understand that. At 
executive level it’s a bit more difficult because they generally see the risks just 
in terms of their financial impact, “okay, how much is it going to cost me? 
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You’re talking about this risk and that risk, tell me how much it’s going to 
cost.” So it’s a bit more difficult to make sure that they understand there are 
different aspects. You have reputation, you have environmental 
consequences.” (C1MT) 
Cases B, who are also private, note that; 
“Well, basically what we have is central function of which I’m part, which has 
an analytics function. It’s not a very big team, there’s only three or four of us. 
What we do is we’re like guarding the conscious of our risk process. And we 
work with every leadership team, both providing training and support to all 
our leadership teams. So what we do is we run workshops and monthly 
sessions to review risk, but we’ll do dedicated bespoke training as well. And 
during that strategic risk process, we’ll also review how we’re doing against 
our risk policies. The board have signed up to stated risk policies in our 
corporate performance manual that states that all managing directors shall do 
this, and it literally states what the process is. But they are ultimately 
responsible for managing risk in their business. We effectively are a second line 
of defence and audit a third line of defence.” B1MT 
With both these privatised companies the maturity of risk management appears 
better than in some of the public authorities, for example; 
“I do worry about the kind of drivers and objective settings they set the way 
that the business runs, it is almost like the law of unintended consequences, 
you set a target and you don’t mean for someone to put the blinkers on and 
just aim for that target, but that’s what happens and it causes two or three 
different problems for other people elsewhere or it’s priorities the short term 
over the long term and I think we need to become more aware of what we are 
doing when we are target setting, I don’t think we always take that into 
account.” (A1MT) 
and 
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“We don’t know what our starting position is particularly, so we can guess 
where we think we are, but we don’t actually know where we are at the 
moment, and we know where we would like to get to, to where our residual 
risk is ideally, but we don’t know whether that’s where our appetite is.” 
(A1MT) 
Taken with evidence in Sections 5.5.1 through to 5.5.3, it appears that risk 
management processes are adopted but the ranking of risks (public health, 
environmental and operational) are lower than financial risk nodes (Figures 5.2 and 
5.3). Middle management within utilities play a critical role in ensuring that risks are 
managed appropriately within the organisation through roll out of appropriate 
training, allocation of resources, monitoring compliance and reporting on near 
misses, events and incidents. In most cases middle management have a range of 
competing demands to contend with and have limited time. The focus at this level of 
the hierarchy within the business tends to be time bound to the financial year, 
compared to directors and senior managers that may take a longer term strategic 
view of the company. Delivering on performance targets set around financial, quality 
and operability metrics tend to be set as the most important priority. Within that 
context, risk management will take a “back seat” to “in the moment business 
priorities”. In the organisations where the middle managers were interviewed it was 
noted many (if not all) are under pressure to ensure that they, and the organisation 
they represent, achieve success in reducing costs which is perceived as value for 
customers.  
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“I would say there is a kind of tension created by the drive for efficiencies and 
cutting costs, it means we stop doing things that we should rather than be 
necessarily efficient, so in some cases we don’t comply.” (A3MT) 
The responses from some interviewees indicated a reluctance to escalate risks (in the 
sense of highlighting or drawing them to the attention of colleagues and superiors), as 
the perception is that this would be seen as a risk to success and would lead to some 
degree of personal loss (reputational or financial in most cases).   
“We try get things fixed quickly before they need escalating but sometimes we leave 
reporting failure too late”. A10OF 
And; 
“Often we just work around the problems rather than escalate them. Raising issues 
leads to blame, even if it`s not your fault.” A11OF 
And;  
“The operators get hauled over the coals when things fail, so we avoid reporting issues 
when it`s easier to just get on and fix them.” B5OF 
Some critical current risks may not get escalated and may lead to a genuine failure in 
the organisation’s operating system that could impact on the utility’s ability to protect 
public health. This type of avoidance behaviour will also prevent, or at the very least 
slow down, a pervasive risk management culture within the organisation. The risk 
managers interviewed also found it difficult to get sufficient time with middle 
management to review the risks within their part of the business. The review of 
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detailed risk registers was largely seen as a “chore” amongst the management 
population. In order to keep risk management alive and relevant, risk managers 
should consider promoting process improvement and identifying opportunities that 
provide competitive advantage for the organisation. This suggests that, in the reality 
of day to day management, finances come before managing operational and public 
health risks. 
Those working at the operational level were fully focused on current risks. In other 
words, the risks live within their operational remit. For example, aging membranes, 
sensor failures, treatment systems that were showing signs of wear (these are 
classified as the risk mitigation barriers of a multi-barrier system). In most cases, the 
operators did not use or recognise the corporate risk language and did not talk 
explicitly about risk. The examples given tended towards technical or engineering 
problems that, if not addressed, could lead to system failure.  
“We have a number of turbidity meters that do not work, this has been reported but 
nothing gets done.” B5OF 
And; 
“We have been asking to get new pH probes and chlorine meters but no one listens. 
We have had to set up local agreements to get what we need, by-passing the 
corporate purchasing systems, to get what we need.” A10OF 
The operators interviewed understood the impact and implications of a system failure 
for the treatment works under their charge. In general, operators were fully aware of 
the escalation protocol for emerging process risks. In some cases, escalation was 
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delayed because the operator felt they could rectify the failure before it became 
more serious and there was evidence to suggest that the individuals did not want to 
let the organisation or their customers down. The result of this failure to escalate 
quickly has resulted in many cases of treatment failure that could have been avoided. 
Figure 5.9 is a representation of some of the observations made from the interviews, 
and highlights the types of risk conversations that happen within the different levels 
of the water utilities involved in the study. 
 
 
Figure 5.9: Risk conversations within a utility 
 
 
 
 
CEO
Board
Audit Committee
Senior Management
Local Management
Operations staff
Time limits, detail and 
consequence influence 
what is discussed on 
risk. This also tends to 
be residual risk rather 
than current risk.
More discussions and challenge 
at this level. Common language 
used together with defined 
process.
Corporate language used and 
partially understood. Some 
personal consequence to raising 
risk.
Corporate risk language not 
used. Local terminology more 
evident. Risks not escalated due 
to personal pride, resource 
limitations or personal 
consequences. Operators 
manage current risks.
Common Themes include:
Time pressure.
Impact on individual.
Resource availability.
Experience.
Different language used at 
different operational levels 
within the hierarchy.
203 
 
5.5.5 Politics, ownership arrangements, regulation and risk 
The analysis and discussion of the interview out-put and review of company 
documents has, up until now, centred on the ownership arrangements and risk 
management approaches taken within a variety of regulatory frameworks (North 
America and Europe). In the section the debate moves on to political influence on 
ownership arrangements, risk and regulation so that the interplay between these 
elements can be further understood. 
As explained in Chapter 2 the debate over ownership arrangements for water utilities 
has been going on for many decades (Parker, 2012, Ruester and Zschille, 2010) and 
there are a wide range of ownership arrangements from publically owned utilities (for 
example Scottish Water) through to Private (English and Welsh companies) with a 
range of other arrangements in between (mutualisation, municipal, public private 
partnership, etc.)(Chapter 2). In each case the ownership arrangements have been set 
by political process that has been influenced typically by factors such as societal need, 
short term release of capital, drive for efficiency and water quality improvements. 
The political structure and the “will” of the people set the direction for many social 
services (health, education, transport, infrastructure, etc) and water services is very 
much one of these priorities. Privatisation of water, at its core, is a very contentious 
issue (unlike some other industries, mining, telecoms, electricity, etc) in that it is 
required to sustain life and it occupies a natural monopoly status (Parker, 1999, 
Parker and Sewell, 1988). However, when water service provision remains in the 
public sector it is open to an increased influence by the political establishment which 
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may introduce risk through lack of investment due to public sector limits on finance 
and/or access to capital markets (Section 5.5.2) or indeed when there is a need for 
political parties to seek votes and focus on other spending priorities (Section 4.4 and 
5.5.1). The opposite of this is that a private water company can restrict access to 
water services to individuals who may not be able to pay the charges; the companies 
need to ensure a return to shareholders and this may lead to under investment and 
short term planning (less than five years).   
Decentralised regulatory frameworks are becoming more common (Gunningham, 
2002; Haines, 2011) as financial pressures on governments drive them to seek cost 
reductions within government at the same time as trying to reduce “red tape” in 
regulation for businesses. This contributes to the movement of regulation centrally 
out into more regional space and places the burden of risk cost back into the 
community or organisation (Gunningham, 2002). In addition to national government 
action, many water services have in fact evolved at a local level (for example Case E) 
and there is quite a push back on centralised control from the local governance 
groups. In the case of Case E, the regulator explains: 
“The federal government has no mandated role in the provision of water service in the 
provinces of the territories.  The reason for that is it is set out in the constitutional acts 
which sets out what the provinces are responsible for and what the federal 
government is responsible for, so the federal government is responsible for things like 
foreign policy, for the maintenance of the armed services, for provision of the high 
level courts, so the supreme court or [Case E] Country, that sort of thing.” E6RT 
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And; 
“It is a confederation so the provinces, rather more than the services, the provinces 
are considered to be autonomous.”E6RT 
Within Case E`s regulatory framework there are multiple government departments 
that are accountable for water regulation and this can lead to confusion and tensions:  
“One of the major tensions I find is in [Case E]`s area is you have two regulatory 
parties, the department of environment and the department of health, and the 
differences in mandate between those two departments can cause some tension in 
terms of what’s driving what. The health act typically trumps the environment act, but 
that’s only where there’s an immediate health risk.” E5RT 
And; 
“There’s always a little bit of tension between the municipalities and the water system 
operators on are we applying the legislation equally. Now, we do our best to work 
around that but where you have a large number of people dealing with drinking water 
sometimes that can be a bit of an issue.” E5RT 
These smaller decentralised systems are often operated by individuals who have 
multiple jobs and/or are part of the political establishment or governance system. 
These multiple accountabilities can often lead to conflict and risk: 
“What you might hear is [municipality A] was issued a boil order advising but 
[municipality B] was not, under what they believe are the same conditions. So we do 
our very best to try to work with our medical officers at health and work with their 
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health inspectors to minimise that, but that is definitely something that causes a bit of 
contention that we have to deal with. And then where there’s contention sometimes 
they go to their political advisors and it can end up being a political issue.” E5RT 
And; 
“Fear of issuing a boil order. Sometimes, this is where we get the smaller politics, a 
mayor might tell the water operator “don’t call health, we don’t ever want to have to 
issue an advisory unless it’s necessary. Oh, it’s not really a big issue, so don’t call 
health.” Where our perspective is call us and we’ll let you know whether or not. We’re 
the ones that can do a risk assessment, so we’ll let you know.” E5RT 
And; 
“Often times they call we don’t have to issue and advisory, but it’s just a bit of fear of 
having an advisory issued. And again it comes back to when they have an advisory on, 
the municipality or mayor might find there’ll be a lack of confidence in the public in 
their water supply systems.” E5RT 
This is very different to regulatory systems operating in Case A and B`s area where the 
regulators are largely independent of the political establishment and risk are reported 
by independent Public Health teams within the business. Risk would be reported at 
two levels; An event which could be classified as a near miss (for example treatment 
is in operation but the alarms have been deactivated); or an incident which may be 
classed as a failure (for example disinfection had failed).  In the case of Case A and B 
the regulators would audit and inspect the business proactively and seek out 
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potential risks. The regulators would check the Water Safety Plans as part of the 
exercise: 
“I have been really impressed with the audits I have been on so far with the knowledge 
and commitment the operators” A8RT 
And; 
“ I think they probably have an awareness of what safety plans are, but in terms of 
how that relates to their day job, I think there is still a kind of disconnect there” A9RT 
Political decisions around centralised or decentralised regulation will drive behaviours 
around risk management. The evidence here corroborates the observations of 
Gunningham (2002) and Haines (2011) in that while centralised command and control 
regulation is not the ideal solution, too much autonomy at a local level will not 
support effective regulation. The examples given by Cases A, B and E suggest that 
regulators should be independent of political influence, have sufficient powers of 
enforcement and be pro-actively auditing and checking operational practise.  
The elicited responses also suggest political influence may be contained at a local 
level and/or change the operating principles of larger organisations very quickly and 
unintentionally. Whither at the local level or at a regional or state level, unexpected 
change through political process can have a significant impact on the risk profile of 
the organisation and the actors interviewed were very aware of the political 
influences and this is reflected in the frequency of coding on this issue (Figure 5.10).  
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Taking the example of Case A, the political owner decided to hold customer charges in 
2011 which was counter to the existing regulatory contract (Section 4.5 and Section 
5.5.2). The risk manager of the organisation observed the sudden change to the 
financial stability of the organisation: 
“I think then you get the kind of other key risks are probably around the 
financial, so the inability to meet our finance and requirements, whether it be 
bad debt, whether it be borrowing, whether it be revenue streams, or the fact 
that we have no other source of getting money other than the customer and 
the government at the moment, that might be a high risk for us going forward 
given the political and economic environment.” (A1MT) 
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The same actor observed: 
“Similarly, recently we have been dragged into conversations which I don’t 
think we would naturally assist in those conversations, so we have had 
examples where a company that we use is having financial difficulties and 
because that company is sitting in a constituency of a senior politician, all of a 
sudden we are being dragged into conversations in order to keep a particular 
company alive, whereas, we would maybe be looking to protect our interests 
to go to a second or third party in order to ensure the continuity of the service 
that that customer provides us, all of a sudden we are being asked not to do 
that, and again that’s an uncomfortable position to be put in for any company, 
there is certain situations like that.” (A1MT) 
Some of the senior management and directors understand the political impact on the 
business; 
“I think the bigger problem for us as a company operating in public ownership 
arrangements is of being constrained by public pay policies because we are 
actually being regulated in a comparative world to private sector, we're not 
able to shall we say offer the same terms and conditions and incentives that 
maybe the private sector can offer.” (A4MT) 
And; 
“There are reputational risks for us in all of that as well, because we have very 
clear objectives laid on the business, and that’s the ministerial direction with 
regard to objectives in the regulatory price review period is an obligation on 
210 
 
the Directors of [Case A], that is quite a difference to the privatised companies, 
who can make I think, a little bit more freedom to make choices of what they 
deliver and when.” (A2DT) 
The same is true for other organisations. 
“The context of [Case D]`s reality is as follows: [Case D] is a self-funding 
company; one regulator sets out the performance objectives but these are for 
benchmarking purposes only (no fines or similar are set if the performance 
objectives are not met); another regulator approves the tariffs. In other words, 
the regulatory priorities set out by the regulators (acceptable increase in the 
tariffs justified by the achievement of good performance indicators) have no 
direct link with the funding model.” (D1DW) 
And at a small local level politics can have a more personal impact; 
“Generally, if the official falls out with [Case E]`s officials they get sacked.  It’s 
like going back to the 1950’s in the United Kingdom, if you think outside of X, Y 
and Z, all the wee towns that have their own drinking water systems now 
somehow tried to deal with the local authority, or rural farms is another 
example, probably a better example, where there is outsiders, where you have 
got the big multi-nationals, it’s the municipality that is responsible for 
everything.” (E1RT) 
This can be compared to the two predominantly privatised companies looked to 
manage the relationships with the political and regulatory stakeholders. 
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“There’s a lot of tensions there, that exist between different facets of the 
organisation and different accountabilities for the relationship with various 
stakeholders. A lot of the external stakeholder management including financial 
regulations, we have a single director of finance regulation who has 
accountability for maintaining stakeholder relationships with a number of key 
stakeholders. Obviously regulatory stakeholders are managed by the 
regulation team, although mainly the economic regulator.” (B2DT) 
At a global scale some organisations work positively within a range of political 
environments, delivering best practise: 
“And OFWat has recognised that and there’s a lot of talk now about tot-ex, 
total expenditure, where I think operating costs are going to be a lot more 
scrutinised and a lot more taken into account in the overall mix. So you won’t 
have “free” capital expenditure. So that’s our second big area, is on capital 
delivery, but particularly looking at how we can help water companies with the 
tot-ex challenge. And the third area is around smart networks which is in 
Shanghai, actually, part of Shanghai, [Case C] has built a water distribution 
network which is using the latest monitoring technology and you can more or 
less tell where every litre of water goes in the network. It’s sort of like a real-
time analysis of your network.” (C1DT) 
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Summary 
Politics does influence regulation and ownership arrangements. The qualitative 
evidence suggests that perhaps both political influence and ownership arrangements 
of water utilities can act favourably together but at the same time it is easy to build in 
unwanted risk if short term and/or local priorities are placed ahead of sustainability 
and public health accountabilities. It is likely that public ownership arrangements of 
water utilities will be successful if political interaction is limited. Regulation should 
also be independent of politics (Parker, 2012 and Section 5.5.5) with the remit very 
well defined (Gunningham 2002 and Section 5.5.5). Privatised models may drive short 
term efficiency gains under some operational and geographical conditions however 
they may put shareholder value ahead of longer term sustainable investment in 
infrastructure priorities. Privatised companies may well have access to capital which 
enables them to invest in innovation (for example smart networks in the example 
above).  
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Chapter 6: Discussion 
6.1 Introduction  
Chapter 6 discusses the outputs and learning from the case studies presented in 
Chapters 4 and 5 together with the insights gained through the literature review. A 
synthesis of the evidence provides the basis for improving understanding of the 
interplay between regulation, ownership arrangements and management culture and 
their influence on approaches to risk management. 
An exploration of the literature landscape (Chapter 2) exposed a richness in studies 
whose primary focus was the effectiveness and efficiency of water service providers 
(Richardson et al., 1992, McGuinness and Thomas, 1997, Bakker, 2003a) with many 
seeking to understand the merits of ownership arrangement variations on the 
efficiency of service delivery (Parker, 1997, Parker, 1999, Saal and Parker, 2001, 
Renzetti and Dupont, 2003, Renzetti and Dupont, 2004, Ruester and Zschille, 2010).   
This is understandable given the broader public debate on the wisdom and benefits of 
privatised water services. The review identified that few had considered the impact of 
regulation, ownership arrangements and management culture on risk management. 
Other literatures examined the influence of regulation on risk perception and 
management (Haines, 2011b), which have recognized and articulated a rich landscape 
of influences on risk environments and management response preferences. 
Additional contributions in this area have sought to benchmark risk management 
capability within the international water utility sector (MacGillivray et al., 2006; 
2007a,b; 2008) and exploring operational antecedents  of good risk governance in the 
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sector (Hrudey et al., 2006; Summerill et al.,2010a,b). This thesis contributes to these 
findings through developing a qualitative understanding of the priorities of 
executives, middle management and operators who manage and enact risk 
management processes. The study revealed that there were changes to the risk 
language and conversation within the business and between organisations that 
operate under different regulation and ownership arrangements (Section 5.5.4).  
6.2 Discussion of Phase I findings 
Phase I comprised of a limited set of interviews with a number of actors who hold 
strategically important roles in Organisation A and the regulators office.  The 
transcripts were analysed using methodology described in Section 3.10. Table 4.3 lists 
some of quotes (relevant to the coding themes) and the coding frequencies for each 
group of actors. 
Funding (Sections 4.4.1 – 4.4.3) and politics (Sections 4.4.2 and 4.4.3) are themes 
which reoccur through the interviews.  Both funding and politics are intrinsically 
linked to ownership (Section 4.4.3) and as discussed in Chapters 1 and 2. There has 
been a great deal of interest in the relative efficiencies of public sector operated 
water organisations compared to their privately operated equivalents (Braadbaart, 
2002, Bel and Warner, 2008, Gonzalez-Gómez and García-Rubio, 2008, Abbott and 
Cohen, 2009). Other contributions (Parker, 2003, Renzetti and Dupont, 2004, 
Chenoweth, 2004, Dassler et al., 2006, Saal et al., 2007, Martínez-Espiñeira et al., 
2009, Walter et al., 2009, García-Rubio et al., 2010) debated the merits of 
privatisation and many of these studies came to the conclusion that there was no 
215 
 
clear trend in efficiency improvement when it was related to ownership 
arrangements. There were various reasons reported for this such as geography, age of 
assets, raw water quality variations and the fact that water services were considered 
natural monopolies (Rodriguez, 2004, Ruester and Zschille, 2010). Yet the 
respondents of organisation point to incentives (Section 4.4.2) designed to enact 
behaviours of those seen in “an equity owned company” A002.  
Post the 2008 banking crisis, many countries are operating under austerity measures 
which imply reduced spending on public services. The constraints on capital and the 
cost of regulation influenced a move away from centralised command and control 
regulation (Gunningham, 2002) together with the political “Currency of votes” A002 is 
influencing politicians` decisions to reduce red tape, reduce regulatory resources and 
push the burden of managing risk back into industry (Gunningham, 2002, Haines, 
2011).  The additional risk management considerations for business may move them 
towards their risk tolerance (Section 1.7.4) threshold without the time or opportunity 
to apply appropriate risk management systems. 
 In organisation A`s case this lead to the political decision in 2011 to overrule the price 
setting in the regulatory contract (section 4.5) influencing investment choices 
mentioned by the regulator (Section 4.4.3) and the other actors (Sections 4.4.1 to 
4.4.3). The shock changes to cash availability will have an instantaneous effect on the 
risk tolerance (section 1.7.4) of the business. In the case of Organisation A, an £80m 
shortfall (Section 4.5) will reduce the risk tolerance by this amount and bring the risk 
appetite (Section 1.7.4) closer to the tolerance value. The consequences are that the 
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business is more cash constrained and need to deselect investments in projects and 
operational activity which have the potential to increase operational risk and risk to 
public health and the environment (Section 4.4.2 and 4.4.3). This is further discussed 
in Chapter 6.  
In Organisation A`s case, public ownership has advantages in being able to plan 
investments and risk mitigation measures (Section 4.4.2) but political decision making 
(Sections 4.4.1 to 4.5) and management incentives (Section 4.4.2) lead to reactive 
decisions and choices that conflict with regulatory objectives (Sections 4.4.1 to 4.4.3).  
Phase I of this study, while limited to one principle organisation, has exposed a 
number of qualitative elements which are significant to the actors involved in 
delivering and regulating water services. These include: 
 Sustainable financing of the service. 
 Political decisions which cause material changes to financing resulting in 
reactive action and risks to investment and operation, leading to a higher than 
planned exposure of risk to public health.  
 Decisions leading to shock reduction in capital will reduce the business` risk 
tolerance. 
 The regulator sees some activity around water safety planning (WSP) (Section 
4.4.4) and wants to see more alignment between WSP and investment choices 
going forward.   
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Table 6.1: Summary of Interview themes and perceived importance to respondents 
Primary Code Sub-Code
Number of 
References 
(n)
Example Statement
Number of 
References 
(n)
Example Statement
Number of 
References 
(n)
Example Statement
Collaborative 6
There are many other ambitions that are determined 
through discussion with Organisation A and the 
regulator and generally consensus. (Section 4.4.1)
4
the commission is saying to us: 'Now right, Organisation A, 
you go and own and develop a strategy, you put forward 
your plans and your propositions, you put forward your 
assessment of how you can improve service and how you 
can improve efficiency.” (Section 4.4.1)
4
In my view organisation A's ambition for its customers 
coming through stronger rather than just being there 
to do what we're told, let someone else interpret. 
We're now actually trying to influence and shape the 
impact of regulations (Section 4.4.1)
Objectives 5
Some of the organisations ambitions and approaches 
are very clearly defined by regulatory objectives. 
(Section 4.4.1) 7
Arguably the only reason Organisation A came into being 
was because of regulatory objectives. (Section 4.4.1)
6
I think the first four to possibly eight years of our 
existence right up to 2010 a lot of our ambitions were 
actually shaped by regulatory objectives. (Section 
4.4.1)
Political 9
I do find the endless political debate over 
Organisation A`s future fairly unhelpful.  I mean 
we’re seeing it in this current election in the 
manifesto, the future of Organisation A and the way 
it’s funded is endlessly debated.  We are starting to 
see Organisation A valued for the good company it is 
and in the potential of Organisation A being seen.  All 
these questions over its future can only serve to 
make that harder I think to realise the benefits. 
(Section 4.4.3)  
11
the ownership model for us inevitably brings politics 
pretty close to where we’re at and the political debate 
around success or failure.  I think you’ve seen an example 
in Northern Ireland over the winter 2010/11 winter when 
Northern Ireland got into some difficulties, that the form 
of ownership immediately made that a very political issue 
for them.  (Section 4.4.2)
10
if the ministers shrink the size of the investment 
program, how many of the things that fall out of the 
program or objectives will affect the delivery of the 
Organisation A`s vision? Now, one assumption might 
be that they can delay some of the statutory programs 
but it's more likely that the ministers will delay the 
discretionary stuff like pressure for customers etc. 
which will give us a reputational problem with our 
customers given that that's our highest priority. 
(Section 4.4.3)
Incentives 10
in Organisation A things are much more pigeon holed 
financially and things need to be agreed well in 
advance for future investment periods.  If that 
money hasn’t been set aside for a particular project 
then it gives Organisation A great difficulty.  So there 
are times when we will use enforcement notices or 
the threat of prosecution to bring about the 
improvements we want but historically that has quite 
often been at the expense of another project rather 
than just the money being absorbed by the business. 
(Section 4.4.2)
11
we don’t have the explicit equity incentives, but we have 
tried to mirror the incentive properties of an equity 
owned company that would apply to the managers of an 
equity owned company in the sense that we’ve got quite 
significant personal incentives in place for the sort of top 
40 senior people in the business who can typically add 
anywhere between 25-50+% to their base enumeration 
through the achievement of demanding performance 
targets. (Section 4.4.2)
9
I think where the public and the private sector differ, 
certainly in the UK, we have in Organisation A, 
because we're in the public sector, much more 
reputational incentive than we would perhaps have in 
the private sector with private shareholders. One of 
the things that drives us as well as the sort of stated 
incentives in the regime is the number of complaints 
in the minister's mail box, (Section 4.4.2) 
Shareholders 0 No Response 4
Regulators normally say that actually public sector, within 
the public sector model you can't mimic the shareholder 
pressure and it's very hard for us to comment on that 
because we haven't felt the shareholder pressure but the 
incentives within both industries are broadly aligned in 
terms of what's got to be achieved for customers and 
what's got to be achieved for compliance and from a 
compliance point of view, what's got to be achieved for 
the environment or for drinking water. (Section 4.4.2)
2
I think actually shareholder models drive short-
termism and quick returns and as a consequence I 
think there are merits in public sector ownership that 
don't exist in private sector and probably there are 
merits in private sector that don't exist in public and 
probably by bringing economic regulation to our 
ownership model, we are trying to mirror some of the 
benefits of the private sector model within a public 
sector environment. (Section 4.4.2)
Funding 11
the key difference is with the investment side of 
things.  In a PLC there seems to be more flexibility or 
I perceive there to be more flexibility in terms of 
funding arrangements.  If the regulator says 
something needs to be done then the money is 
found. (Section 4.4.2)  
9
We had a specific target to achieve by 2005/06, the last 
year of that first regulatory period. And it almost felt in 
the business that there was no future beyond 2005/06, it 
was could we get to the OPEXs target for that particular 
year and initially that looked very, very daunting. So the 
whole focus of business was one, to achieve OPEXs target 
set by the regulator, but two, it was, even from mind-set 
angle, it was set on this regulatory period, there was no 
sense of the business beyond 2006. (Section 4.4.1) 
7
I'm not sure it's a form of ownership that is as 
important as how the company is financed or it's 
available access to financing. I think you should look 
at the models in England and Wales of privatisation. 
That was purely around securing capital from the 
markets to invest in large enhancement programs. 
(Section 4.4.2)
Process 9
I think in terms of churning out water safety plans as 
an exercise in project management, Organisation A`s 
done an excellent job, a really excellent job and 
we’ve nearly got our full complement of plans.  But I 
think in terms of actually producing something that 
was meaningful in terms of protecting, well 
identifying risks to water quality and protecting 
consumers I think the early plans were somewhat 
lacking. (Section 4.4.4)  
11
I think we are a business that is very strong on governance. 
I'm not saying that there aren't areas that are maybe under-
governed but generally we have a very strong governance 
framework from board down, real clarity on who is 
accountable, the board, what gets handled through the 
board, committees of order and remuneration, what's 
delegated to the executive team, to functional director 
and then down through the management ranks. (Section 
4.4.5)
8
I should say we look at both risk and opportunity, but 
we do look at the risks that we're running, we look at 
the impact that they might have and we look at the 
likelihood that they might come up. We do that at the 
corporate level we do that for each directorate and 
we do that for the big processes and the big project 
across the business. (Section 4.4.4)
Decision Making 7
I think we’re all very keen to move away from the 
failure driven compartmentalised drivers that have 
been used in the past to drive investment to 
something that’s better thought out where different 
risks are evaluated against each other. (Section 4.4.4)
9
You do start to put an indicative level of value against an 
emerging risk and you track it closely to the point at which 
you would want to build it into your LBE, Latest Best 
Estimate, of value of the programme.  Once you get past 
that emerging stage we deal with risk in the capital 
programme at three levels. (Section 4.4.4)
10
we do some Monte Carlo simulations and everything 
else around that that eventually comes out with a 
view that what numbers are the eighty percent 
probability of it costing less or twenty percent 
probability of it costing less and what number have 
we bid (Section 4.4.4)
Accountability 6
The buy-in from particularly local asset planners has 
grown.  I think there’s still some work to do in the 
accessibility of the plans but they’re aware that the 
water safety plan is the way to secure investment to 
address water quality risks. (Section 4.4.4)  12
There’s a good degree of governance around that and sign 
off by operational colleagues as well as by people in my 
team at the time of saying we’ve concluded on a particular 
type of asset to be built to solve this problem.  We then 
proceed with that project. (Section 4.4.4) 5
And I think we confuse governance and management, 
instead of the start. I think we've   created far too 
many steering groups and control groups that actually 
get in the way of people doing their job but they've 
become a crutch to people and if you remove them 
now people will think they're being hung out to dry or 
something daft like that which, it would be the 
intended but it could be the unintended consequence 
(section 4.4.5)
Economic 7
Organisation A can’t possibly deliver everything that 
it needs to deliver well in any financial climate really.  
Consequently Organisation A has to make some quite 
tough decisions between, equally valid spending 
areas, areas requiring funding. (Section 4.4.3)  11
Business risk of securing our revenue which is a little bit 
harder now with business separation and with a retail set 
up in the wholesale world which is about £300 million of 
our income per year not under our direct control.  It has 
caused us an issue in the year just ended where the 
wholesale revenue was less than we’d budgeted for in the 
year.  There’s no regulatory recourse on that, that’s a risk 
that we take. (Section 4.4.3)
9
I think one of the biggest risks that we have at this 
point is whether the government will continue to 
lend to us. The government have already withdrawn 
the ability for us to borrow for the 2011/12 year. It has 
committed to lending to us to the full extent set out 
in the final determination over the 11-15 period, but 
just not in the 2011/12 year. So that means that the 
140 million that was due to be lent to us this year is 
deferred. (Section 4.4.3) 
Political 12
 I would actually have political interference down 
there as well.  It’s something I’ve seen first-hand in 
dealing with the bursts over the winter period.  The 
government certainly the current encumbrance are 
very keen to be seen to be actively managing issues. 
(Section 4.4.3)
12
We have an owner in the Organisation A whose currency 
of value is different to that of private shareholders. 
Private shareholders primary motivations is the 
maintenance and growth of the value of their investment 
in the water company. Typically investors into water 
companies are looking for a reasonably low risk but 
predictable return from their investment. Our shareholder 
in the Government, the thing that matters most to them is 
the currency of votes. (4.4.3)
11
we have an operational sort of satisfactory 
relationship with the government and actually 
continuing to have the freedom to operate even 
though we are within the public sector and that 
means a lot to us. So it's actually, it drives certain 
decisions, it drives behaviours because we want to 
make sure that reputationally we don't lose any 
ground with the government or with the customers 
that much which would then drive back to complaints 
with the minister. (Section 4.4.2)
Public Health 14
The regulator will try and push Organisation A much 
more to own its own risks on water quality rather 
than waiting for the regulator to come and tap them 
on the shoulder and say “Look, this needs something 
doing about it.” (Section 4.4.3)  
5
The most obvious risk is the risk of failing to provide a 
continuous supply of water that is fit for human 
consumption. As a business there is providing a product 
that is relatively continually ingested by customers right 
across the country, from many hundreds of different water 
sources and treatment plants. We are required to make 
sure that water is fit for consumption at all times (Section 
4.4.3)
0 No Response
Governance
Risk Management
Regulator Directors Managers
Regulation
Ownership
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6.3 Discussion of Phase II findings 
The Phase II activity highlighted that ownership arrangements, regulation and 
management culture do influence risk management activities (Section 5.5) in a 
number of ways. Explicitly the choices made by the political, institutional or 
governance bodies will impact on the financial stability of the water utility by altering 
charging mechanisms and access to borrowing (Section 5.5.2 and 4.4). This will enable 
or impede (dependant on the aspirational capital program, assets condition, number 
and scale of assets and operational interventions). Political influence can act to 
support or impede the sustainability of the water utility (Section 5.5.5) as can private 
ownership arrangements (5.5.2). What is perhaps important is the leadership 
capability of the water utility in managing the complex array of external influences on 
the organisations ability to protect public health by sustaining drinking water and 
waste water services (both quality and quantity) (Section 5.5.3).  The organisation 
should be mindful of the leadership choices that will help inform, determine and, as a 
consequence, manage the risks facing the business (Section 5.5.3 and Section 5.5.4). 
Risk management will be enhanced if all personnel within the water utility are clear 
on the meaning implied in risk conversations (Section 5.5.4) and are fully engaged in 
designing and implementing the risk mitigation measures. Water service providers 
strategic, regulatory and political objectives are centred around provision of safe 
drinking water and protection of public health, however, the rankings and importance 
placed on operational and public health risks are lower compared to financial risk 
(Section 5.5.2). There is a disconnect between what is laid out in the strategic 
business plans and what is delivered on the ground by managers on a day to day 
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basis. While risk management processes exist there is little evidence to suggest that 
risk mitigation measures have been costed and that risk has been properly ranked 
within the context of the operability of the water service providers (Section 5.5.4). 
6.4 Regulation and risk management 
Water service providers aspire to deliver safe drinking water and sanitation (Section 
2.2) with regulation providing a national or local framework for delivery of water 
services (Pollard, 2008). The outcome of the literature review recognised that the 
majority of studies pointed to a lack of consensus around regulation of water services, 
noting variations on geography, social and political views as possible influencing 
factors (Bakker, 2003a; Cubbin and Stern, 2004; Reuster and Zschille, 2010). Financial 
factors also influenced choices in terms of central command and control regulation 
versus devolved local regulation (Haines, 2011; Gunningham, 2007). It was noted that 
regulatory frameworks influence risks to service and efficiency of operation (Reuster 
and Zschille, 2010; Parker, 1999). 
The initial question in the interview designed for the Phase I case study sought to 
understand how the regulation influenced the objectives and ambition of the 
organisation while validating the organisational approach to regulation (Table 3.3). In 
Phase I, regulation was influential in defining the water service provision model 
(Section 4.4.1) where the regulator pointed out that the water service provider`s 
(Organisation A) ambition and activities are defined by regulation. There was clearly 
some discussion between Organisation A and the regulators to define targets but the 
directors and managers both felt that the organisation was planning to go beyond the 
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regulations in terms of improvements to water quality, operational efficiency and 
customer experience. The introduction of OPA drove greater ambition within 
Organisation A to make efficiencies (in terms of reduced costs) and the regulator had 
concerns that the organisation would over look some basic quality issues. As one 
director said “the whole focus of the business in 2006 to 2010 suddenly changed from: 
“yes we need to become more efficient but actually all about improving our customer 
services measured by OPA”. This sudden shift in management behaviour did not 
appear to take into account the risks to water quality as highlighted by the regulator 
in the Phase II discussion (Section 5.5.3).  
In Phase II (Case Study E) raised concerns that the regulators were not independent 
enough and there was evidence of some political pressure to not report failures 
(Section 5.5.5). The regulation of water in Case Study E`s country is decentralised, 
multi-sector and administered by a number of independently operating departments. 
The difficulties in enforcing the regulations and, as a consequence, the risks to public 
health suggest that accountability and independence of the regulator needs to be 
very well defined. The regulators need to have independence and the ability to 
enforce regulation if risk management measures are to be effective.  
The case studies supported the literature (Parker, 2000; Saal and Parker, 2001; Saal 
and Reis, 2004; Renzettie and Dupont, 2010) suggesting that efficiency targets were 
the focus  of water service providers driven by regulation (Gunningham 2007; Haines, 
2011) with risks to the regulators authority when devolved to a regional or local level 
(Gunningham, 2007, Baldwin, 2012).  
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While some regulatory frameworks are developed to define the economics of 
operation and capital investment (Pollard, 2008), attention needs to be paid to the 
consequences for water quality and safe sanitation (Hrudey, et al, 2006). The output 
from Chapters 4 and 5 suggests that regulation for water services needs to be defined 
and costed on the water quality and sanitation challenges, if risks are to be managed 
appropriately. Regulators may consider defining service targets which have an 
emphasis on water safety planning (WHO, 2004) which informs the financial 
requirements. This should improve opportunities for effective risk management. The 
principle focus on efficiency was a feature that re-occurred when considering 
ownership arrangements (Section 6.4). 
6.5 Ownership and risk management 
The economic performance of a variation in ownership arrangements is widely 
debated   (Richardson, et al., 1992; McGuinness and Thomas, 1997; Bakker, 2003a, 
Saal, 2007; Renzetti and Dupont, 2003). Few of these studies took into account the 
consequences for risk management.  Arguably, the principle objectives of the water 
service provider are the delivery or safe drinking water and sanitation (Section 1 and 
2.2). The WSP approach (discussed in Section 2.1) provides a mechanism to 
identifying and mitigating risk within a water system. Importance is placed on risk 
management interventions supporting delivery of safe water and sanitation (Pollard, 
2008; Davidson and Deere, 2005; Hrudey, 2001).  The actors associated with 
Organisation A were asked questions to validate their understanding of the risk 
strategy within the organisation (Table 3.3) to determine how important WSP was to 
ensuring day to day delivery of safe water. The introduction of incentives for senior 
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managers, promoting “private sector” behaviours is not reflected in the body of 
research (Chapter 2), which suggests public sector and private sector organisations 
perform equally well (Renzetti and Dupont, 2003; Dore et al., 2004, Bel and Warner, 
2008; Ruester and Zchille, 2010). Other studies  (Saal and Parker, 2001; Saal and Reid, 
2004; and Saal et.al, 2007) point to factors such as price caps, raw water quality and 
water services occupying a natural monopoly position as factors influencing the 
effectiveness of the water service provider, rather than ownership (Section 2.3).  A 
range of ownership arrangements were considered (Section 5.4). Table 6.2 
summarises the ownership arrangements of the participating organisations. 
Table 6.2 Ownership arrangements of the case study candidates 
Country of Case Ownership 
arrangements 
Services Covered Regulatory Framework 
United Kingdom Public ownership 
arrangements 
Water and Waste 
Water: Assets owned 
and operated. 
Local Regulation based 
on EU Directives. 
United Kingdom Private ownership 
arrangements 
Water and Waste 
Water: Assets owned 
and operated. 
Local Regulation based 
on EU Directives. 
France Private ownership 
arrangements 
Water and Waste 
Water: Assets operated 
but not owned. 
Multi-national company 
operating in a number 
of countries with a 
range or regulatory 
frameworks. 
Portugal Public ownership 
arrangements 
Water: Assets owned 
and operated. 
Local Regulation based 
on EU Directives. 
Canada Public ownership 
arrangements 
Energy, Water and 
Waste Water: Assets 
owned and operated. 
Provincial Regulations 
aligned to Federal Law. 
 
The case studies provided a range of ownership arrangements and services that 
operated under a variety of regulatory frameworks. The variation of ownership 
arrangements offers an insight into the potentially different approaches to risk 
management associated with delivering core water and waste water services.  
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The review of the business plans highlighted that, regardless of ownership 
arrangements, there were aspirational strategic objectives centred around water 
quality improvement, customer experience and environmental stewardship (Section 
5.4 and 5.5.1). Supporting these objectives were (in the majority of cases) investment 
plans that had a range of time horizons from annual to five years (Section 5.5.1).  The 
balance between financing operations, capital investment and capital maintenance 
varied between organisations and was limited by the institutions ability to raise funds 
through customer tariffs, government borrowings and/or capital markets. The value 
of “cash in the bank” or reserves varied greatly (Tables 5.4 to 5.8) and this monetary 
amount, when taken in the context of the number of assets that the organisation 
requires to operate, give some insight into the risk tolerance that the can be borne by 
the institutions. The risk tolerance here (as described in Section 1.7.4) is taken to 
mean the organisations financial capacity to bear the cost of a risk or risks without 
going bankrupt or needing a bail out from an institute or government and excludes 
difficult to measure psychological aspects of risk tolerance and appetite. Most of the 
Cases in the study only presented aspirational risk appetite statements (more 
psychological in nature) which included reference to causing no harm to human 
health or the environment.  The issue for the water service providers is that there is 
no evidence to suggest that they have costed out a range of scenarios for various 
operational risks (Section 5.4-5.6), all of which may cost substantive amounts of 
money to resolve reactively and put stress on capital reserves irrespective of risk 
appetite statements (Section 5.5.2). It would be to the water service providers 
advantage to invest some resource into fully costing out the impact of risk on the 
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financial capacity of the organisation, removing in the first instance at least, the more 
psychological elements of risk impact. It is the access to capital reserves which is a 
principle differentiating factor of ownership arrangements (Table 5.12). By 
considering the investment of capital as a solution to mitigating the primary risks of 
public health and environment the organisations will start to priorities risks that are 
more in-line with the aspirations laid out in their business strategies (Section 5.5.1). 
The more epistemic (and psychological) aspects of risk appetite/tolerance can then be 
layered upon a baseline measured set of values for risk appetite and tolerance.  
6.6 Management culture and risk management 
The influence of risk management culture on risk management strategy has been a 
consideration within previous bodies of work (Macgillivray et al., 2006; Pollard, 2008; 
Summerill et al., 2010b) and is of interest to this study (Chapters 1&2). Competing 
demands on staff within organisations leads to prioritisation of objectives (Section 
2.4). In Phase I and Phase II, the actors were asked to comment on the priority given 
to risk management within the context of competing business objectives (Table 3.3 
and 3.4).  
Section 2.4 discussed some of the behaviours, cultural features (Johnson, 1992; Drew 
and Kendrick, 2005; Baumgarter, 2009; Rizak and Hrudey, 2007) and interplays 
between governance, regulation and risk (Laeven and Levine, 2009). Studies such as 
McKenna and Martin-Smith (2005) emphasised the importance of leadership in 
decision making when operating within organisations that have complex adaptive 
systems and domains of high uncertainty (Tetenbaum and Laurence, 2011). The 
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conversation with the actors sought to establish the appropriateness of the risk 
management processes/governance (and leadership) of risk management required to 
ensure the delivery of safe water and sanitation within the stewardship of 
Organisation A (Table 3.3). 
Regardless of regulation, ownership arrangements, politics and other influences; 
ultimately it is individuals who make choices within the boundaries of a set of 
parameters that lead to the success or failure of a business. Of importance here is the 
clarity of vision and the leadership messages (George et al., 1999, Chatman and 
Eunyoung Cha, 2003, Furash, 2003, Bal, 2008, Baumgartner, 2009, Bacon, 2010). 
Irrespective of regulation and ownership arrangements, if the leadership do not see 
risk management as important then the staff (and therefore the culture) will not 
embrace risk management principles. The evidence from the case studies suggests 
that the majority of board members and senior managers see risk management as an 
important feature of business decision making (Section 5.5.4). however staff`s 
interpretation of “risk” within the organisation may differ and some evidence 
suggests that target driven organisations see risk management as yet another box to 
tick rather than risk management being part of a wider decision making strategy 
(Section 5.5.4).  Some evidence suggests that within organisations there are a range 
of views on how successful risk management is applied and in some occasions 
managers confuse meetings with good governance (Section 4.4.5). 
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6.7 Summary 
The case study evidence suggests that regulators need to be independent of political 
influence and control if they are to deliver the appropriate incentives to drive the 
water service providers to protect public health and the environment. Ownership 
arrangements when considered with financing of services influence management 
culture. The more common behaviours of water service providers (Evidenced in Case 
Studies A,B and E) suggest a reactive management culture which is promoted through 
limits on financing and therefore efficiency targets delivered through reductions in 
resources (normally staff reductions).  Case Study E presented evidence (Section 
5.5.2) which suggested that the income generated through customer charges was 
significantly lower than the cost of the service per cubic meter. Case Study A and E 
highlighted tariff setting and, in particular, keeping customer charges as low as 
possible, as being a significant political driver.  Customer charges should be set 
independently to ensure service levels are achieved and risks within the water 
systems are appropriately managed. 
Figure 6.1 applies the learning from the case study work to the study framework 
developed in Chapter 2.   
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Overall the research supported the literature by confirming: 
 Performance (efficiency) of the water service provider is not dependent upon 
ownership arrangements (Section 5.4, 5.5.2) supporting, for example,  
Renzetti and Dupont (2003, 2004) and Reuster and Zschille (2010). 
 Water safety planning and risk management is not embedded within the 
water sector as it should be (Section 5.5.4) supporting MacGillivray et al. 
(2006, 2007, 2008) and Summerill et al. (2010a,b). 
 Decentralised command and control regulation is becoming more common 
(for example Case E) but too much local autonomy without empowered 
independent regulation will lead to public health risk (Section 5.5.5) 
supporting Gunningham (2002) and Haines (2011). 
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In addition to the confirmatory evidence, the study exposed a number of feature that 
need to be considered, improved upon or changed significantly to improve risk 
management within the water sector: 
 Charging mechanisms and financing need to be based on strategic investment 
plans and, once agreed, need to be free from political intervention. Overtime 
investment to improve system reliance will reduce failure and reactive 
management action. Ultimately this will save money and secure public health 
protection. (Section 5.5) 
 Regulators need to be independent and empowered to enact. Collaboration 
with water service providers should be encouraged. Regulatory objectives 
need to be fine-tuned and the dominant position of the financial regulators 
(for example Case A) needs to be aligned to the principle purposes of the 
water company (protection of public health and the environment) (Section 
5.5.2 and 5.5.3). 
 Attention needs to be paid to the risk conversations within the organisations 
(Section 5.5.4). The executives should make it easier for operational staff to 
report risk rather than the current status quo where operators are potentially 
penalised (Section 5.5.4) for reporting and escalating risk. More time needs to 
be given to meaningful risk conversations. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusions and recommendations 
Chapter 7 proposes a simple reporting mechanism articulating the consequences of 
financial choices on operational and public health risks (Section 7.3).  The conclusions 
and recommendations of the study provide insights that will be useful to policy 
makers, risk managers and senior executives who have a desire to improve the 
effectiveness of risk management thinking within their organisations irrespective of 
ownership arrangements or regulatory frameworks. Further work needs to be done to 
develop a framework which recognises the significance of public health and 
operational risks in the context of water service provision. The evidence presented in 
Section 5.5 exposes the need to remove political influence from the risk management 
process and regulatory decision making. This supports the views of Parker (2012) 
where he suggests that regulatory frameworks should operate at arm’s length from 
politics. Setting the charging mechanism more effectively and sustaining finances to 
deliver planned investment will allow, or at least support, a move to a more resilient 
water supply system. This in turn will reduce the number of operational failures and 
elevate the need for reactive management. Evidence presented from Case E further 
support Gunningham (2002) and Parker (2012) by suggesting that too much local 
control over regulation and ownership/operation of services can lead to failure. The 
evidence suggests that embedding risk management would be best supported by 
empowered independent regulators working with autonomous water service 
providers that had longer term strategic investment plans based on water safety plan 
outputs, appropriately costed.  
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This may seem obvious but many countries do not have empowered independent 
regulators (for some examples see Table 1.1) and in Phase II only Cases A and B 
appeared to have operating environments closest to having empowered regulators 
and financed investment plans (Section 5.5.2). Even Cases A and B still had a 
dominance of reactive management and a drive for efficiency as features of 
management culture (Section 5.5.3) suggesting risk management could be improved. 
This final chapter reviews the contribution that the thesis and research activity has 
made to inform the understanding of the interplay between regulation, ownership 
arrangements and management culture on approaches to risk management. The first 
part of Chapter 7 suggests improvements to risk reporting. The second element of 
Chapter 7 majors on the principle research question and how this prompted and 
exploration of the research landscape which influenced the approach to data 
gathering, analysis and interpretation that developed and adds to existing knowledge. 
The final part of Chapter 7 is a personal reflection and review of the research journey 
taken, the challenges experienced through the process and how these where 
overcame. The final part of the chapter concludes the thesis report by discussing the 
principle findings, the potential implications (and applications) of the research out-put 
as well as identifying some areas of future work. 
7.1 Development of a conceptual framework based on the case study outputs. 
The two parts of the case study work have highlighted a tension between the amount 
of capital available to water utilities and the performance priorities of the stakeholder 
groups (Chapters 4 and 5).  The political influence is critical and smaller publically 
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owned municipal systems appear to be more open to political interference compared 
to independently regulated larger organisations (public or private) (Section 5.5.5). It 
has also been noted that the boards tend to discuss residual risks compared to 
operational teams that focus on technical current risks (Section 5.5.4). Boards are 
focused on discussions around the financial consequences of risk (Section 5.5.2 and 
5.5.4). Respondents inferred that competency of staff was a central issue and that 
more time needed to be spent on understanding the root cause of risks and 
developing improvement plans, rather than seeing the risk management functions 
within the business as an audit function. The study identified that the risk managers 
within the organisation were not fully empowered and would benefit from more 
board engagement, as well as being given the time to fully roll out and support risk 
management within the operational teams. The regulators, in general, highlighted 
financial constraints, staff competence and a change in language around protection of 
public health as influencing factors on risk (in both Chapters 4 and 5). This study 
recognises that the optimum balance of risk management practise will include 
support from empowered independent regulators; prioritised public health risks 
mitigated by meaningful choices of investment.  
Successful risk management strategy will dependent upon the ownership 
arrangements, management culture (and leadership), regulations, funding, efficiency 
and political environment (Allan et al., 2013). Maturity models are needed to 
benchmark performance and identify improvement opportunities (MacGillivray et al., 
2007a, MacGillivray et al., 2007b) and define best practice in risk management for 
water utilities. 
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7.2 The research informing improvements to risk management practise. 
Despite the protection of public health and environment being strategically important 
issues articulated in water service providers business plans (Section 5.4.1), the 
priorities of the water service providers was financing (Section 4.5 and 5.5.2) with risk 
registers highlighting financial risk being scored higher than public health (Figure 5.1).  
There is little doubt that the financial well-being of the organisations needs to be 
sustained to deliver water and wastewater services (Saal and Parker, 2010, Renzetti 
and Dupont, 2003, Renzetti and Dupont, 2004) however financial performance 
measures (Section 5.5.2) and political influence (Section 5.5.5) tend to mean cost 
reduction and profitability (Sections 5.4 and 5.5) rather than investment in securing 
high reliability by investing in resilient managed water systems.  
The implementation of risk management can be improved by: 
 Costing out a range of risk mitigation measures and assessing the quality 
improvements (most cost efficiency calculations don’t take into account 
quality and quantity enhancements (Saal and Parker, 2010). 
 Reporting risk mitigation measures in relation to risk tolerance and risk 
appetite (Section 5.4 and 5.5) that creates a meaningful context within 
organisations and stakeholder groups. Using the measurable rather than 
psychological risk factors as a baseline (Section 1.7.4). 
 Acknowledging that current risks is more relevant to operational staff while 
residual risks are more concerning for executives. In doing so calibrate the 
reporting to be explicit about the nature of risk measured and reported.   
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 Simply improving the quality of risk conversations within the business and 
making time for risk management priorities. 
7.3 Improvements for reporting or risk  
Senior executives understand the importance of risk within the decision making 
process and, in conversation, do acknowledge that more time should be spent 
discussing and reviewing risk. The executives and leaders of these organisations have 
many competing demands on their time which in itself is a risk to the business. The 
more reactive they are the higher the probability of them missing some strategic risk 
priority which could be catastrophic to their business. When executives to review the 
risk register it appears to be a dreaded task or chore rather than a vital part of the 
decision making process. It may be advisable for risk managers to take a look at how 
risks are presented to boards. As highlighted in Section 5.5.2 directors are very 
interested in the financial consequences of risk which indicates, to some extent at 
least, that they are really discussing the risk impact relative to the risk tolerance of 
the organisation. It may be appropriate for risk managers to present risks in a way 
which demonstrate the financial implications of risk in relation to the risk tolerance 
value. The presentation should also include factors such as reputational impact and 
personal impact on directors. Figure 7.1 is a representation of how risk managers 
could present risks in a more compelling way to senior management that allows them 
to see the financial impact of risks. By representing risk impact in a visual way it may 
get more buy in from leadership teams and help to make risk management more 
relevant and consistent at all levels in the business. The visualisation of risk impact 
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could also be used to explain the impact of decisions to stakeholders outside the 
business. 
 
The representation in Figure 7.1 could be applied to an individual risk, or a number of 
risks could be aggregated to give a very clear picture of risk impact. This can be 
adapted to financial impact or some other metric, for example water quality 
parameters set in the regulations. The point here is that a visual representation of risk 
impact could be understood by many operational teams within a business and gives a 
common understanding of how close the organisation is to financial or legal 
operational limits (measured parameters rather than psychological components). 
These diagrams could be easily constructed based on available company data and 
would provide one set of tools that helps support improving pervasive risk 
management and ensuring that risk management is seen as a leadership issue. Figure  
7.1 is a representation of an elevated view of risk appetite in relation to risk tolerance 
at any chosen point in time along the x-axis of Figure 1.2 (Figure 7.2) and could 
235 
 
represents the current or future predicted risk profile of a business, department or 
project. 
 
A consistent theme throughout the investigation was the actors` concerns over 
financing, affordability and charging mechanisms (Section 5.5.2).There appears to be 
a need to develop a reporting standard which represents the components of the 
financial consequences of risk and in particular, the stress that risk costs place on the 
risk tolerance (Section 1.7.4) of the business. At the same time there is a need to 
represent data that can be easily understood by all actors within an organisation in a 
way that is relevant to them, particularly looking at risks at a local, regional or 
corporate or project level. A standard visual report should support pervasive risk 
management, with greater buy-in, at all levels within a business. Figure 7.1 can be 
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used to represent, in very simple but explicit terms, how close an organisations 
finances are to the risk tolerance value. The diagram can easily represent individual 
projects, business units or treatment systems. Equally the finances can be aggregated 
to represent directorates, business units or the overall financial position of the 
organisation.  A more detailed analysis can be conducted so that decision makers can 
make informed choices. Figure 7.3 is a representation of a real budget from Case A. 
The business unit, operational activities and investment choices have been 
anonymised. The proposed interventions have been costed accurately and confirmed 
by the financial department of Case A. The numbers have been converted into the 
“waterfall diagram”. The increases in cost have been colour coded in blue with 
decreases in cost colour coded in wine. The diagram gives a visual representation of a 
“spend to save” investment, where some additional funding is required to reduce 
ongoing operational cost, resulting in an lower overall cost to the business and 
ultimately the tax payer (in this case). 
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Figure 7.3: A representation of the impact on operational cost of various investment choices. 
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This approach to representing the movement of total costs (TOTEX) should be easy to 
quantify for the majority of water service providers as many of them (if not all) have 
very sophisticated financial accounting systems that allocated costs to operational 
cost codes and project codes. In many cases the cost codes can be analysed across 
supply types (Chemicals, energy, staff costs, etc) and/or departments, activities and 
projects. The cost information can be analysed by department or section right up to 
directorate, division or organisation. The costs of failure of treatment, in many cases, 
is captured as a specific activity (some organisations, for example Cases A and B, 
capture treatment failure costs under an emergency financial code). It is possible to 
calculate the costs of failure at individual small works right through to large scale 
works. This financial analysis does not take into account other more psychological 
risks such as reputational risks or political risks, but these could be layered on once 
the financial risks were calculated. For example, If the political decision is made to cap 
customer charges (as happened in Case A in 2011, Section 4.5, 5.5.3 and 5.5.5) then 
the financial analysis and risk diagram would give the politicians and water utility a 
common view of the financial impact of the decision and the potential consequences 
to operability of treatment. Similarly the analysis could inform the impact on 
reputation as treatment failure from lack of investment could result in community 
illness and/or fatalities. These additional risks (and impacts) could be explicit in a 
commentary that accompanies the financial report.  Figure 7.4 represents a 
constructed report that could be presented to a range of stakeholders, giving them a 
common understanding of financial risk. 
239 
 
 
Figure 7.4: A possible simple representation of the changes to the financial impact of risk with investment. 
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Figure 7.4 is simplistic but has high visual impact. The circular representation in the 
bottom left hand corner represents a financial position that is close to the risk 
appetite for the activity being reported. The diagram implies that the risk appetite 
might be exceeded but the risk tolerance will not be breached. As the impact of the 
interventions in the graph move across to the right hand of the diagram, the circular 
diagram in the bottom right hand of the picture shows an improvement in financial 
position and a reduction in threat to breaching the risk appetite value. In representing 
planned changes in this way, board members (and other stakeholders) can get a 
single view of the interventions planned and the overall impact of the proposed 
changes on the financial wellbeing of that element (or all elements) of the business 
being examined.  
The report lends itself to representing a range of scenarios which would be of 
importance when building a business case for investment.  This methodological 
approach could be used to build cost profiles for water safety plans, where multiple 
investments in treatment systems may be required to mitigate the risk to public 
health. In doing so, it would be clear to investors, how much investment is required 
and what financial benefits could be realised in reducing reactive interventions when 
treatment fails.   
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7.4 Answering the research question 
The research question developed in Chapter 2 is: 
 
 
The research activity (Chapters 4 and 5) was built to investigate the research question 
and revealed a number of features of regulation, ownership arrangements and 
management culture that influence risk management including: 
 Regulation, ownership arrangements influence and define financial limits for 
water and wastewater services. The constraints of financing are of greatest 
concern to the majority of actors participating in this study (Sections 4.5 and 
5.5.2).  
 Political intervention may overrule regulation (Section 5.5.5). Water and 
wastewater services would be best supported by independent empowered 
regulators working with water service providers that operate under a 
regulatory contract that is at arm’s length from politics (Chapter 5). 
 Privatised companies (Cases B and C) may choose to sell strategic assets (Case 
C) which will improve the financial well-being of the organisation and de-risk 
the operations but may increase national risk by selling strategic assets 
(Section 5.4 and 5.5.2).  
 Policy informs regulation, ownership arrangements, financing and investment 
choices which drive management culture towards efficiency targets and 
reactive management (Section 5.5.1, 5.5.3, 5.5.5). Culturally this limits the 
How do the specifics of regulation, ownership and management culture influence 
risk management choices for water service providers? 
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time that executives, managers and operators have to spend on risk 
management activities and conversations.   
There is still a need to re-evaluate the priority given to public health risks and financial 
risks. Here, the thesis recognises the need to achieve consensus on tools for tracking 
uncertainty and develop consistent processes for the reporting and implementation 
of risk management throughout a utility. Furthermore there is a need to build on 
previous work and develop novel ways to ensure that the board are fully engaged in 
the risk management conversations and that the output of these discussions are 
relevant to all levels of employee within the business. A critical component in this 
(identified by our interviewees) is the need to create the sufficient priority and time 
for risk management conversations that lead to improvement action within the 
organisation (Section 5.5), coupled with a need to present compelling evidence of the 
impact of risk and intervention in a way that is easily understood through-out the 
business and by other stakeholders. There is a need to ensure that both regulators 
and water service providers can operate independently from political intervention 
(Section 5.5.5) and Parker (2012).  
While risk itself can be both desirable and undesirable (influenced by the nature of 
risk and the impact vs the reward) it was noted that within the water industry the 
general organisational position tended towards being risk adverse. Here, this is taken 
to mean there was a desire to reduce the exposure of risk in a broad sense within the 
water sector service providers. Maturity in risk management will promote a planned 
approach and strategic plan to deploy capital in a way which adds resilience to the 
utility, this has a higher probability of shifting the business actively towards pro-active 
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and adaptive risk management. Again regulation, ownership arrangements and the 
management culture have influence over the utilities approach to risk management. 
The output of the literature review therefore informed the principle elements of the 
research activity which included consideration of: 
 Regulatory and governance structures 
 Financing water services 
 Ownership arrangements 
 Management culture 
 
The research activity was then designed to explore the interplay of the elements 
listed above. Chapter 3 outlines the methodology used to develop an approach to a 
two stage research activity. The principle methodology was qualitative in nature and 
sought to explore the views and experiences of a range of actors that deliver or 
regulate water services in a selection of countries that have adopted different 
ownership arrangements and/or regulatory frameworks (or instruments).  
The research agenda was broken down into two phase where Phase I (Chapter 4) was 
designed to test the output and observations made from the research proposal and 
literature review. The Phase I activity also acted as a way to test and check the 
principle researchers technique and quality of output before investment was made in 
a more substantive interview exercise across multiple international organisations. 
Phase II (Chapter 5) built on the output of the literature review and Phase I. The 
method was modified (Section 5.3) to take into account the learning from Chapter 2 
and 4.  
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Chapters 4 through 6 describe in detail, the findings of the case study activities which 
confirms that interplay between ownership arrangements, regulation and 
management culture do inform choices made about risk management. The analysis 
highlighted that financing is a major area of concern for executives and while this is 
expressed in a number of ways there are consistent messages about availability of 
funds; agreement (or lack of agreement) on the priority for spend; the impact of the 
change to funding routes on the financial stability of the organisation (in other words 
the impact on the risk tolerance (Section 1.7.4) value of the business). The evidence 
presented (Section 5.5.1) revealed tensions between the aspirations of the strategic 
business plans (public health comes first) and the risk management priorities 
(finances come first). The analysis highlighted that within organisations the context 
and language of risk within the business as debate moves from strategic discussions 
to operational risk (Section 5.5.4). Boards discuss residual risks compared to 
operators who discuss current risk and are concerned with short term operational 
interventions (Section 5.5.4). The challenge for the risk professional is to recognise 
the variation in conversation and ensure that there is consistency in the meaning of 
risk types that are relevant to the organisation. Chapter 6 offers some simple 
suggestions for reporting the financial impacts of decisions that may alter the 
business` ability to manage the impact of risks (in this context risk refers to 
operational risk and impact may be a treatment failure or distribution failure).  
The analysis conducted in Phase II highlighted that all cases, regardless of ownership 
arrangements or regulation aspired to deliver clean safe water within the financial 
limits of their capability and ensure no detriment to the environment (Section 5.5.1).  
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The strategy adopted by each organisation varied in terms of investment planning 
horizon, number of customers served, geographical area, staff numbers and value of 
investment (which included a range of splits between capital investment and capital 
maintenance) (Section 5.4). 
The analysis re-enforced the importance of “tone at the top” when considering the 
implementation of risk management (Section 6.5). It is important for the leadership 
teams to engage with risk management discussions in a meaningful way and ensure 
that the risk management professionals within their business have sufficient gravitas 
to ensure that risk management is embedded into the management culture.  If 
managing risk is seen as an important feature of business as usual activity, then it is 
likely that it will become pervasive within the business and lead to more mature risk 
management approaches that will ultimately protect public health and increase trust 
and confidence in the water service provider. 
This study was designed to explore the interplay between regulation, ownership 
arrangements and management culture (Chapter 1, 2 and Section 2.6) in order to 
better understand the effect that these elements have on risk management choices. 
This is of importance to risk managers and professionals who want to know what 
makes risk management “stick” within organisations.  
This research has informed understanding of the tensions that exist between water 
service providers and regulators together with tensions that are present within 
organisations when there is competition between what action needs to be taken to 
deliver clean safe drinking water and the financing available to support investment in 
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infrastructure. Culturally many business leaders take comfort, perhaps unwisely, in 
the existence of detailed processes and meeting structure to manage risk, in contrast,  
risk managers sometimes feel unsupported or not empowered to drive in risk 
management thinking within an organisation. This may be, in part, down to unclear 
definitions and changes in risk language used through the organisations; where at a 
board level they mainly focus on residual risk and the financial consequence of risk 
rather than current risk; compared to operators who have a day to day concern with 
current risks that will impact on live operations.  
The most significant concern for board members, politician, shareholders and 
regulators is financing arrangements that support service deliver and the choices that 
are then made to invest the limited funds. Multiple tensions exist which effect the 
choices made by decision makes with respect to their relative positions. Politically, 
customer charges must remain low; borrowing to supplement customer charges must 
be available; and in trade-offs must be made between operational expense, capital 
maintenance and capital investment projects. Many of the regulators interviewed 
highlighted concerns with lack of spend on capital maintenance. Actors within 
organisations were not always clear on the priority of spending (Section 5.5.1 and 
5.5.2) and the impact that lack of investment had on the risk appetite and risk 
tolerance of the organisation (Section 5.5.4). In fact many actors saw risk appetite a 
general statement committing them aspirational objectives (considered psychological 
aspects of risk appetite (Section 1.7.4)) to avoid the impact of risk (Section 5.5.4). In 
fact risk appetite and the risk tolerance of the business can be defined (or party 
defined) through financial analysis where the risk tolerance can be taken as the limit 
247 
 
of financial impact an organisation can sustain (Section 1.7.4), as a consequence or 
risk, without going bankrupt. The risk appetite can then be calculated as a quantum 
that provides a monitoring measure (Section 6.4 and 6.5) that acts as a warning signal 
to the business when risk impact occurs. No organisation that was interviewed had 
quantified risk appetite or risk tolerance in this way. In Chapter 6, simple 
representations of risk appetite and risk tolerance are combined with a financial 
profile that contains calculable financial information relating to interventions that 
materially affect the quantifiable risk impact as a financial measure (Figure 6.3). In 
this way it is possible to produce a report (with company data) which articulates the 
impact of risk intervention on the financial limits of the organisation. The model 
presented can be applied to local projects, operational systems and/or aggregated up 
to directorate and organisational level as needed.  The important factor is that the 
model uses easily accessible corporate data.  The report may also be used to inform 
investment choices, political decisions and regulatory approvals; if taken in context 
with the organisations strategic business plan. A representation of the diagram could 
be used to help engage risk owners in the business to ensure they understand the 
financial impact of the choices they make.  
The simplistic report does not include factors such as reputational risk or other types 
of psychological risk impact but, as explained in Chapter 6 (Section 6.3 and 6.4), these 
could be overlaid in commentary report.  
The findings of the investigation demonstrate the complex nature of the interplay 
between regulation, ownership arrangements, management culture and risk 
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management (Chapters 4 and 5); by exploring and expanding on the nature of 
interactions and priorities of the actors within water service providers, regulators and 
other stakeholder groups. While the actors interviewed do state that risk and risk 
management are an important issue (Section 5.5.4), limited time is spent within 
organisations discussing risk. Most of the organisations point to risk management 
controls, processes and governance groups designed to control and monitor risk 
(Section 5.5.4), however, many of the very busy middle and senior managers see little 
value in many of the processes and meeting, citing the level of from filling and 
reporting as something of a chore rather than adding strategic value to the process 
(Section 5.5.4). Risk management is an important factor in managing water utilities 
and time needs to be given over to relevant conversation. 
Regulators also had a range of concern around the priorities of the water companies 
and suggested that capital maintenance was often overlooked (Section 5.5.2). It is 
critical that once commitments are given to the regulator to implement investment 
(improvements or maintenance) these activities happen. If funding changes then 
planned intervention that do not happen should be notified to the regulator for sign 
off (Section 5.5.2 and 5.5.5). Such changes to the programme should have detailed 
risk assessments with them so that the regulator and other stakeholders make an 
informed choice. 
When it comes to ensuring risk management remains relevant (and pervasive) 
regardless of regulation, ownership arrangements or management culture, what is 
important is, clarity on the impact of risk; keeping the message simple and clear; 
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ensuring that quality conversation around risk happens (which means time is given to 
risk management debate); the risk management professionals have gravitas and 
authority within the organisation; and there is not an overreliance on governance or 
process to ensure risks are managed. 
7.5 The research findings and novelty of the project 
This thesis describes the regulatory frameworks, ownership arrangements and 
management cultures across five case studies operating in a number of countries. The 
study explores the interplay between the features of the case studies to first 
understand the approaches to risk management and then offer some insight into how 
risk management can be improved within water service providers and communicated 
to a broader range of stakeholders. The research finding and novelty are summarised 
as follows: 
 The research provides a novel approach to understanding risk management 
within the context of regulation, ownership arrangements and management 
culture which differs from the body of literature (Chapter 2) which majors 
more on efficiency of public versus private ownership.  
 The research is, in part, confirmatory in re-enforcing previous works (for 
example (Saal and Parker, 2001, Bakker, 2003b, Parker, 2003, Renzetti and 
Dupont, 2003, Saal and Parker, 2006, Nauges and van Den Berg, 2010)) that 
financing, efficiency and investment is of primary importance to the leadership 
team within a water utility. 
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 The research identifies a number of social processes and associated cultural 
factors (Chapter 5) that influence organisational priorities of risk management.  
 The research identifies a need for improved board reporting of risk and 
develops a scalable tool which can be used to present measurable financial 
data (TOTEX) in relation to risk appetite and tolerance. The proposed report 
does not include less measurable psychological aspects of risk appetite and 
tolerance (Section 6.3 and 6.4), these can be considered separately. 
 The research supports the literature (Gunningham, 2002, Gouldson et al., 
2009, Parker, 2009, Haines, 2011b, Parker, 2012), confirming that regulation 
needs to be independent and free from political intervention (Section 5.5.5). 
 The research exposes that regardless of the strategic priority of the water 
utility, financing is a critical factor (Section 4.5 and 5.5.2) and that constraints 
in capital will mean less strategic investment and more reactive management 
(Chapter 5). 
 
7.6 Limitations of the study 
The study undertaken included a detailed scoping exercise, an in-depth literature 
review and two phases of case study activity. The case studies covered a number of 
organisation and regulatory regimes across a range of countries. In addition to this a 
vertical approach was adopted where actors at a range of hierarchal positions within 
the organisations were interviewed. Finally the qualitative analysis and coding 
structure was verified by a 3rd party post-doctoral researcher. This multi-dimensional 
approach supported the development of a legitimate qualitative study (Yin, 2009; 
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Silverman, 2011; Creswell, 2009; Neuman, 2003). However the qualitative study does 
have limitations which need to be noted.  
The study is limited to a small group of actors meaning that the extent to which the 
findings can be confidently generalised will be limited. The interviews were conducted 
over a short period of time (approximately 3 months) meaning the study does not 
have a strong longitudinal aspect. Politicians, regulators, regulations and staff within 
organisations change with time. Therefore risk management maturity will progress 
and the concern with, for example financing, will change. The study findings may be 
modified and updated as new regulatory and ownership arrangements are developed. 
The bias of the researcher has been a consideration from the conception of the 
project and has already been reported in Chapter 3 and is of concern. The researcher 
was embedded in Case A for part of the project; this allowed greater access to actors 
within the organisation but the researcher could have been influenced by the actors 
or indeed influence of them. This was in part addressed by third party verification of 
the interview analysis (Chapter 3). 
7.7 Recommendations for further work 
Through the research process, this thesis has sought to develop a better 
understanding of the interplay between regulation, ownership arrangements and 
management culture on risk management. Some interesting elements have been 
noted through the research, such as the type of risk conversations that occur; the 
importance of securing the right access to capital; the potential impact of political 
decision making on the operability of public water companies; and the variation in 
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risk management application across a range of service providers; the different priority 
put on risks; and the different interpretations of risk. It was also clear that the risk 
management professional need to have more gravitas within the organisation, so that 
risk management is seen as an important day to day consideration when considering 
the elements required to successfully managing business operations.  
Some useful commentary has been developed on some of the consistent views of 
actors within the water sector that demonstrate that most see risk management as 
important but believe governance, process and the risk management professionals 
provide safe guards against failure. However other actors (including regulators and 
risk professionals) feel that risk management should go beyond process and 
governance, becoming embedded in the broader decision making process. 
The thesis has made some suggestions for improving risk conversations, delivering 
consistent definitions of risk terminology and providing simple reports that can 
supplement risk conversations by providing a single, easily understood picture. The 
proposed reports can be adapted to cover a range of risks, projects and department 
specific needs. 
Further work could be done to develop the calculations that define the financial risk 
tolerance of an organisation. This is a critical component when assessing the impact 
of risk on the financial well-being of an organisation and should be seen as the value 
that an organisation cannot exceed. Once this is defined then a risk appetite value can 
be more easily established. Financial performance can then be measured against 
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appetite and tolerance where getting close to or exceeding the risk appetite would 
act as a prompt to act.  
Following on from that, more work can be done to develop simple reports that help 
risk management professionals demonstrate the possible impact of decisions on the 
finances of the organisation and ultimately the potential risk profile of the 
organisation, where less tangible risk factors are presented as commentary to 
supplement the reports.   
Risk management professionals need to be fully supported and empowered. Having a 
risk director on the board may be a way of escalating the importance of risk. More 
work could be done to explore a range of tools to be used by the risk professional to 
ensure risk management becomes pervasive and embedded in the organisation. It 
would also be of interest to see how many senior managers responsible for risk 
operate at board level within water companies. 
The research agenda has highlighted some real examples of political decisions that 
have a measurable impact on the financial wellbeing of public utilities (for example, 
the Case study A Government`s decision in 2011 to hold customer charges (Section 
4.5, 5.5.2). The full impact of the decision will not be understood for some time and it 
would be useful to conduct further analysis on the long term outcomes associated 
with such decision on company performance, impact on public health and unintended 
changes to regulatory authority.  
The industry, based on the five selected case studies, appears to be more focused on 
drinking water. From a risk management perspective the water service providers 
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should consider both water and wastewater services in concert as part of the whole 
system. Clean safe drinking water and safe sanitation are both public health 
considerations and risk management should consider all possible risks within these 
systems. This will be of particular importance when considering water systems that 
both receive wastewater effluent discharges and are also used for abstraction of 
drinking water. Further work could be done in this area. 
The researcher’s initial thoughts on risk appetite (Section 1.7.4) were that a different 
approach was needed to quantifying elements of risk which could inform decision 
making between stakeholders. However, the results of Phase I (Chapter 4) and Phase 
II (Chapter 5) forced a reconsideration of the original position (Section 1.7.4) as it 
became evident that the water service providers may use risk appetite as mitigation 
for failure to meet regulatory obligations. The researcher notes that water service 
providers should focus on current risks within their business; spending time planning 
investments to reduce current risks. In doing so, the water service provider will meet 
the regulatory requirements; protect public health and the environment with more 
certainty and confidence. Further work could be done to explore the possibility of 
replacing a focus on risk appetite in favour of more robust risk management aligned 
to systems thinking. 
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Ethics Committee Proposal 
 
Title: Risk challenges in the water industry – the impact of regulation and business 
model choices on the risk profile within the utility. 
Proposal Submitted by: Richard Allan 
Supervisors: Professor Paul Jeffrey and Professor Simon Pollard  
 
Introduction 
 
This PhD thesis is part of Richard Allan’s personal development goals within Scottish Water 
and will meet the requirements of Continued Professional Development. The project is 
sponsored by Scottish Water. 
 
Richard Allan is the Chief Scientist at Scottish Water and reports to the director of asset 
management (Geoff Aitkenhead) with a reporting line to the Chief Executive (Richard 
Ackhroyd). Richard is responsible for Scientific matters within Scottish water that include 
sampling, laboratories and public health related matters. 
 
This thesis sets out to examine how regulation and the ownership arrangements of a water 
utility influence the business decisions made by the organisation in developing strategy to 
achieve the objectives set out in the Bonn Charter. The study will go on to examine the risk 
management strategy adopted by the utilities and look at quantifying the risk (Operational, 
engineering and financial) held within the chosen organisations. The project will conclude 
with an examination of the unintended consequences of the regulations on the delivery of 
the objectives of the Bonn Charter by the water utilities taking part in the study.  
During the study it is the intention to examine the extent to which epistemic and stochastic 
uncertainty is taken into account during key business decisions that influence both the risk 
management strategy and the priority for investment of each utility. In other words how do 
the organisations justify the business priority in the face of the limit of the companies’ 
knowledge, experiences and accumulated data? 
The thesis objectives can be summarised as follows: 
 What are the water companies’ business plan priorities with respect to meeting the 
demands of regulation, owners’ objectives and maintaining operability? 
 What are the risk management strategies of each of the water companies and how 
do these strategies take into account epistemic and stochastic uncertaintyWhat are 
the emerging unintended consequences of the business plan implementation? 
By focusing the thesis on these questions it will be possible to make recommendations that 
will inform the water utility sector on preventative interventions that will better support the 
achievement of the objectives of the Bonn Charter. 
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Method 
 
The questions listed above will be answered using a number of different methods:  
 
1. A survey of (max 20) senior Scottish Water managers (conducted by interview) to 
validate the project proposal and literature review. 
2. A review of the existing and proposed regulations. 
3. A review of water utility ownership arrangements applied across a range of countries. 
4. A review of risk management strategies adopted by a selected representative group 
of utilities. 
5.  A number of surveys (conducted partly direct interview, partly by e-mail, and partly 
using an online survey tool) of individuals working in  a. Water Utilities, b. Water 
Regulators, c. Sector Policy-making bodies. 
6. Analysis of primary data and other data sources using CAQDAS software. 
Study respondents will be middle and senior management / technical staff typically educated 
to degree level. They will be asked questions relating to their work related opinions and 
experiences. This proposal to SEREC relates to components 1 and 5 of the methodology 
outlined above. Snowball sampling will be used for all surveys with initial contacts from the 
researcher’s own professional community.  
Ethical Considerations 
Informed consent and deception 
 
Participation in this study will be voluntary and by invitation only. The research should be 
neutral and unbiased which means that there is a requirement to fully brief the Cases in the 
nature of the study. As an employee of a water utility the principal researcher will need to 
ensure that personal bias and professional opinion do not compromise the validity of the 
project. It is also a requirement that the principal researcher explains their status within the 
water utility to each Case. 
 
Cases will be asked to provide full informed consent (either verbally or in writing) prior to the 
commencement of interviews. Cases will be provided with information on the purpose of the 
study, the information being sought, and how the data will be used, as well as procedures 
undertaken by the researcher to ensure confidentiality. Contact details for the researcher and 
supervisor will also be provided. 
 
The research methodology does not require the use of deception and such techniques will 
not be used during this study. Cases will be fully informed of the purpose and structure of the 
project and provided advance warning of the interview topics several days in advance. 
 
Full disclosure of the researcher’s employer (Scottish Water) and position within the 
organisation (Chief Scientist) will be made as part of the invitation for each interview. This will 
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be information will be included in writing along with the research proposal and the purpose 
of the interview. 
 
The data will not be disclosed to Scottish Water. The data will only be used for the purposes 
of this research project and be available to the researcher and supervisory team. 
 
Freedom of participation 
 
All Cases will be asked to take part on a purely voluntary basis.  At the beginning of each 
interview, the researcher will: 
 
 Verify that participation is on a purely voluntary. 
 Explain the nature of the study and the position the researcher holds within Scottish 
Water. 
 Stress that Cases may decline to answer particular questions if they so wish. 
 Agree not to tape-record the interview, should the Case raise any specific 
reservations. 
 
The attached consent form outlines the key points documented in this proposal and the Case 
will be asked to sign off before the interview takes place. It is also recognised that the 
interviewee has the right to withdraw from the interview at any stage and that they have the 
right to request that their answers are not used as part of the research. 
 
Confidentiality 
 
The only personal data to be collected during this study will be respondent name, job title 
and organisation. The knowledge generated from the study is dependent on relating 
responses to both the role of the respondent and the type of organisation they are located in. 
Consequently, respondents will be asked whether they are happy for their job role, 
organisational affiliation or type of organisation (e.g. regulator / utility) to be mentioned in 
study reporting. This information will only be used in publically accessible outputs with the 
full consent of Cases.  
All recordings, transcripts and interview notes will be stored in accordance with the Data 
Protection Act (1998) and access to the data will be restricted to Richard Allan, Paul Jeffrey 
and Simon Pollard. 
Protection of Cases 
 
Cases will not require any special skill in order to take part in the study and will not be placed 
in any physical or psychological harm due to participation in the research.  
Professional Conduct 
 
The research will be carried out in a professional manner, with respect and consideration to 
all persons involved whether they have participated or not to this study.  The nature of the 
research will be clearly explained in a way that is suiTable and not patronizing to the 
individuals. Case refusal to participate, be recorded using a dictaphone, or be mentioned by 
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name or affiliation in outputs will be accepted in a respectful manner.    Interviews will be 
conducted away from front-line work activities and will not involve any physical danger over 
and above those associated with everyday life. Measures highlighted above to address 
informed consent, freedom of participation, freedom to withdraw and confidentiality will 
minimise the potential for psychological harm or harm to individual careers. 
 
The researchers interview technique will be validated by the supervisor through a control set 
of trail interviews to address any concerns with bias of the researcher. This acknowledges the 
position of the researcher with Scottish Water. 
 
Observation 
 
No observational work will be conducted in this study. If there is an emerging requirement for 
observable experimentation then a supplementary submission to SEREC will be prepared. 
Right to withdraw 
 
Immediately prior to the interview, the researcher will advise Cases of their right to withdraw 
at any stage of the interview process. 
 
Debriefing 
 
Full details of the basis of the research and subsequent analysis will have been provided at 
the outset. Debriefing will be limited to answering any questions that may arise as a result of 
the interview itself, as well as informing Cases of their right to request a summary of the key 
findings of the study once the research is complete (contact details will be provided). 
The researcher will ask the interviewee for permission to contact them for possible follow up 
meetings during the course of the research. The interviewee may wish to receive updates on 
progress of the research, which the researcher will endeavour to provide. 
Control and storage of Raw Data 
The raw data (interview files) will be kept on a secure server and password protected. It is the 
intention to retain the raw data for a period of 1 year after submission of the final thesis. This 
policy will be explained to the interviewee as part of the interview briefing and invitation. 
 
Richard Allan 
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CONSENT FORM FOR PARTICIPATION IN RESEARCH 
(by interview) 
 
Being over the age of 18 years I hereby consent to participate as requested in the letter of 
introduction for the research project on “Risk challenges in the water industry – the impact of 
regulation and business model choices on the risk profile within the utility”. By signing this 
consent form I confirm that; 
1. I have read the information provided. 
2. Details of procedures and any risks have been explained to my satisfaction. 
3. I agree to my information and participation being recorded on tape. 
4. I am aware that I should retain a copy of the Information Sheet and Consent Form for 
future reference. 
5. I understand that: 
 I may not directly benefit from taking part in this research. 
 I am free to withdraw from the project at any time and am free to decline to 
answer particular questions. 
 While the information gained in this study will be published as explained, I will 
not be identified, and individual information will remain confidential. 
 I may ask that the recording be stopped at any time, and that I may withdraw 
at any time from the session or the research without disadvantage. 
 I understand that I may request to withdraw my interview answers even after 
the interview has taken place but before final publication. 
 I understand that the raw data (recordings and documentation) will be kept in 
password protected files in a secure location and that only the principle 
researcher and the supervisory team will have access to the files. 
 I understand that the raw data (recordings and documentation) will be kept for 
up to a year after publication of the final thesis and will be destroyed after this 
time. 
 
 
Case’s signature……………………………………Date…………………... 
 
 
I certify that I have explained the study to the volunteer and consider that she/he understands 
what is involved and freely consents to participation. 
 
Researcher’s name………Richard Allan…………………….……………………. 
 
Researcher’s signature…………………………………..Date……………………. 
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Nodes Number of coding references Number of items coded
Nodes\ \ Management culture\ Target driven\ Customer experience 98 17
Nodes\ \ Management culture\ Accountability 95 16
Nodes\ \ Management culture\ Long term planning 93 19
Nodes\ \ Management culture\ Reactive management 65 13
Nodes\ \ Management culture\ Drivers\ Finance 52 13
Nodes\ \ Management culture\ Short term planning 51 14
Nodes\ \ Management culture\ Target driven\ Efficiency targets 46 12
Nodes\ \ Management culture\ Language of risk 44 15
Nodes\ \ Management culture\ Target driven\ Overall Performance Assesment (OPA) 33 8
Nodes\ \ Management culture\ Drivers\ Public Health 27 11
Nodes\ \ Management culture\ Drivers\ Environment 26 10
Nodes\ \ Management culture\ Risk maturity 24 10
Nodes\ \ Management culture\ Risk taking 24 8
Nodes\ \ Management culture\ Target driven\ Political objectives 23 7
Nodes\ \ Management culture\ Target driven\ Regulatory objectives 23 10
Nodes\ \ Management culture\ Compliance 22 9
Nodes\ \ Management culture\ Centralised control 21 9
Nodes\ \ Management culture\ Drivers\ Regulatory 19 6
Nodes\ \ Management culture\ Drivers\ Service Provision 17 5
Nodes\ \ Management culture\ Drivers\ Water Quality 15 3
Nodes\ \ Management culture\ Ownership of Issues 13 4
Nodes\ \ Management culture\ Reactive management\ Incident management 12 9
Nodes\ \ Management culture\ Drivers\ Health and Safety 10 3
Nodes\ \ Management culture\ Drivers\ Growth 9 2
Nodes\ \ Management culture\ Pro-active operational activity 9 1
Nodes\ \ Management culture\ Dont value data 8 2
Nodes\ \ Management culture\ Drivers\ Politics 6 3
Nodes\ \ Management culture\ Target driven 5 3
Nodes\ \ Management culture\ Internal competition between managers 4 2
Nodes\ \ Management culture\ Management incentives 4 1
Nodes\ \ Management culture\ Task focused 4 4
Nodes\ \ Management culture\ Drivers 3 2
Nodes\ \ Management culture\ Organizational Change 3 1
Nodes\ \ Management culture 2 2
Nodes\ \ Management culture\ Pro-active operational activity\ Critical Mass and Economy of Scale 1 1
Nodes Number of coding references Number of items coded
Nodes\ \ Ownership Arrangements\ Private ownership 46 10
Nodes\ \ Ownership Arrangements\ Public ownership 32 10
Nodes\ \ Ownership Arrangements 14 5
Nodes Number of coding references Number of items coded
Nodes\ \ Public Health 5 3
Nodes Number of coding references Number of items coded
Nodes\ \ Regulation\ Affordability 92 15
Nodes\ \ Regulation\ Charging mechanisims 71 13
Nodes\ \ Regulation\ Tension 62 16
Nodes\ \ Regulation\ De-centralised 27 3
Nodes\ \ Regulation\ Enforcement 23 4
Nodes\ \ Regulation\ Economics of capital investment 22 5
Nodes\ \ Regulation\ Economics of operation 22 13
Nodes\ \ Regulation\ Collaboration 21 11
Nodes\ \ Regulation\ Water quality 18 10
Nodes\ \ Regulation\ Competition 14 5
Nodes\ \ Regulation\ Public health 13 7
Nodes\ \ Regulation\ Regulation influincing risk management and operational practise 11 2
Nodes\ \ Regulation 10 9
Nodes\ \ Regulation\ Regulation improving performance 10 2
Nodes\ \ Regulation\ Drivers\ Reputational 8 5
Nodes\ \ Regulation\ Environment 8 6
Nodes\ \ Regulation\ Cost of implementing regulation 5 2
Nodes\ \ Regulation\ Drivers 4 2
Nodes\ \ Regulation\ Reducing red tape 4 4
Nodes\ \ Regulation\ Going beyond regulation 3 1
Nodes\ \ Regulation\ Trending Data 3 2
Nodes\ \ Regulation\ Mandating systems 2 1
Nodes\ \ Regulation\ Private supplies 2 1
Nodes\ \ Regulation\ Investigating 1 1
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Nodes Number of coding references Number of items coded
Nodes\ \ Risk Management\ Embedding risk management 101 17
Nodes\ \ Risk Management\ Risk management processes 79 15
Nodes\ \ Risk Management\ Engagement 56 13
Nodes\ \ Risk Management\ Maturity of risk management 50 15
Nodes\ \ Risk Management\ Board Engagement 47 8
Nodes\ \ Risk Management\ Leadership 41 13
Nodes\ \ Risk Management\ Risk Governance 39 11
Nodes\ \ Risk Management\ Risk Register 34 8
Nodes\ \ Risk Management\ Risk review meetings 32 6
Nodes\ \ Risk Management\ Asset Investment Planning 31 14
Nodes\ \ Risk Management\ Risk Scoring 26 6
Nodes\ \ Risk Management\ Risk appetite 24 7
Nodes\ \ Risk Management\ Failure to Investigate 16 3
Nodes\ \ Risk Management\ Risk Tolerance 16 6
Nodes\ \ Risk Management\ Trending data 16 3
Nodes\ \ Risk Management\ Monitoring Water Quality 11 3
Nodes\ \ Risk Management\ Barriers to Escallation 10 4
Nodes\ \ Risk Management\ Epistemic risks 8 3
Nodes\ \ Risk Management\ Arduous Task 7 3
Nodes\ \ Risk Management\ Opportunities 6 5
Nodes\ \ Risk Management\ Risk management processes\ Influencing 6 2
Nodes\ \ Risk Management\ Risk management processes\ Implementation internationally 4 1
Nodes\ \ Risk Management 3 1
Nodes\ \ Risk Management\ Broad range of risks 2 1
Nodes\ \ Risk Management\ Risk management processes\ Investigating Complaints 2 1
Nodes\ \ Risk Management\ Risk management seen as an independant activity 2 2
Nodes\ \ Risk Management\ Risk management processes\ Aggregation of risks 1 1
Nodes\ \ Risk Management\ Vigilance 1 1
Nodes Number of coding references Number of items coded
Nodes\ \ Risks to service delivery\ Financing of services 133 19
Nodes\ \ Risks to service delivery\ Political intervention 101 11
Nodes\ \ Risks to service delivery\ Staff competence 45 13
Nodes\ \ Risks to service delivery\ Resource availability 40 7
Nodes\ \ Risks to service delivery\ Staff retention 28 8
Nodes\ \ Risks to service delivery\ Reputational 26 10
Nodes\ \ Risks to service delivery\ Delivering non-core activities 25 7
Nodes\ \ Risks to service delivery\ Financing of services\ Aquisition of capital 22 7
Nodes\ \ Risks to service delivery\ Climate Change 19 8
Nodes\ \ Risks to service delivery\ Operational Risk 19 4
Nodes\ \ Risks to service delivery\ Resiliance 18 9
Nodes\ \ Risks to service delivery\ Asset Investment 17 3
Nodes\ \ Risks to service delivery\ Treatment 16 5
Nodes\ \ Risks to service delivery\ Value of Water 15 3
Nodes\ \ Risks to service delivery\ Financial consequences to customers 9 6
Nodes\ \ Risks to service delivery\ Building competence 7 4
Nodes\ \ Risks to service delivery\ Non-reporting of risks 6 3
Nodes\ \ Risks to service delivery\ Outsourcing 6 1
Nodes\ \ Risks to service delivery\ Political intervention\ Low risk appetite 6 3
Nodes\ \ Risks to service delivery\ Shareholder expectations 6 2
Nodes\ \ Risks to service delivery\ Changes in raw water quality 5 1
Nodes\ \ Risks to service delivery\ Health and safety 3 3
Nodes\ \ Risks to service delivery\ Distraction through change 2 1
Nodes\ \ Risks to service delivery\ Lack of management buy-in 2 2
Nodes\ \ Risks to service delivery\ Internationalisation 1 1
Nodes\ \ Risks to service delivery\ Value of Water\ Occupying a Natural Monopoly 1 1
Nodes Number of coding references Number of items coded
Nodes\ \ Water safety plans 26 10
Nodes\ \ Water safety plans\ Im plementation of water safety plans 55 11
